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Climate change may soon have its "lawmaking moment" in the United
States.  The  inherent problem with such lawmaking moments,  however, is
just that: they are moments.  What Congress and the President do with much
fanfare can quickly  and quietly  slip away in the  ensuing years.  This  is
famously so  for environmental law.  Subsequent legislative amendments, lim-
ited budgets, appropriations  riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive de-
lays in rulemaking, and simple nonenforcement are more than capable of
converting a seemingly uncompromising legal mandate into nothing more
than a symbolic aspirational  statement.  Climate change legislation is espe-
cially vulnerable to being unraveled over time for a variety of reasons, but
especially because of the extent to which it imposes costs on the short term for
the realization  of benefits many decades and sometimes centuries later. To be
successful over the long term, climate change legislation will need to include
institutional  design features that insulate  programmatic  implementation to a
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significant extent from powerful political and economic interests  propelled by
short-term concerns.  Such design features should include a variety of asym-
metric precommitment strategies, which deliberately make it hard (never im-
possible) to  change the  law  in  response to  some kinds  of concerns while
simultaneously providing  avenues  for change in response to other longer term
concerns that are in harmony with the law's central  purpose-to achieve and
maintain greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time.  The  traditional
objection to lawmaking precommitment strategies-that  the present should
not be allowed to bind  future lawmakers-also  has little  force in the climate-
change context, where the purpose of such strategies is not to protect the pre-
sent at the expense of the future, but the precise opposite: to protect the future
at the expense of the present.
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INTRODUCTION
During  the  next four years,  the  new  President,  Barack  Obama,
and the new Congress are expected to join together in the first serious
effort  in  the  United  States  to  enact  sweeping  national  legislation  to
address  global climate  change.  If they are  successful, federal  climate
legislation  will  be  the first major  environmental  protection  law  in al-
most two  decades,  dating back  to the  Clean  Air Act Amendments  of
1990.1  Indeed,  given  the  enormity  of the  undertaking  necessary  to
address  climate change,  the passage  of federal  climate  change legisla-
tion will  rival in  historic significance  one of the  nation's greatest law-
making  moments-the  passage  in  the  1970s  of  a  series  of
extraordinarily  demanding and sweeping pollution control and natu-
ral  resource  conservation  laws. 2  To  reduce  the  nation's greenhouse
gas emissions from  1990 levels by as much as 60 percent to 80 percent
1  Pub. L.  No.  101-549,  104 Stat.  2399  (codified in  scattered sections  of 42  U.S.C.).
2  Congress  passed the following laws  during the 1970s:  Clean Air Act (1970),  Federal
Water  Pollution  Control  Act  (1972),  Federal  Insecticide  Fungicide  and  Rodenticide  Act
(1972),  Noise Control Act  (1972),  Coastal Zone Management  Act (1972),  Marine Mammal
Protection  Act  (1972),  Endangered  Species  Act  (1973),  Safe Drinking  Water Act  (1974),
Forest and Rangeland  Renewable  Resources Planning Act  (1974),  Magnuson Fishery  Con-
servation  and  Management  Act  (1976),  Federal  Coal  Leasing  Act Amendments  (1976),
Toxic  Substances  Control  Act  (1976),  Resource  Conservation  and  Recovery Act  (1976),
National  Forest  Management  Act  (1976),  Federal  Land  Policy  and  Management  Act
(1976),  Clean Air Act Amendments  (1977),  Clean Water Act  (1977),  Surface  Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation  Act (1977),  and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (1978).  See RICH-
ARDJ. LAZARUS,  THE MAKING  OF ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW 67-75  (2004)  (highlighting "the most
significant environmental events of the  [1970s],  including an overview of the related statu-
tory and  institutional  changes  that occurred");  see also Daniel A.  Farber, Politics and Proce-
dure in Environmental Law, 8J.L. ECON.  & ORG. 59, 66-67  (1992)  (describing original  1970
Earth Day as  a "republican moment" for lawmaking); Christopher  H. Schroeder,  Rational
Choice  Versus  Republican Moment-Explanations  for Environmental Laws,  1969-73,  9  DuKE
ENV-rL.  L. & POL'Y F.  29, 29  (1998)  ("The years between  1969 and  1973 constitute  a water-
shed  in the evolution  of federal  environmental policy and legislation.").CORNELL LAW REVIEW
by 2050 and then maintain that emissions level throughout the twenty-
first century will require Congress to craft an ambitious  mix of regula-
tory programs and economic incentives.  Those programs must funda-
mentally  change  business  operations  in  virtually  every  economic
sector as well  as individual  behavior in  many aspects of daily life.  To
be  effective,  the  new federal  law will  also  need  to  include programs
that  allow for the  adaptation  necessary  to lessen  the serious  adverse
public health and welfare effects of climate change that, based on past
emissions levels, will unavoidably occur in the next few decades even  if
significant reductions are achieved  in the future.  Finally, the federal
legislation  will  have  to  strike  a  proper  balance  between  the  federal
government's  need  to  maintain  a  country-wide  legal  regime  suffi-
ciently  stable  to  achieve  these  essential  national  objectives  and  the
states'  sovereign  authority over activities  within their own  borders.3
The  inherent problem with  such lawmaking moments,  however,
is just that:  they  are moments.  What Congress  and the President  do
with  much  fanfare  can  quickly  and  quietly  slip  away  in  the  ensuing
years.  This is famously so in  environmental  law.4  Subsequent legisla-
tive  amendments, limited budgets, appropriations  riders, interpretive
agency rulings, massive  delays in rulemaking, and simple nonenforce-
ment are more than capable  of converting a seemingly uncompromis-
ing  legal  mandate  into  nothing  more  than  a  symbolic  aspirational
statement.  In  short, what  Congress  and the  President  give,  they can
just as easily  take  away.5
This Article's  central thesis  is  that making it easy for subsequent
lawmakers  to  unravel,  undermine,  or even  formally change  existing
law is not always desirable, and it is certainly not an essential feature  of
our democratic  lawmaking  system.  Lawmakers should instead be un-
derstood as possessing  the authority  to anticipate and respond in  the
first instance to the dynamic nature of lawmaking and its related  chal-
3  The  exclusive  focus  of this Article  is  federal rather than  state legislation,  with the
exception  of some  related discussion  of potential  federal  preemption  of state  law.  This
focus is not intended to intimate  that states  do not have  (as  they already have  had) a major
role  to play in  climate change law in the future.  Clearly, they do.  Many of the  lawmaking
design features  that I describe  in this Article may lend themselves to use by the states.  And
the states no doubt already use  some  techniques of which  I am unaware.
4  See Daniel A. Farber,  Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23  HARV.  ENVrL.  L.  REv.  297,  298-99  (1999)  ("It  could almost be
said ...  [that] slippage is actually the primary feature of the system:  the so-called standards
are important  only because they help channel  the informal  interactions between  agencies
and regulated  parties."); see also RichardJ. Lazarus,  Congressional  Descent: The Demise of  Delib-
erative Democracy in Environmental  Law, 94 GEO.  L.J. 619, 638-52  (2006)  (describing the rise
of environmental  appropriations  legislation).
5  ERIC M.  PATASHNIK,  REFORMS  AT RISK:  WHAT HAPPENS  AFTER  MAJOR  POLICY CHANGES
ARE  ENACTED  3 (2008)  ("Rather  than a one-shot static affair, policy reform must be seen as
a dynamic process, in which  political  forces seeking to protect  a general-interest  reform  may
be opposed  by forces  seeking to undermine  it.").
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lenges, which do not end with the formal enactment  of much-needed
legislation.  The  same powerful  short-term  impulses  that seek  to  pre-
vent a law's enactment do not disappear upon the law's passage.  They
instead  typically  remain  to  seek  the  law's  ultimate  undoing.
Lawmakers  should not ignore but legitimately account for that possi-
bility in the first instance, especially for climate change legislation,  be-
cause failure to do so could significantly limit rather than promote the
ability of future  generations  to  govern  themselves.  To  be  sure,  cur-
rent lawmakers may well be making it more difficult for future legisla-
tors and agency  officials  to  substitute  their views  of sound  policy for
the judgment of past lawmakers.  Current lawmakers would be  doing
so, however, not to enrich themselves at the expense  of future genera-
tions.  Instead, given the potentially catastrophic consequences  of fail-
ing  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  over the  longer  term,  they
would  be  acting  for  the  very  different  purpose  of safeguarding  the
ability of future generations,  including  their elected  representatives,
to have  far greater  control  over their own lives.  This  is  an especially
legitimate  basis  for  imposing  lawmaking  restraints  notwithstanding
their undemocratic  effects.
The  critical  lesson  for climate  change  legislation,  accordingly,  is
that the  pending lawmaking moment must include  the enactment  of
provisions specifically designed  to maintain  the legislation's ability to
achieve its long-term  objectives over the longer term.  Climate  change
legislation is peculiarly vulnerable  to  being unraveled  over time for  a
variety of reasons,  but especially because  of the extent to which  it im-
poses  costs  on the short term for the realization  of benefits many de-
cades  and  sometimes  centuries  later.  Because  of its  fundamentally
redistributive  character,  there  will  invariably  be  politically  and  eco-
nomically powerful interests,  unhappy with the short-term  costs of cli-
mate  change  legislation,  seeking  to  relax  the  law's  requirements
either formally or informally.  It is therefore  not enough for Congress
to  enact  a  law  that  mandates  tough,  immediate  controls  on green-
house  gas emissions.  Nor is  it enough for Congress  to build into the
new  law  strong economic  incentives  that render more  palatable  the
changes in business and individual  behavior necessary  for those  man-
dates to  be accomplished  and  promote overall  economic  efficiency.
Much more is needed.  Like much legislation, for climate change
legislation  to be successful,  the  new legal framework  must simultane-
ously be flexible in certain respects  and steadfast in others.  Flexibility
is  necessary  to  allow for the  modification  of legal  requirements  over
time in light  of new  information.  Steadfastness  or "stickiness"  is  im-
portant  to  maintain  the  stability  of a  law's  requirements  over  time.
The need for both is particularly great for climate change legislation.
Flexibility  is absolutely essential for climate change legislation in lightCORNELL LAW REVIEW
of the enormity  of the  undertaking, both  in  its  temporal  and spatial
reach,  and  the  surrounding  uncertainty  concerning  the  wisdom  of
specific  regulatory  approaches.  Yet the basic legal  framework and le-
gal mandate must also be steadfast enough  to be  maintained over the
long term notwithstanding  what will be an unrelenting  barrage  of ex-
tremely  powerful  short-term  economic  interests  that  will  inevitably
seek  the mandate's  relaxation.
To that end, the law will need  to include institutional design fea-
tures  that allow for such flexibility but insulate  programmatic  imple-
mentation  to  a  significant  extent  from  powerful  political  and
economic  interests  propelled  by  short-term  concerns.  Such  design
features  will  include  "precommitment  strategies' 6  that  deliberately
make it hard  (but never impossible)  to change the law in response to
some kinds of concerns.  At the same time, the legislation should also
include contrasting  precommitment  strategies that deliberately  make
it easier to change the law  in response to other longer-term concerns
that are in harmony with the law's central purpose, which is to achieve
and  maintain greenhouse  gas emissions  reductions  over  time.  Such
concerns  are  otherwise  less  likely to have  powerful voices  in  lawmak-
ing fora.
Directed  to  all  three branches  of government,  such institutional
design features  should therefore  be deliberately  asymmetric,  making
it  easier  to  change  the  law  in  one substantive  direction  rather  than
another.  Like the classic  children's board game Chutes and Ladders,
the design  of climate  change  law  should include  chutes that make  it
harder for certain kinds of changes to be made and  ladders that make
it easier  for other  kinds of changes  to  be  accomplished  and for the
overall  statutory  purpose  to be  achieved  over time.  Climate  change
law should further include a series of other structural features deliber-
ately designed to keep the statute on track over time within the execu-
tive  branch  in  particular.  These  features  include  a  series  of
requirements  for consultation  with other agencies, scientific advisory com-
mittees,  and  stakeholders  more  insulated  from  short-term  political
pressures;  statutory and regulatory hammers and judicial review provisions
that ensure  timely implementation; and preemption triggers that accom-
modate the prerogatives of competing sovereigns while also exploiting
the  resulting tension  as leverage  to further  climate  change policy.
The purpose of this Article is to explain why such asymmetric  in-
stitutional design features  are a critical, legitimate aspect of global cli-
mate  change  legislation  here  in  the  United  States  and  how  such
features  might operate.  The Article  is  divided into  three parts.  The
first part highlights  the distinct features  of the lawmaking challenges
6  See infra note 138  and accompanying  text.
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presented  by  global  climate  change  that  render  it  a  "super wicked
problem"  for  public  policy  resolution  and  therefore  legal  redress.
These  challenges  include both  those  that derive  exclusively from  the
underlying science of climate and those that derive more immediately
from  human  nature  and  the  nature  of U.S.  lawmaking  institutions.
The second part explains the central  role that institutional design fea-
tures  can play  in responding  to these  kinds  of lawmaking challenges.
This explanation  is  both  historical and  theoretical.  It describes  why
such design features are necessary and legitimate, notwithstanding the
constraints  that they  place  on future  lawmaking, and  how  such  fea-
tures have  historically been  used in various settings  to overcome  cer-
tain  kinds  of lawmaking  challenges.  Finally,  the  third  part  of the
Article  offers  a  menu  of possible  institutional  design  features  that
might  be appropriate  in  global climate  change  legislation.
I
THE  CHALLENGES  OF  CLIMATE  CHANGE  LEGISLATION:
A  "SUPER  WICKED  PROBLEM"
Even  once  one  accepts  the  current scientific  consensus  that sig-
nificant  global  climate  change  is  happening,  human  activities  are  a
significant  contributing cause of that change, and the associated pub-
lic  health  and  welfare  impacts  are  sufficiently  serious  to warrant  cli-
mate  change  legislation, 7  crafting  that  legislation  is  extraordinarily
difficult.  Scholars  long  ago  characterized  a  public-policy  problem
with  the  kinds  of features presented  by climate change  as  a "wicked
problem" that defies  resolution because of the enormous interdepen-
dencies,  uncertainties,  circularities,  and  conflicting  stakeholders  im-
plicated by any effort to develop  a solution.8  Sometimes described  as
7  The  purpose  of  this Article  is  not  to  rehash  the  threshold  question  of whether
human activities  causing global  climate change  are  sufficiently serious to warrant  climate
change  legislation  that seeks  a major reduction  of greenhouse  gas  emissions.  In light of
recent scientific  studies, this Article assumes the propriety of such legislation and considers
the next step of how best to draft that legislation  to accomplish  its goals.  See INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Summary for Politcymakers, in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:
IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND VULNERABILITY  7, 8-22  (Martin Parry et al. eds.,  2007)  [hereinaf-
ter  IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS],  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assess-
ment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf  (summarizing "the  impacts  of climate  change  on
natural, managed  and human systems" and the adaptability and vulnerability of those sys-
tems);  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Summary for Policymakers, in CLI-
MATE  CHANGE  2007:  THE  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE  BASIS  1-18  (Susan  Solomon  et al.  eds.,  2007)
[hereinafter  IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL  SCIENCE],  available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf  (summarizing  findings  on
global climate change and presenting  options and long-term perspective  to policymakers).
8  See generally Horst W. J.  Rittel &  Melvin  M. Webber,  Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning,  4  POL'Y  SCI.  155,  160-69  (1973)  (introducing  the term  "wicked  problems"  to
describe nature of social policy problems);  see alsoJEFF  CONKLIN,  DIALOGUE  MAPPING:  BUILD-
INC  SHARED  UNDERSTANDING  OF  WICKED  PROBLEMS  3-40  (2006).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
"social messes," classic wicked problems include AIDS, healthcare, and
terrorism.9
Climate  change,  however,  has  been  fairly described  as  a  "super
wicked problem" because  of its  even  further  exacerbating features.' 0
These features  include the fact that time  is not costless,  so the longer
it takes  to  address  the problem,  the  harder  it will  be  to  do so. 1  As
greenhouse  gas emissions  continue  to increase,  exponentially  larger,
and  potentially  more  economically  disruptive,  emissions  reductions
will  be  necessary  in the  future  to  bring  atmospheric  concentrations
down  to  desired  levels. 12  Future  technological  advances,  therefore,
would likewise  have  to be able  to achieve  those exponentially  greater
reductions  to  make up  for lost time.  The  climate  change  that hap-
pens  in  the  interim  may  itself cause  sufficient  economic  disruption,
for instance, by slowing growth rates, so  as to make  it much harder  to
accomplish  the necessary  technological  innovation.
Another  problematic  characteristic  of  climate  change  is  that
those who are in the best position to address  the problem are not only
those who  caused it, but also  those with the least immediate incentive
to act within that necessary shorter timeframe. 13  The major sources of
greenhouse gas emissions include  many of the world's  most powerful
nations,  such  as  the  United  States,  which  are  not only  reluctant  to
embrace restrictions on their own economies but are least susceptible
to demands  by  other nations  that they do  so.  In  addition, by  a per-
verse  irony,  they  are  also  the  nations  least  likely  to  suffer  the  most
from  climate  change  that  will  unavoidably  happen  in  the  nearer
term.
14
A third feature  is  the  absence  of an  existing institutional  frame-
work of government with the ability to develop, implement, and main-
tain  the  laws  necessary  to  address  a  problem  of  climate  change's
tremendous  spatial  and  temporal  scope. 15  Climate  change  is  ulti-
9  Robert  E.  Horn  & Robert  P.  Weber,  New  Tools for  Resolving Wicked  Problems:
Mess Mapping and Resolution Mapping Processes 3  (MacroVU(r),  Inc.  & Strategy Kinetics
LLC,  2007),  available  at  http://www.strategykinetics.com//New  ToolsForResolving_
WickedProblems.pdf.  I  owe  special  thanks  to Professor  Douglas  Kysar  for notifying  me
about "wicked"  analysis  in  his comments on  an  early  draft of this article.
10  See  Kelly  Levin  et  al.,  Playing  It Forward:  Path  Dependency,  Progressive  Incre-
mentalism, and the "Super Wicked" Problem of Global Climate Change 8-10  (July 7, 2007)
(unpublished  manuscript, on  file  with  author),  available at http://environment.yale.edu/
uploads/ publications/ 2007levinbernsteincashoreauldWicked-Problems.pdf  ("Although
the  challenges  of climate  change  and  many  other  complex  environmental  and  social
problems are captured  by the above characteristics, climate poses three additional  features
that render it a  'super  wicked problem.'").
I I  See id. at 8-9.
12  See infra notes 39-42  and accompanying  text.
13  See Levin  et al.,  supra note  10, at 9.
14  See infra text accompanying  notes 59-66.
15  See Levin et al.,  supra note  10, at 9;  infra text accompanying  note 42.
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mately  a global  problem.  But there  is an absence  of any global  law-
making institution  with a jurisdictional  reach  and legal  authority that
match  the scope  of the  problem.
16
Each  of these  features, which  I discuss  in  more  detail  below, re-
lates to the science  of climate change, human nature, and the nature
of  U.S.  lawmaking  institutions.  They  present  significant  obstacles
both  to  the  enactment of climate  change  legislation  in  the  first  in-
stance and  to its successful  implementation  over  time.
A.  The  Science  of Climate  Change
The  science  of climate  change  has  several  distinct features  that
render lawmaking  especially  difficult.  As  I describe  below,  these  in-
clude the  physics and chemistry underlying climate  change  as well  as
the  resulting  impacts  of such  change  on  humankind  and  the  global
ecosystem.
1.  The Greenhouse Effect
Although  ultimately  riddled with complexities,  the  basic science
of climate  change  is  fairly  straightforward.  As  the  concentration  of
certain  chemicals  in  the  atmosphere  increases,  the  amount  of heat
from sunlight  in the form  of infrared radiation  that would otherwise
simply  reflect  off  the  earth's  surface  and  radiate  back  into  space  is
instead  captured  within  our  atmosphere.  This  process  works  like  a
"greenhouse," which is why it is popularly referred to as a "greenhouse
effect"  and also  why those  chemicals  that capture  higher concentra-
tions of heat are known  as "greenhouse  gases.' 7
Carbon  dioxide  (C0 2)  is  one  of several  significant  greenhouse
gases,  and a  CO 2 molecule's  potential  to  capture  heat  is  actually far
less  than others',  such as  methane,  by several  orders  of magnitude. 18
16  See William  W.  Buzbee,  Recognizing the Regulatory  Commons: A  Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89  IowA  L. REv.  1, 13  (2003)  ("Global warming also confronts  no matching or com-
mensurate  political or legal regime that..,  is logically situated to take the lead and address
global warming's causes and anticipated  harms.").
3 7  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Historical Overview of Climate
Change Science, in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007: THE  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE  BASIS  93,  103,  105-06,  115
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007)  [hereinafter IPCC Historical  Overview],  available at http:/
/www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl  /ar4-wgl-chapterl  .pdf (providing  a  histori-
cal  overview  of scientists'  understanding  of the greenhouse  effect);  INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Technical Summary,  in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  THE  PHYSICAL
SCIENCE  BASIS  19,  23-28  (Susan  Solomon  et  al.  eds.,  2007)  [hereinafter  IPCC  Technical
Summary],  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl  /ar4-wgl-ts.pdf
(providing a  technical summary of greenhouse gases);  see also R.T. Pierrehumbert,  Climate
Change: A  Catastrophe in  Slow  Motion, 6  CHI.  J.  INT'L L.  573,  573-74  (2006)  (discussing
human-induced  emissions).
18  SeeJennifer  Woodward,  Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do to
Help Ease Global Warming, 39 Am.  U.  L.  REv.  203, 210  (1989)  ("In  amounts comparable  to
carbon  dioxide, other gases are  also currently adding to the greenhouse effect.  AlthoughCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  94:1153
The  reason  CO 2  is  nonetheless  the  subject  of so  much  attention  is
because  the  natural  concentrations  in  the  atmosphere  are  relatively
small compared  to  the volume of CO 2 emissions  now being added by
human activities. 19  Although  the largest source of CO 2 emissions his-
torically  was  volcanic  activity,  fossil-fuel  burning  alone  adds  fifteen
times  that supplied  by  volcanoes  each  year,  and that ratio  is rapidly
increasing.20  The  now-famous  "hockey-stick"  graphs  depicting  the
dramatic  and  accelerating  rise  in  CO 2  atmospheric  concentrations
during  the  last  one  hundred  years  and  the  corresponding  rise  in
global  temperatures  illustrate  the  essential relationship  between  CO 2
and global warming  as a matter  of scientific  cause and effect.21
Exacerbating  the additions of CO 2 to the atmosphere from classic
sources  of pollution,  especially power  plants and motor vehicles,  are
other human  activities  that  dramatically  eliminate  nature's  ability to
take  CO 2 out of the  atmosphere.  There  are  several  natural  "sinks"
that can decrease greenhouse gas concentrations by taking those gases
out of the  atmosphere. 22  If those  sinks  were  increasing  in  capacity
while the  sources were  increasing their emissions, there would be  no
net greenhouse  effect.  But just the  opposite  is  happening:  the  num-
ber and capacity  of those natural  sinks are decreasing. 23
scientists  have identified  at least a dozen  trace  greenhouse  gases  in  the atmosphere,  the
most significant  gases  are chlorofluorocarbons,  methane,  nitrous oxide, and tropospheric
ozone.")  (citations omitted).
19  See Pierrehumbert, supra note  17, at 574-75  ("It is because  there  is relatively  little
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that human economic  activity has the prospect  of doub-
ling its concentration  within the twenty-first century, with greater increases in sight thereaf-
ter.");  see also IPCC Historical  Overview, supra note  17,  at 108  (concluding that "emissions
resulting  from  human  activities  are  substantially  increasing  the atmospheric  concentra-
tions of the greenhouse  gases:  CO,, CH4, CFCs, N20"); IPCC Technical Summary, supra note
17,  at  23-27  (providing  technical  summary  of increases  in  atmospheric  carbon  dioxide,
methane  and  nitrous  oxide);  National  Oceanic  Atmospheric  Administration,  Global
Warming: Frequently Asked  Questions (Aug. 20,  2008),  http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/cli-
mate/globalwarming.html#Q2  ("The global  concentration  of CO2  in  our atmosphere  to-
day  far  exceeds  the  natural  range  over  the  last  650,000  years  of  180  to  300  ppmv.
According  to  the  IPCC  Special  Report on Emission  Scenarios  (SRES),  by the  end of the
21st century, we could expect to see carbon dioxide concentrations  of anywhere from  490
to  1260 ppm  (75-350%  above  the pre-industrial  concentration").).
20  Pierrehumbert,  supra note  17, at 576.
21  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Changes in  Atmospheric Constitu-
ents and in Radioactive Forcing, in CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  THE  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE  BASIS  99,
134 fig.2.2 (Susan Solomon  et al. eds.,  2007);  see also David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to
Global Warming: Is It Constitutional  to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE  ENVrL.  L. REv.
53,  61  (2003)  (detailing  the human  connection  to the  rise in  carbon dioxide levels  since
1900).
22  See Karen  N. Scott,  The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean C0 2  Sequestration and the Future  of
Climate Change, 18 GEO.  INT'L  ENVrL.  L.  REv.  57,  58-59  (2005)  (discussing  the ocean  as
"both a natural  sink and a reservoir  for COs").
23  See, e.g.,  id. at 59  ("[T]he response of the ocean  carbon  cycle to changes  in atmos-
pheric CO2 levels  is slow, being limited  by both chemical  and physical  factors.").
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For instance, plants are a major sink of CO 2.24  Plants absorb CO 2
and release  oxygen in  a biochemical  process  (photosynthesis)  neces-
sary  to  produce  energy:  the  fascinating  converse  of the  process  by
which  animals  breathe  in  oxygen and release  CO.  Plant absorption
of CO 2  has historically  served  as a  significant  means  of keeping  CO 2
concentrations  in  the atmosphere  in  check.
2 5  Because,  however,  de-
velopment activities  throughout  the globe  have  literally cleared  mas-
sive landscapes  of vegetation, including some  of the densest tropical
rainforests, the ecosystem's ability to reduce atmospheric  CO 2 concen-
trations has dramatically decreased at the very moment that it is most
needed.  Even  worse,  those  same  development  activities  emit  huge
volumes  of CO 2  gas into  the  atmosphere  by burning  the  vegetation,
which  releases  the  CO 2  otherwise  absorbed  within  the  vegetation's
chemical  makeup.
26
Finally, the  greenhouse  effect  is a global  phenomenon, not one
that occurs  in some parts  of the world and not others.  Atmospheric
concentrations  of greenhouse  gases  are  uniform  throughout  the  at-
mosphere;27 they do not differ over distinct parts of the globe.  A mol-
24  See id. at 58 (stating that terrestrial vegetation  is a natural mechanism  that removes
CO 2 from  the atmosphere);  Food and Agricultural  Organization  of the  United  Nations,
Roles  of Forests  in  Climate  Change  (Feb. 4,  2009),  http://www.fao.org/forestry/53459/
en/.
25  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Couplings Between Changes in
the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007: THE  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE BASIS
514  (Susan  Solomon  et  al.  eds.,  2007)  (discussing  plants'  role  in stabilizing  atmospheric
carbon  dioxide concentrations).
26  See Food and Agricultural  Organization  of the United  Nations,  supra note  24;  see
also  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  LAND  USE,  LAND-USE  CHANGE,  AND
FORESTRY  207-08  (Robert T. Watson  et  al.  eds.,  2000)  ("Burning  ...  represents  a short-
term  transfer of carbon from grassland ecosystems  to the atmosphere  ....  Increasing fire
frequency over time tends to reduce grass biomass production  ...  result[ing]  in declines in
soil carbon  pools  .... );  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Changes in At-
mospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  THE  PHYSICAL  SCI-
ENCE  BASIS  135  (Susan  Solomon  et  al.  eds.,  2007)  [hereinafter  IPCC  Changes]; IPCC
Technical Summary, supra note 17, at 26; Yadvinder Mathi et al.,  Climate Change,  Deforestation,
and the Fate of the Amazon, 319  SCIENCE  169, 170-71  (2008)  (discussing  the  effect of forest
burning in the Amazon); Mircio Santilli et al.,  Tropical  Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol, 71
CLIMATIC  CHANGE  267, 269 (2005); Tom Knudson,  'Green'Storage  in Forests May Be Going Up
in  Smoke;  Study:  Wildfires Emit More Global Warming Gases than Thought, SACRAMENTO  BEE,
Mar.  12,  2008,  at A3  (discussing  the implications  of the  greenhouse  gases  emitted  from
California  wildfires  on  the state's  efforts  to reduce  emissions from  human activity).
27  The impact  of CO 2 emissions on climate change  turns on  atmospheric  concentra-
tions of  CO2  in  the  troposphere,  which  become  uniform  around  the  globe.  See  IPCC
Changes, supra note  26,  at  137-40;  A. Denny  Ellerman,  Tradable Permits  for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: A Primer  with Particular  Reference to Europe,  69 MITJoINT  PROGRAM  ON ScI.  & POL'Y
GLOBAL  CHANGE  2  (2000),  available  at  http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/
MITJPSPGCRpt69.pdf  ("A  ton of CO 2 emitted  or abated  in  Bombay  will  have  the  same
effect  on  climate  as  a  ton  emitted  or  abated  in  Buenos  Aires,  Chicago,  Kiev,  or Stock-
holm."); see also PETER FOLGER,  THE  CARBON CYCLE:  IMPLICATIONS  FOR CLIMATE  CHANGE  AND
CONGRESS  2  (Congressional  Research  Service  Report, Mar.  13,  2008),  available at http://
www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/carbon-cycle.pdf  ("[WI]here  fossil  fuels are burnedCORNELL LAW REVIEW
ecule  of  carbon  dioxide  added  by  a  source  in  New  Zealand
accordingly  has the same effect on CO 2 concentrations  as a molecule
added by a source  in Kansas,  Brazil, or  Sweden.28
What  are the related lawmaking challenges? The  first  is  that  both
sources of greenhouse  gases  and potential sinks  of greenhouse  gases
are  relevant.  Laws  concerned  with  addressing  the greenhouse  effect
need to consider the possibility of reducing sources while also increas-
ing the capacity of sinks.  The second lawmaking challenge is that any
effective  climate change  legislation must include,  of course, domestic
controls, but no domestic legislation  is enough  standing alone.  Even
if one  or  many  nations  decrease  their  emissions  rates  or  their  own
destruction of carbon sinks, those efforts are susceptible  to being over-
taken  by  activities  occurring  within  another  nation's  borders. 29  Of
particular  significance  in the  United  States,  a  third  lawmaking  chal-
lenge relates to the need for land use controls.  Land use controls are
federal environmental  law's "third rail" because  of the related specter
of federal interference  with  state  and  local  land  use  planning.  The
prospect  of such  federal disruption  of state and  local  governmental
prerogatives  to determine  land use development patterns has derailed
several  efforts  by  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  over
the years  to address air and water pollution caused by particular  uses
of land.
30
2.  Stock/Flow Nature of Atmospheric Chemistry
One of the distinctive features  of the science of climate change  is
the stock/flow nature of the physical  and chemical  processes underly-
ing  it.  A  stock/flow  relationship  is  counterintuitive  because  it does
not operate like  the kind of simple, short-term, more linear relation-
ship between  cause  and effect that most people  (and lawmakers)  as-
sume is  at work when  they contemplate  pollution and the options for
its regulation.  Unfortunately,  climate change  now cannot be avoided
simply by reducing greenhouse  gas emissions, much the same way that
one could stop a teaketde  from boiling by just turning down the stove.
makes relatively little difference  to the concentration  of C0 2 in the atmosphere;  emissions
in  any one  region affect  the  concentration  of CO2  everywhere  else  in  the atmosphere.")
(emphasis omitted).
28  See sources  cited  supra note  27.
29  China has recently passed the United States as the single largest producer of green-
house  gas  emissions,  and India  and Brazil  are also  accelerating their emissions  rates.  See
infra notes 65-66  and accompanying  text.
30  ROBERT  V.  PERCIVAL  ET  AL.,  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION:  LAw,  SCIENCE,  AND  POLICY
716-18  (5th  ed. 2006).
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The  relevant  atmospheric  controls  for  temperature  are  not  so
straightforward.
31
The kind of stock/flow relationship that prompts climate change
is instead very different.  Climate  change  results from  the  buildup of
greenhouse gases over time, indeed, over centuries.  Unlike the pollu-
tants  in  most  ecological  contexts,  once  added  to  the  atmosphere,
greenhouse gases remain there for a very long time-notjust decades,
or even centuries, but thousands of years.  The pollutants do not natu-
rally dissipate  in significant  amounts.  And so  long as  the  amount of
greenhouse  gases  being emitted into  the atmosphere  is greater  than
the amount that naturally falls out every year, greenhouse  gas concen-
trations  increase over  time.  Of course,  that is  exactly what has  been
happening, and at an accelerating  rate.32
The  most  accessible  description  of the  stock/flow  relationship
that  I  have  encountered  is  to  contemplate  the  atmosphere  as  the
equivalent of a bathtub  that has  been filling with water over time  be-
cause the pipe adding water into the tub is much larger than the drain
coming  out of the  tub.33  In  the  "tub" of the atmosphere,  while  the
metaphorical  emissions  pipe coming in  has  gotten  much  larger,  the
drain has gotten  much smaller for two  distinct reasons.  The first, as
earlier discussed,  is the destruction of vegetation that would otherwise
have absorbed some CO 2 from the atmosphere  by way of photosynthe-
sis.  The  second  is  the  ocean,  which  also  provides  a  natural  sink  in
which some greenhouse  gases like CO 2 can  dissolve.  As, however, the
concentrations  of  greenhouse  gases  in  the  atmosphere  have  in-
creased,  the ocean's capacity  to dissolve  additional  greenhouse  gases
out of the atmosphere  is diminishing  because  the ocean  is  filling up
beyond its chemical  capacity to dissolve  more  gases.
The  practical  implications  of such  a stock/flow  relationship  are
significant, particularly temporally.  First, because the high concentra-
tions of greenhouse  gases in the atmosphere are the result of decades
of buildup and  natural  drainage  is  very  slow,  those  high  concentra-
tions  cannot be  reduced  easily  or  quickly.  It will  require  not just  a
decrease in the rate of emissions increases but in the absolute amount
of emissions  each  year.  And  even  if annual  emissions  are  reduced
considerably,  the  atmospheric  concentrations  will  continue  to  in-
crease  until  those  annual  increases  are  less  than  the  annual  drain-
31  See John  D.  Sterman  &  Linda  Booth  Sweeney,  Understanding Public Complacency
About Climate Change: Adults'Mental  Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter, 80
CUMATIC  CHANGE  213,  214-15, 222-28  (2007).
32  See Pierrehumbert, supra note  17, at 576-77.
33  Sterman  & Sweeney,  supra note  31,  at 235.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
age.3 4  The  bathtub may fill  up more  slowly but the water will still  be
rising.
Finally,  even if one manages to achieve annual emissions that are
lower  than  the  annual  drainage,  it will  likely  take  many  decades  to
lower  the  atmospheric  greenhouse  gas  concentrations.  And  until
those concentrations  are substantially  lower, climate  change will  con-
tinue to occur.  For example,  for every kilogram of CO 2 added  to the
atmosphere  today, one quarter  of that amount will remain  in  the at-
mosphere for five hundred to one thousand years, and approximately
7 percent will persist in the atmosphere for hundreds of thousands of
years.35  That's a  long time.
But even the  stock/flow characteristic  of atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse  gas  is  only  half of the  time  lag that  renders  re-
dressing  climate  change  problematic.  A  comparable  stock/flow
relationship  exists in the atmosphere for the buildup of radiative heat.
Just as greenhouse  gas concentrations  build up over lengthy  periods
of time, radiative  heat does  so  too.36  For that reason,  there  is,  in  ef-
fect, not just one bathtub in  the atmosphere, but two: one for green-
house gases and one for radiative heat, with the former adding heat to
the latter.  And here too, the heat builds up in the second bathtub so
long as the amount of heat being added is greater than the heat drain-
ing oUt.
3 7
The practical implication of adding yet one more stock/flow rela-
tionship  to the  global-warming  equation  is stark.  It means  that even
once  one  achieves  an  absolute  reduction  of greenhouse  gases,  after
decades of effort, one will not see  any resulting decrease of heat.  The
decrease  will  occur  only after  the  amount  of heat being  added  as a
result of greenhouse  gas concentrations  gets  so low that it is  less than
the  heat being  drained.38  A reduction  in additional  heat will  other-
wise  only decrease  the rate  of global-warming increases,  but not actu-
ally result in a temperature  decrease.
What  are the related lawmaking challenges? Here  again,  there  are
several.
The first challenge  is that major reductions  will clearly  be neces-
sary.  It will  not be enough  to  slow  the  rate  of increases  or  even  to
34  Id. at  215-16.
35  Pierrehumbert,  supra note  17, at 577.
36  See IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL  SCIENCE,  supra note  7, at  13.
37  Sterman  &  Sweeney,  supra note  31,  at 215;  see  also IPCC  Summay for Policymakers,
PHYSICAL SCIENCE,  supra note  7, at 13 (referring to model experiments showing that even  if
all  radiative  forcing agents remained  constant at the  2000 levels,  further warming would
take  place primarily as a  result of slow ocean  response).
38  See Sterman & Sweeney, supra  note 31,  at 215 (noting that warming would continue
until both greenhouse  gas concentrations  fell and global mean  temperature  rose enough
to restore  net  radiative balance).
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decrease  absolute  annual  emissions.  As just described,  only if emis-
sions are lower  than drainage  will greenhouse  gas concentrations de-
crease,  and  even  then reduction  in  atmospheric  heat will not occur
until the  net radiative  heat being  added by greenhouse  gases  is  less
than  the amount draining out.
The second  challenge  is  that there will  necessarily  be a huge  lag
between  the  time  reductions in greenhouse  gas emissions  occur and
any mitigating effect  on climate  change.  The  time lag  is  at the very
least longer than  the lifetime of any adult.  The upshot is  that no one
who  is asked  to curtail  activities  to reduce greenhouse  gas concentra-
tions  will  be  likely  to  live  long enough  to  enjoy  the benefits  of that
curtailment.
The  related lawmaking  implication  is that many of the measures
that can make a significant difference for current lives are adaptation
measures  rather  than mitigation  measures  designed  to  reduce  emis-
sions.  Much of the  climate change  that is going  to occur in  our life-
times  is unavoidable.  We can still reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
avoid accelerating  even worse effects, but all that can  done about that
now-unavoidable  change  is  to address  the needs of those who  will be
most adversely  affected and develop  ways  to adapt to  climate  change
that will  minimize  its  adverse  effects  and perhaps  take  advantage  of
some new  opportunities  that it presents.
A  third  significant  challenge  is  that  the  enormous  temporal
dimensions  of climate  change,  potentially  crossing multiple  genera-
tions, resist easy application  of the kind of cost-benefit  analysis  many
policymakers  favor for  the  setting of environmental  protection stan-
dards.  The proper role of cost-benefit  analysis has long been debated
in environmental  law, with many commentators strongly in favor and
others  sharply  critical  of the  efficacy  and  fairness  of such  analysis.3 9
But,  ignoring  the  tendency  of climate  change  to  raise  the  kinds  of
value  conflicts  that  detractors  of cost-benefit  analysis  claim  it  is  ill-
suited  to measure, 40  the temporal dimension alone renders heavy reli-
39  See generally MATrHEW  D.  ADLER  & ERIC A. POSNER,  COST-BENEFIT  ANALYSIS:  LEGAL,
ECONOMIC, AND  PHILOSOPHICAL  PERSPECTIVES  (2001)  (reproducing a series of articles offer-
ing contrasting  perspectives  on the  efficacy  of cost-benefit  analysis).
40  See, e.g.,  RiCHARD  L. REVESZ  &  MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,  RETAKING  RATIONALITY: How
COsT-BENEFIT  ANALYSIS  CAN  BETTER  PROTECT  THE  ENVIRONMENT  AND  OUR  HEALTH  55-147
(2008)  (detailing  the  "fallacies"  of  cost-benefit  analysis);  Frank  Ackerman  &  Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of  Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA.  L.
REV.  1553,  1562-81  (2002)  (showing that the attempt of cost-benefit analysis to  put prices
on priceless  values and  to discount harms makes  it a poor way  to evaluate environmental
protection regulation);  David  M.  Driesen,  Distributing  the Costs of Environmental, Health, and
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,  and Regulatory Reform,  32  B.C.
ENVTL.  AFF.  L.  REv.  1, 64-94 (2005)  (arguing that the principle requiring maximum feasi-
ble emissions reductions is a more appropriate method for considering costs in the context
of most technology-based  standards).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ance on cost-benefit analysis problematic at the very least.  Proffering
a discount rate  for valuing  costs and benefits  that will  be  realized  or
avoided  only centuries in the future and under completely uncertain
societal conditions is heroic, foolish, or a mixture of both.41  But in no
event does  it provide  an  especially  solid  basis  for  making  confident
policy choices  today.42
A final lawmaking challenge  that derives from the stock/flow na-
ture of climate change is that lawmaking delays are costly.  The longer
one waits,  the  more dramatic  the  necessary  reductions  in  emissions.
The  reason  is  simple.  With  every year of delay,  greenhouse  gas con-
centrations  and  radiative  heat levels  increase  and,  no less important,
the economic interests in maintaining increasingly high rates of emis-
sions  get  ever  more  deeply  entrenched.  Power  plants,  for instance,
have long life spans.  It is much harder to change direction after mas-
sive investments have been made in their construction and operation.
This problem  is  present with many other parts  of our nation's energy
infrastructure that currently depend on the emission of huge volumes
of greenhouse  gases.43
3.  Spatial  Dimension of Climate Change: Global Cause vs.  Global
Effect
Although atmospheric concentrations  of greenhouse  gas concen-
trations  are uniform  around the  globe,  the  impacts  of those  concen-
trations  are  not  similarly  uniform.  Hence,  although  the
Intergovernmental  Panel on  Climate Change  (IPCC)  and other scien-
tific bodies routinely refer to increases  in average  global temperature,
that does not mean that every part of the globe will in fact experience
the same temperature increase.  That "average" instead masks substan-
tial differences  in temperature increases.  For some parts of the world,
the temperature increase  will  be much  greater than for other parts.44
Even  more  important,  considered  in  isolation,  temperature  in-
creases  mask the  much  larger differences  in  resulting worldwide  im-
pacts.  The  impacts of any increase  in  temperature on public health,
41  For a discussion of the challenges  of discounting  in  the context of climate change,
see ERIC A. POSNER,  CASS  SUNSTEIN  &  DAVID  WEISBACH,  CLIMATE  CHANGE JUSTICE  (forthcom-
ing 2008)  (manuscript at 127-45,  on  file with  author).
42  See Regulating  Greenhouse  Gas Emissions  Under  the Clean Air Act,  73  Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,414-16  (proposed July 30, 2008)  (describing the host of limitations of economic
analysis, especially cost-benefit analysis,  as applied to a problem with enormous spatial and
temporal dimensions  like  climate change).
43  Kelly Sims Gallagher, Acting in Time on Climate Change 9-10 (Sept. 18-19, 2008)
(unpublished conference  paper, presented at Acting in Time on Energy Policy Conference
at  Harvard  University),  available at  http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/actingintime-
onenergy/papers/gallagher-climate.pdf  (describing  long  lifetimes  of  investments  in  en-
ergy infrastructure  and  impact on  timing and cost of climate change  policy).
44  See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, PHYSICAL  SCIENCE,  supra note 7,  at 9.
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welfare,  and  the  environment  are  highly dependent  on  geographic
location.45  What  might  even  be  a  potentially  beneficial  increase  in
one  part  of  the  world  could  be  a  completely  devastating  effect
elsewhere.
46
For instance, the impact of a given increase in temperatures  turns
on factors such as the ways the wind blows, water flows, and the Earth
spins in its orbit around the sun.47  For those parts of the globe where
water may  already  be scarce,  an increase in temperature  can quickly
result in severe  droughts and famines, leading  to  mass  migrations  of
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people.48  For those parts of
the world where people live close  to the ocean  in low-lying elevations
vulnerable  to flooding, rising sea levels  could literally wipe out entire
island  nations  and  coastal  cities.  And  for those  parts  of the  world
where,  because  of  preexisting  higher  temperatures,  many  of  the
world's  diseases  originate,  even  higher temperatures  could both pro-
mote  the  development  of new  diseases  and  increase  their ability  to
spread further around the globe.
49
By  contrast, in  other parts  of the world,  increased  temperatures
might  even  seem  to yield  some  benefits, at least in the  short term.50
In  higher latitudes,  an  increase  in  temperature  might lengthen  the
growing season and thereby offer a potential boost in agricultural pro-
ductivity. 51  Some  scholars  have  made just that claim  with  respect  to
45  See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,  supra note  7, at  11-18.
46  See id. at 10 fig.1  (presenting a chart showing that increased temperatures will cause
increased  water  availability  in  moist tropics  but  decreased  water  availability  in  mild, and
some  low, latitudes);  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Summary for Policy-
makers, in CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  SvNTHESIS  REPORT  8-13 (The  Core Writing Team  et al.
eds.,  2007)  [hereinafter  IPCC Summary for Policymakers, SYNTHESIS],  available  at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4-syr-spm.pdf  (listing  and  discussing  different
regional  impacts); Anthony J. McMichael  et al.,  Global Climate Change, in 1 COMPARATIVE
QUANTIFICATION  OF  HEALTH  RISKS:  GLOBAL  AND  REGIONAL  BURDEN  OF  DISEASE  ATTRIBUTA-
BLE  TO SELECTED  MAJOR  RISK  FACTORS  1543 (Majid  Ezzati et al.  eds,  2004)
47  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Frequently Asked  Questions, in
CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  THE  PHYISICAL  SCIENCE  BASIS  94-97  (Susan  Solomon  et al.  eds.,
2007).
48  See IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,  supra note  7,  at  12;  IPCC  Summary for
Policymakers, SYNTHESIS,  supra note  46,  at 8-13;  McMichael  et al.,  supra note  46.
49  IPCC Summary for Policymakers,  SYNTHESIS,  supra note 46, at 8-13;  see Pierrehumbert,
supra note  17, at 578-79  (describing non-uniform  impacts).
50  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Food, Fibre and Forest Products,
in CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  273, 284 (Martin Parry
et  al.  eds.,  2007),  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-
wg2-chapter5.pdf;  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Industry, Settlement and
Society,  in CLIMATE  CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND VULNERABILITY 357, 365 (Martin
Parry  et al.  eds.,  2007)  [hereinafter IPCC  Industry],  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter7.pdf;  IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,
supra note  7,  at 12.
51  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Human  Health,  in  CLIMATE
CHANGE  2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  391,  411  (Martin Parry et al.  eds.,CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
wine  production.52  Similarly,  although  higher  temperatures  in  the
Arctic may sound the death knell for certain species, such as the polar
bear, and for certain  native  villages, melting ice  could  open  up new
passageways  for  marine  transportation  and  access  to  energy
resources.
53
There  is also  a reason why  the problem  is defined not as "global
warming" per se but as global  climate change.  Changes in temperature
are  simply the first in a  chain  reaction  of ecosystem  changes.54  The
changes  in climate that result from changes in temperature are highly
dependent  on  location.55  Some  places  may  get  more  rain;  other
places  may  get  less.  Some  places  may  get  more  damaging  weather
patterns;  others may not.  If, as some scientists suggest, changing tem-
peratures  can  shift the  ocean currents,  such  as the  Gulf Stream,  and
melt polar ice,  the variation in global impacts  will be even more  pro-
nounced.56  To  be  sure,  if  some  of  the  most  catastrophic  conse-
quences-including  dramatic  sea  level  rises  and  global  spread  of
infectious diseases-occur  over  the longer term, there will  be signifi-
cant  absolute  costs  everywhere. 57  But,  the  consequences  of climate
change from uniform atmospheric concentration of greenhouse  gases
will not be the same everywhere,  certainly in the nearer term and not
in the distant future, which  is another defining feature of the science
of climate  change.
58
What are the related lawmaking challenges? Here again, there are sev-
eral  and all are quite  formidable.
The  most significant challenge  is that  although  all  parts  of the
world  can influence  global climate  change,  not all  parts of the world
will suffer  equally  if such change  occurs.  Indeed,  some  parts  of the
world will suffer potentially catastrophic effects, even with a rise ofjust
a few  degrees, while other parts of the world will suffer relatively little
and  may  even  believe  that  they  are  enjoying  some  short-term  eco-
nomic  benefits.  Such  distributional  differences  will  make  it  much
harder  to  achieve  the  international  cooperation  and  coordination
necessary  to address the  problem.
2007),  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.
pdf.
52  See, e.g.,  A. B.  Tate,  Global Warming's Impact on  Wine, 12 J.  OF  WINE  RES.  95, 96-97
(2001)  (suggesting potential short-term  beneficial  effects of higher temperatures on wine
production).
53  IPCC Summary for Policymakers, IMPAcrs,  supra note  7,  at 15;  McMichael et al.,  supra
note 46.
54  See IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACrs, supra note  7,  at 17.
55  See id. at 13-15.
56  See  id.  at  17;  Pierrehumbert,  supra note  17,  at  578-79  (describing non-uniform
impacts).
57  See IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,  supra note  7,  at 11-12,17-20.
58  See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying  text.
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But what makes addressing  the problem seemingly insurmounta-
ble is  that the parts of the world that are most directly threatened are
completely different from those that are the primary sources of green-
house  gases  now  in  the atmosphere.  Those  parts  of the  globe  most
threatened,  especially  areas near  the  equator  and  of high elevation,
are also some of the world's poorest and have the least-developed  gov-
ernments. 59  Populations  in  these  areas,  such  as  parts  of Africa  and
Asia, often lack basic shelter, health care facilities,  a diversified econ-
omy, and a government able to deliver basic social services in times of
stress.  Their  ability  to  adapt  to  climate  change  is  consequently
minimal.60
In tragic contrast, the most highly industrialized nations that have
emitted  the vast majority of greenhouse  gases  over the past one hun-
dred years-including the United States, Russia, and much of Western
Europe-are  located almost exclusively in  the higher latitudes in  the
northern  hemisphere. 61  These  are,  somewhat  perversely,  the  areas
that are likely to suffer the least in the short term and economic  inter-
ests  in  these  areas  may even  believe  that  they will  enjoy some  short-
term  benefits.
62
59  See,  e.g.,  IPCC  Industry, supra note  50,  at  365-66;  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON
CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability, in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:
IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  821  (Martin  Parry et  al. eds.,  2007),  available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter20.pdf;  IPCC  Sum-
mary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,  supra note  7, at  13; see also Kathryn  S.  Brown,  Taking Global
Warming to the People, SCIENCE  MAG.,  Mar. 5,  1999, at 1440-41;  Michael Grubb,  Seeking Fair
Weather: Ethics and the International  Debate on Climate Change, 71  INT'L AFF.  463, 467  (1995);
Paul Reiter,  Climate Change and Mosquito-Borne  Disease, 109  ENVTL.  HEALTH  PERSp.  141,  142
(2001).
60  See  IPCC  Summary for Policymakers, IMPACTS,  supra note  7,  at  12-13;  Brown,  supra
note  59,  at  1441.
61  World  Resources Institute, Contributions  to Global Warming;  Historic  Carbon  Di-
oxide  Emissions  from  Fossil  Fuel  Combustion,  1900-1999,  http://earthtrends.wriorg/
maps_spatial/maps.detail-static.php?map-select=488&theme=3  (last visited Apr. 5,  2009).
62  See  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Asia,  in  CLIMATE  CHANGE
2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  469,  482  (Martin  Parry et al.  eds.,  2007),
available  at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterlO.pdf;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Assessing Key  Vulnerabilities and the Risk
from  Climate Change, in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY
779,  796 (Martin  Parry et al.  eds.,  2007),  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl  9.pdf;  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,
Europe, in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  541,  554,  556
(Martin  Parry  et  al.  eds.,  2007),  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl2.pdf;  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  Global
Climate Projections,  in  CLIMATE  CHANGE  2007: THE  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE  BASIS  747, 782  (Susan
Solomon  et  al.  eds.,  2007),  available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/
wgl/ar4-wgl-chapterlO.pdf  (stating  that  precipitation  would  increase  in  northern  Eu-
rope);  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  North America, in CLIMATE  CHANGE
2007:  IMPACTS,  ADAPTATION  AND  VULNERABILITY  617,  623  (Martin  Parry et al.  eds.,  2007),
available  at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl  4.pdf;
see  also Herman Shugart  et al.,  Forests and Global Climate Change: Potential  Impacts on  U.S.
Forest Resources, at ii,  iv-v, 43  (Pew Center  on  Global Climate  Change, Arlington, Va.,  Feb.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Such  nations  are not only  the  most  responsible  for  the  current
problems, but they are  also invariably some of the most politically and
economically  powerful  nations  on the  globe.  They are  consequently
not  readily  susceptible  to  less  powerful  nations'  efforts  to  compel
them to reduce their emissions.  Because of their relative wealth,  they
are  also  more  easily  able  to  adopt  adaptation  measures  and  conse-
quently suffer fewer  immediate  hardships.
As  a result,  it will  prove  extremely  difficult  in  the  short  run  to
persuade  the  powerful  nations responsible for  climate  change  to un-
dertake  the dramatic  action  now needed.  They will  not perceive  the
benefits for doing so, in  part because they will not in fact be  the ones
suffering  the  greatest  and most  immediate  harm.  And  by  the  time
longer-term  climate change  begins  to adversely  affect even  the more
powerful  nations-because  of political  destabilization  caused  by mas-
sive  migrations,  the  spread  of infectious  diseases,  dramatic  changes
caused by shifts  in the Gulf Stream, or melting glaciers-it will be too
late  to take action to  avoid  such greater  effects.  As  described  above,
the stock/flow nature of the atmosphere precludes the normal luxury
of awaiting serious  and immediate  adversity before  taking action. 63
There  is no scientific reason why such a geographic mismatch be-
tween cause  and effect has to  exist.  But it does.  It is the result of an
unwittingly perverse combination of the laws of physics and chemistry
with  patterns  of economic  industrialization  around  the  globe.  No
matter how unwitting,  however, the resulting obstacle to lawmaking  is
correspondingly huge.
Finally,  there  is  yet  one  more  distributional  twist  that  makes
meaningful lawmaking  that much harder.  Although  it is  the long-in-
dustrialized  nations,  such  as  the United  States, Russia,  and  those  in
Western  Europe,  that have  contributed  disproportionately  to  green-
house gas concentrations now in the atmosphere, there is a new set of
developing nations with exploding economies that has or at least soon
will  surpass  the  developed  nations  in  annual  emissions.64  China has
become the single largest producer of greenhouse  gases, beating pro-
2003),  available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/forestry.pdf  (stating  that the
United States  will receive short-term  positive benefits from climate change  in the sector of
forest resources).
63  See supra Part  I.A.2.
64  See Energy  Information  Administration,  Emissions  of  Greenhouse  Gases  Report,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html#developments  (last  visited  Apr.  5,
2009).
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jections of when it would overtake the United States. 65  India and Bra-
zil  are similarly increasing  their emissions  at accelerating  rates. 66
The  related  lawmaking  problem  is  obvious.  The  developed  na-
tions,  like  the United  States, are hard  pressed  to dictate  to countries
like China and India that they should not expand  their economies  by
increasing greenhouse  gas emissions.  After all, why should China and
India agree  to  do so when the  United States  is  primarily  responsible
for existing  greenhouse  gas  concentrations  and  has already  enjoyed
decades of economic  prosperity and military  superiority as a result of
greenhouse gas-producing industries that still produce far greater per
capita emissions  than sources  in either  China or India?  At the same
time,  the  developed  nations  like  the United  States  are  less  likely  to
take unilateral  action  to reduce  their emissions  if they believe that if
they do,  the  rapidly  developing  nations  will  simply  surpass  them  in
economic  strength and simply replace U.S. greenhouse  gas emissions
with  their own, thereby  not reducing  climate  change  at all.
B.  Human  Nature  and Cognitive  Psychology
The science  of climate  change  creates a series  of forbidding law-
making obstacles  that contribute  to climate  change's  wickedness  as  a
public policy problem.  But one reason  that those obstacles are so po-
tentially  overwhelming  is  because  they work  in  tandem  with  human
nature.  Whether as a result of hard- or soft-wiring, human beings as  a
species tend to think in certain ways.  As described  by the field of cog-
nitive  psychology,  we  tend  to  favor  some  outcomes  over  others,  are
able  to  grasp  some  kinds  of concepts  more  readily  than others, and
use a series  of mental shortcuts or  "heuristics" in making  decisions. 67
65  Joseph Kahn  & Mark Landler,  China Grabs West's Smoke-SpewingFactories, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21,  2007, at Al; Andy Scott & Lucy Brady,  China, Top Producer  of Greenhouse Gases, Looks
to  Tap Potential  Resource, CHINA BRIEFING  NEWS,  Nov.  2,  2007, available at http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2007/11/02/china-top-producer-of-greenhouse-gases-looks-to-tap-po-
tential-resource.html;  see also China Surpasses US. Emissions, INT'L  HERALD  TRIB., June 21,
2007, LexisNexis Academic.
66  See U.S.  GEN.  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,  CLIMATE  CHANGE:  TRENDS  IN  GREENHOUSE  GAS
EMISSIONS  AND  EMISSIONS  INTENSITY  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  OTHER  HIGH  EMITTING  NA-
TIONS,  GAO-04-146R,  at  4  (2003);  Energy  Information  Administration,  Table  H.lco2:
World  Carbon  Dioxide  Emissions  from  the  Consumption  and  Flaring  of  Fossil  Fuels,
1980-2006,  http://www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html  (follow  "Total  Emissions"  hyper-
link)  (last  visited Apr.  5,  2009);  see also Sheryl  Gay Stolberg,  Bush Proposes Goal to Reduce
Greenhouse Gas: Long-Term  World Target, N.Y. TIMES, June  1, 2007, at Al  (listing  China and
India  as other "top producers" of greenhouse  gas emissions).
67  See, e.g.,  Paul  Slovic et  al.,  Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION
AND  SOCIAL  BEHAVIOR,  165,  168-74  (John  S.  Carroll  & John  W. Payne  eds.,  1976);  Amos
Tversky & Daniel  Kahneman, Judgment  Under Uncertainty: Heuristics  and Biases, in  JUDGMENT
UNDER  UNCERTAINTY.  HEURiSTICS  AND  BIASES  3, 3-4,  18-20 (Daniel  Kahneman  et al.  eds.,
1982); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski  & Cynthia R. Farina,  Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87  CORNELL L.  REV.  549, 555-58  (2002).CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
As  applied  to climate  change,  these  cognitive  tendencies  and  limita-
tions  produce a  "massive social  trap."68
Many  of these  human  tendencies  are  directly  relevant  to  both
why  climate  change  has  occurred  and,  most  important  for  current
purposes,  why  lawmaking  to  address  climate  change  has  proven  so
hard  to establish  and will  be even  harder to  maintain  over  time.  In-
deed, there is almost complete opposition between  the kinds of judg-
ments  that  need  to  be  made  to  address  climate  change  in  a
meaningful  way  and  the  kinds  of judgments  that  our  basic  way  of
thinking favors.  Several  of the most prominent  types  of decisions  re-
late  to  the  temporal dimension,  spatial  distribution,  and  sheer com-
plexity  of climate  change.
1.  Myopia and Climate Change's Temporal Dimension
As  described  above,  the  central  feature  of climate  change  is  its
temporal  dimension.  Cause  and  effect  are  spread  out enormously
over time.  It is not just a matter of hours, days, weeks, years, or even
mere decades.  There is a delay of many decades and then irreversible,
unavoidable  consequences  that,  once  realized,  can  last  for  literally
hundreds  and  sometimes  thousands  of  years.  Addressing  climate
change,  accordingly,  requires  people  to  take  action  now  to  redress
consequences  that will  not occur until far into the  future.  Unfortu-
nately, this  is precisely  the  kind of thinking and  decision  making  in
which people do  not naturally engage.
We are a species characterized  by myopia.69  We "think mostly in
physiological  time '70  and, because  of natural selection,  are subject  to
"the forces of psychological  denial. '71  We discount future  utility and
put off long-term  investments  in favor  of short-term  return.  We  do
that with  decisions  in our  own  lives.  But  the  tendency  is  orders  of
magnitude  larger  when  the  time periods  affected  by  those  decisions
extend  beyond  our own  lives,  as  with  climate  change,  to  temporally
distant future generations.
68  JeffreyJ. Rachlinski,  The Psychology of Global Climate Change,  2000 U.  ILL. L. REV. 299,
300.
69  See Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental  Preservation  and Second-Order  Procrastination,  35
PHIL.  & PUB.  AFF.  233,  237  (2007);  Eerik Lagerspetz,  Rationality and Politics in Long-Term
Decisions, 8 BIorIvSITrv &  CONSERVATION  149,  150  (1999)  (defining myopic  thinking  and
exploring the  differences  between  that kind of thinking and other rational  and irrational
thinking paradigms);  Dustin J. Penn,  The Evolutionary Roots  of Our Environmental Problems:
Toward a Darwinian  Ecology, 78 THE Q. REV. OF BIOLOcy 275, 284-85  (2003)  (discussing the
human tendency  to discount  the future).
70  Penn,  supra note  69, at  284  (quoting E.O.  WILSON,  BIOPHILIA:  THE  HUMAN  BOND
WITH  OTHER  SPECIES  120  (1984)).
71  Id. at 285  (quoting Garrett Hardin,  The  Tragedy of the Commons, 162  SCIENCE  1243,
1244  (1968)).
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There are many readily available  bases for our deciding to ignore
climate  change.  Many  relate  to  the  tremendous  uncertainty  that is
inevitably  injected  into  the decision-making  process when  cause and
effect are marked by the kind of extraordinary  temporal distance con-
templated  by  climate  change.  Such  uncertainty  makes it that much
easier  to  conclude,  without  any  obvious  selfishness,  that it would  be
foolish to undertake significant restraints on activity now to avoid con-
sequences in the distant future.  For instance, how can one ever know
what  consequences  will  occur  fifty,  one  hundred,  or one  thousand
years from  now?  Consider how much humankind  has transformed  in
the last millennium  and then  what enormous  arrogance  it would  re-
quire for anyone today to claim to know what human society, let alone
environmental  consequences,  will look  like in the far-off future.
Consider  the  extent  to  which  future  technology  and  scientific
knowledge  will  change during  the next hundreds  of years.  Consider
how people's  tastes  will  profoundly shift.  How  foolhardy  for  today's
generations  to  try  to  anticipate  what humankind  and  the world  will
look like  then and purport to freeze  the present in  the guise  of pre-
serving  the  future.  The  wisdom  of  such  a  self-imposed  seizure  of
human progress is certainly nowhere suggested by centuries of history
of human civilization.
Addressing  climate  change  by  reducing  resource  consumption
can also be especially difficult to accomplish.  At least on an individual
basis, natural selection has seemingly favored over- rather than under-
consumption. 72  Sometimes  described  as  an  expression  of an innate
human desire  to  attract mates  and  exercise  dominion, most humans
seek to distinguish themselves by pursuit not of wealth in any absolute
sense,  but  relative wealth. 73  Consumption  establishes  wealth and  so-
cial status, whether in the form of resplendentjewels,  clothes, or other
extravagant  goods  in  modern  society  or the  simple  consumption  of
fats  and sugars  in earlier  times.
74
Procrastination, not prescience, is the most likely result.  The nec-
essary laws are not likely to be  enacted and, even  if they are, they are
likely to be riddled with exceptions or ignored, overridden  by the de-
sire  to further delay their effectiveness. 7 5  Even worse, just as  in Gar-
rett  Hardin's  Tragedy  of  the  Commons,76  consumption  may  actually
increase in the short term as each consumer seeks to obtain his or her
share  before  the  common  supply is  exhausted.  Otherwise,  the  only
72  See id. at 282-83.
73  See id.
74  Id.
75  See Andreou,  supra note  69,  at 237-43.
76  See supra note 71  (describing  'the tragedy of commons'  as a situation in which  every
person  is compelled  to increase his or her gain "without limit-in a world that is limited").CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
benefit of any one person's  (or nation's)  unilateral  temperance  is  no
more than another person's  (or nation's)  increased  exploitation  and
the relative  impoverishment of the former.
2.  The Availability Heuristic, Space, and Complexity
The  "availability  heuristic"  describes  the  human  tendency  to
judge the likelihood  of an  occurrence based on the relative  ability to
imagine its happening.77  If one can readily imagine an occurrence-
that  is,  the  possibility  is  more  cognitively  "available"-one  is  apt  to
believe  that that  occurrence  is  more  likely  than  it in  fact  is.  In  the
field of risk regulation,  some commentators  have invoked this heuris-
tic as grounds for worrying that government may overregulate private
conduct  in order to  avoid  harms  that, although  easily  imagined,  are
extremely unlikely  to occur.  They argue  that political entrepreneurs,
taking  advantage  of "availability  cascades,"  can  enlist public support
in favor of unnecessarily stringent regulation  of conduct based on un-
realistic fears.
78
Climate  change,  however,  most  implicates  the  mirror image  of
the availability heuristic.  There is  no reason to suppose that the avail-
ability heuristic's  only policy implication  is the  tendency to  overregu-
late.  Just  as  problems  that  can  be  easily  imagined  may  in  theory
prompt overregulation, problems that cannot be easily imagined-and
therefore presumably  implicate  an "unavailability heuristic"-may  be
plagued by underregulation. 79  Climate change, of course,  is just such
an  unimaginable  problem.
There  are  several  reasons  why  climate  change  is subject  to  the
"unavailability  heuristic."  First, there  is  climate  change's  spatial  di-
mension.  The cause and effect underlying climate change are spread
out over enormous  space.  Actions on one part of the globe have con-
sequences  for  other parts  of the globe.  Just as  these  consequences
lack immediacy in time,  they lack immediacy in space,  which renders
77  See, e.g.,  Rachlinski  & Farina,  supra note  67, at  556  ("[W]hen  making judgments
about  the frequency of events,  people  often  rely  on  the  ease with  which  an  instance of a
target event can  be called  to  mind ...  .").  See generally William  N.  Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Structuring  Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A  Critical View, 87 CORNELL  L.  REV.
616  (2002)  (analyzing  lawmaking through  the  lens of theories of cognitive  psychology);
Timur Kuran  & Cass  R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51  STAN.  L.  REv.
683  (1999)  (analyzing availability cascades and suggesting reforms to avoid  their potential
harms); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,  Availability:  A Heuristic  forJudging  Frequency and
Probability,  5  COGNITIVE  PSYCHOL.  207  (1973)  (exploring how  the  availability heuristic  can
create  bias).
78  See Kuran  & Sunstein, supra note 77, at 742-43,  744-46.  "Availability  cascades" are
'social  cascades  .. .through  which  expressed  perceptions  trigger chains of individual  re-
sponses  that make  these  perceptions  appear  increasingly  plausible  through  their  rising
availability  in  public  discourse."  Id. at 685.
79  See id. at 731  n.176 ("The same process can dampen public concern and discourage
governmental  activity  with respect  to dangers  that happen  to be very serious.").
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them  more difficult to  imagine.  Spatial  gaps, like  temporal gaps,  in-
ject uncertainty  about whether  a particular  action  is truly  having  an
alleged  impact in a  distant location.
Spatially diffuse impacts are  especially  elusive for the  human im-
agination because  they inevitably render the consequences effectively
invisible  and  therefore  more  abstract.  Moreover,  the  abstraction  is
compounded  if the impacts of climate change closer to home are dra-
matically  different  from  those  in  distant  locations.  In  the  case  of
global climate  change,  of course,  such a  spatial disparity  is  not just a
theoretical  possibility;  it is  to  be  expected.  Some  parts  of the world
may actually perceive  short-term benefits to their economies  from cli-
mate  change,  while  other  parts  of the  world  may  suffer  devastating
consequences  from such change.  Were  those who were  suffering  the
more  immediate harsh consequences  the same  people who were  best
able  to  address  the  problem  in the future,  the  discrepancy  between
the  two  would  of course  present  no  obstacle  to  lawmaking.  Some
commentators  would no doubt express worry in  those circumstances
that  the  availability  heuristic  would  lead  to  overreaction  to  climate
change.  But it is just the  opposite.s0  Because  the  greatest sources of
the problem are located in nations that are likely to suffer the least in
the short term, it is that heuristic's far more evil  twin, the unavailabil-
ity heuristic,  that threatens  lawmaking.
It is  not, however, just  climate  change's  spatial  dimension  that
implicates  the  unavailability  heuristic.  The  stock/flow  nature  of cli-
mate  change,  also  discussed  above,8'  does so  as well.  People  have  a
weak intuitive  understanding  of stock/flow  relationships.  In particu-
lar, people do not intuitively grasp how stock can increase  even if flow
is  decreasing  (for  example,  how the  water  level  in  the  bathtub  can
continue  to increase  even after one turns  the faucet  down).82
Indeed, studies have demonstrated  that people do not intuitively
understand stock/flow relationships  in general, and that they are una-
ble to do so in the context of the science of climate  change in particu-
lar.
8 3  In  one recent  study of graduate  students  at an elite  university,
students  were  supplied  with  basic  information  about the  science  of
climate  change, including  the stock/flow  relationship, and  then they
were  asked  a series of questions  to discern  what kinds of steps  would
be  necessary  to  reduce  global  warming.  The  students  repeatedly
failed  to  grasp how reductions  in flow would  not necessarily  lead to
80  See,  e.g.,  Paul L. Joffe,  The Dwindling Margin  for Error: The Realist Perspective on Global
Governance and Global Warming,  5 RUTGERSJ.  L. &  PuB.  POL'Y 89, 140-41  (2007)  (describing
some of the difficulties  involved  in achieving  international cooperation  toward sustainable
development,  including  the disparate  concerns  of various nations).
81  See supra Part IA.2.
82  See id.
83  See,  e.g.,  Sterman  &  Sweeney,  supra note  31,  at 222-36.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
stock reduction.  Even for extremely bright students,  the relationship
was too  complex for ready apprehension. 4
3.  Representativeness Heuristic and Climate Change Cause and Effect
A third  tendency  of human cognition  is  the  "representativeness
heuristic."  This  heuristic  provides  that people  can more  readily  dis-
cern  cause  and  effect if the  effect  of a  given  action  seems  logically
related to the assigned cause.85  It is therefore easy to understand  how
striking  a  match  can lead  to  destruction  by fire,  or how breaching  a
dam  can  cause damage  by flood.
But for that same reason,  climate change cause and effect eludes
normal human  cognition.  There  is nothing logical or intuitive about
the relationship.  How can  buying some extra furniture at a discount
store lead to climate change?  Or driving some additional miles in the
family car, which happens  to be a SUV?  Or idling unnecessarily while
waiting to pick up a child in the school parking lot?  Or buying a state-
of-the-art high definition television?  Or using power strips and any of
a host of appliances that, for sake of consumer convenience are always
"on"  to a certain  extent and  therefore  more immediately usable?86
And, of course, it is not just discernment of the  relationship be-
tween ordinary consumer behavior and climate change that would be
necessary.  The  harmful  consequences  of all of this excess  consumer
consumption  in developed  nations, such as the United States, are not
climate  change  per se.  The  harmful  consequences  are  those  of cli-
mate  change:  people literally  starving for  food  and water  in  already
impoverished  areas  of the world, especially Africa;  the spread of new
and  more  virulent  infectious  diseases;  flash  floods  in  parts  of  Asia;
mass migrations of populations  in search  of food and water;  increased
civil unrest and even  war as  the demand for scarce  resources  intensi-
fies  in places such  as the  Middle  East.
8 7
The undeniable fact is that well-meaning  people in developed na-
tions, including our own, are engaging in extraordinarily wasteful and
unnecessary  consumption  that fuels climate  change.8 8  None of these
84  Id.
85  Tversky & Kahneman,  supra note  67,  at 11,  24-27.
86  See generally Michael  P.  Vandenbergh  & Anne  C.  Steinemann,  The  Carbon-Neutral
Individual,  82  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  1673  (2007)  (discussing the contributions  that individual ac-
tions make to  climate change).
87  See Thomas  Homer-Dixon,  Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict, in WORLD
SECURIT.  CHALLENGES  FOR A  NEW  CENrURY 342-62  (Michael  T. Klare & Yogesh  Chandrani
eds., 3d ed. 1998); IPCC Summay for Policymakers, IMPACTs,  supra note  7,  at 11-18;  LAZARUs,
supra note  2,  at 8-15  (discussing  potential  implications  of climate  change).
88  See John C. Dernbach,  Harnessing  Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Op-
tions for Congress, 26 VA.  ENvrL. L.J.  107,  144-56  (2008)  (discussing legislative  measures to
ensure  greater  individual  cooperation  with  national  efforts  to  address  climate  change);
Paul  R. Ehrlich  & Lawrence  H.  Goulder, Is Current  Consumption Excessive? A  General Frame-
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activities  would  be  remotely  acceptable  were  the  consequences  of
these  actions  clear.  Their acceptability  can  be  partially attributed  to
the  clouding  effect  of temporal  and  spatial  distances.  But  it  is  also
because  the  complexity  of  the  causal  chains  makes  those  conse-
quences  seem far removed from the actions  that contributed to  their
occurrence.89
C.  The Nature  of U.S. Lawmaking  Institutions
The nature  of U.S.  lawmaking institutions  is the third ingredient
that presents obstacles  to the enactment of climate change legislation
and  its  maintenance  over  time.  Most  simply  put,  the  kind  of law
needed  to  address  climate  change  is  precisely  the  kind  of law-be-
cause of its enormously redistributive implications-that  our lawmak-
ing system  deliberately  makes  difficult to  enact  in  the  first instance.
Our lawmaking system also  renders such  laws especially vulnerable  to
second-guessing  and  derailment  over  time  by  Congress,  Executive
Branch  officials,  and judicial  review.90  But because  the  structure  of
our lawmaking institutions  is the one ingredient that is most suscepti-
ble to ready revision, this final ingredient may well be the most signifi-
cant for current lawmaking  purposes.91
1.  The Challenges of Environmental  Lawmaking in General
I have  previously outlined why and how  I believe  environmental
lawmaking  is  generally  difficult to  accomplish  through  U.S.  lawmak-
ing institutions. 92  These reasons include  the structure of our lawmak-
ing institutions,  especially the deliberate  fragmentation  of lawmaking
authority  between  sovereigns, within sovereigns, and within branches
of sovereigns.  The reasons also include the political  processes for the
election  of members of the legislature and  executive  branch leaders,
work and Some Indications  for the United States, 21  CONSERVATION  BIOLOGy  1145,  1153 (2007)
(finding  that consumption  in many sectors of the  U.S. economy is  greatly distorted, lead-
ing  to  excessive  fossil  fuel  usage);  Vandenbergh  &  Steinemann,  supra  note  86,  at
1699-1700  (explaining that "low-hanging fruit"-behavior change  requiring little effort or
cost to be effective-allows  individuals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent).
89  Professor Jeffrey  Rachlinski  elaborates  on  two other  significant  human  cognitive
limitations potentially relevant to climate change:  "biased assimilation" and a "loss aversion
and  the status  quo bias."  Rachlinski,  supra note  68, at 304-08.  The first  refers  to the ten-
dency of people  to see what they want to see in uncertain  data, which  he argues can con-
tribute  to a polarization  of views on climate change; the second refers  to  the tendency  of
people to prefer maintaining the status quo, which  can extend  to an aversion  to incurring
costs  for future benefit.  Id.
90  See infra Part III.
91  See id.
92  See generally LAzARus,  supra note  2.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
which  are  dominated  by short-term  election  cycles  and  dependence
on massive  donations for election  campaigning.93
The  natural  and  deliberate  effect  of  fragmenting  authority
among branches  of government and between  sovereign authorities  is
to  make it more  difficult to  enact  laws.  Great  effort is  needed to  se-
cure  the necessary  congressional committee approvals;  garner  major-
ity  votes  in  both  chambers;  obtain  presidential  signature;  achieve
agency  implementation  and  enforcement;  and,  if necessary,  defeat
challenges  in court to  the law's validity.
There is,  in short, a strong structural bias within our existing law-
making  institutions  in  favor  of government  acting  slowly  and  incre-
mentally.94  Whatever their ideological  bent, sweeping  law reforms  in
response  to new information  or values are very difficult to accomplish
without institutional change, yet those  same institutions that need re-
form  resist just that possibility.
The  features  of environmental  protection  law, moreover,  make
reform  an  especially  demanding  undertaking.  Because  of environ-
mental  law's inherently  redistributive  thrust, there  will  almost always
be those resisting the change who, under existing law, possess consid-
erable  resources that they will work hard to avoid losing.9 5  They will
also  be  able  to  base  their opposition  to  statutory  enactments  on  the
substantial  scientific  uncertainty  and  sheer  complexity  surrounding
ecological  injury.  The latter, in  particular, will render the  process  of
legislating detailed  statutory provisions  especially difficult.
Environmental  law's  inherently  dynamic  nature  creates  further
obstacles  in that multiple  statutes, statutory amendments, and regula-
tory revisions are likely to be necessary over time.  Securing passage of
environmental  law  is  not just a  matter of exploiting one  opportune
moment  in  time.  It requires  multiple  debates  and  lobbying efforts,
with  any  one failed  effort potentially leading  to  the  aforementioned
irreversible,  catastrophic  environmental  harm.  Environmental  law
must be flexible and responsive  to new information regarding ecologi-
cal  cause  and  effect,  available  technology,  and  changing  lifestyles.
The  essentially  conservative,  fragmented,  and  deliberately  cumber-
some process for lawmaking in the United States does not readily lend
itself to such responsive,  iterative  lawmaking  initiatives.
93  I derive the discussion in this subsection from the somewhat fuller analysis in LAZA-
RUS,  supra note  2,  at 29-42.
94  See Alan  M. Jacobs,  The Politics  of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policymaking  for
the Long Term, 38 BIT. J. POL. SCI.  193, 201  (2008)  (arguing that one way to make distribu-
tional  tradeoffs  harder  to accomplish  is  to spread  out lawmaking  power, which  makes  it
harder  to enact laws and gives more leverage  to potential losers, thereby creating, in effect,
a veto).
95  See  MANCUR  OLSON,  THE  LOGIC  OF  COLLECTIVE  ACTION:  PUBLIC  GOODS  AND  THE
THEORY  OF  GROUPS  2,  53-65  (2d  prtg. 1971).
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Fragmentation  also  makes  it difficult  to  address issues in a  com-
prehensive, holistic fashion.  Ecological injury resists narrow redress-
due  to  the  highly  interrelated  nature  of the  ecosystem,  it  is  almost
always  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  one  can  isolate  a  single,  discrete
cause as the source of an environmental problem.  A broader overview
that accounts for the full spatial and temporal dimensions of the mat-
ter is needed.  Failure  to pursue such an overview  is likely to result in
an approach that is at best ineffective  and at worst unwittingly destruc-
tive because of unanticipated  consequences.  If, however,  governmen-
tal  jurisdiction  over  the  host  of  diverse  activities  affecting  the
ecosystem  is divided among many entities, necessary coordination  and
overview  are surprisingly difficult.
The institutional obstacle of fragmentation  not only arises  among
the  various  branches,  but  also  within  them.  Fragmentation  of con-
gressional committee jurisdiction over environmental  issues is inevita-
ble given  the ways  in which ecological  cause  and effect span so many
diverse  human  activities.  Environmental  law will  invariably implicate
the interests not just of congressional committees  concerned with en-
vironmental law per se, but also of most major committees  concerned
with various aspects  of the economy and society potentially subject  to
environmental  regulations-the  tremendous  spatial  and  temporal
dimensions  of ecological  injury guarantee  it.
Moreover,  because  of the  separation  of authorizing  committees
and  appropriations  committees  in  both  congressional  chambers,
there are likely to be powerful  factions on appropriations  committees
particularly  skeptical  of the  thrust of environmental  protection  laws.
Due to self-selection  or their experience  on  other committees  prima-
rily concerned  with budgetary limitations,  members named to appro-
priations committees  are likely to be  especially sensitive  to  economic
costs.  For  that  reason,  they are  likely  to  be  disproportionately  con-
cerned  with  the more immediate and  known economic  costs of envi-
ronmental controls than  they are responsive  to the more speculative,
uncertain,  long-term  benefits  of those  same  controls.  Accordingly,
they  are  prone  to  inserting  appropriations  riders  that  preclude  the
meaningful implementation of previously enacted legislation that they
dislike.
Nor is such a structure merely a matter of theoretical speculation.
Just  such  an  appropriations-process-driven  dynamic  has  overridden
environmental lawmaking in the federal arena for almost twenty years.
Congress  essentially  passes  no  sweeping,  comprehensive  lawmaking
through  its authorization  committees, which  is one reason why it has
proven  so  hard  to  enact  climate  change  legislation.  The  congres-
sional  committees  that have  been  the most  active  in actual  environ-
mental lawmaking have been the appropriations  committees and theirCORAELL LAW REVIEW
subcommittees.  Members  of those  committees  have  perfected  to  a
high art the inclusion of appropriations riders in bills and earmarks in
accompanying  legislative  reports that  seek to  micromanage  environ-
mental lawmaking in the Executive Branch on behalf of narrow, short-
term economic interests to which members of those committees tend
to be especially  responsive.96
A  similar  division  of  interests  is  evident  within  the  Executive
Branch.  Although  certain  agencies, primarily the EPA, have  defining
missions  that render them  especially  sensitive  to  environmental  pro-
tection concerns,  the same  is not necessarily so for many other power-
ful  forces  within  that  branch.  The  Departments  of  the  Interior,
Agriculture  (including the Forest Service),  and Commerce  (including
the  National  Oceanic  and Atmospheric  Administration)  each  have
mixed missions-they both enforce  certain  restrictions and,  because
of their own resource management activities, are subject to others.  As
a result, a single agency  often includes offices  (such  as  the Fish  and
Wildlife  Service and the Bureau  of Land Management  at the Depart-
ment of the Interior) with sharply contrasting policy outlooks.  Other
very powerful cabinet agencies, such  as the Departments of Transpor-
tation, Energy, and Defense,  are  mostly the  targets  of environmental
regulation and therefore  are more likely  to  be skeptical  of tough re-
strictions  that cabin  their discretionary  authority  to  pursue their pri-
mary agendas.  And, of course, the Office of Management  and Budget
(OMB) within the Executive Office of the President is, at least histori-
cally, systematically  focused  on the near-term  economic  outlook  and
its budgetary implications.
The  result  is a  disjunction  of sorts within  the  federal  Executive
Branch.  The federal Executive Branch  is simultaneously  the regulator
and the regulated.  Some portions  of the Branch  take  an expansive,
supportive  view  of environmental  protection  law,  while  other  parts
embrace  a narrower,  more  skeptical  outlook.  The  highly uncertain
nature of ecological  cause and effect and its complexity provide much
fodder for disagreement, which both informs and slows down the law-
making process.
97
The  peculiar  political  systems  that  have  developed  around  gov-
ernment in the United  States,  especially  surrounding the  election of
the  President,  members  of Congress,  and  many state  and  local  offi-
cials, provide another source  of obstacles for environmental  law.  The
most obvious  of these  obstacles  is  the extent  to which  those  running
for office are dependent on campaign donations from those with con-
siderable economic resources.  Clearly, because of its inherently redis-
96  I  have written at length on this shift in  the dynamic of environmental lawmaking in
Lazarus, supra note  4.
97  See supra Part  I.A.
1182 [Vol.  94:11532009]  SUPER WICKED PROBLEMS AMD  CLIMATE CHANGE  1183
tributive  nature,  environmental  protection  law  tends  to  be  most
threatening  to  those  who  currently  have  many  economic  resources.
Such  persons and entities  tend, notwithstanding some notable excep-
tions, to  be understandably  opposed  to laws  that would reduce  their
existing wealth and corresponding  economic  clout.  As a result, those
advocating  environmental  protection  laws  typically  face  well-funded
opposition.
At  the  same  time,  those  persons  and  entities  favoring  stronger
environmental protection laws  (that is, environmentalists)  are likely to
face severe organizational barriers  to mounting effective political cam-
paigns.  To the extent that environmentalists  are dominated by those
currently "losing" under the  existing system of laws,  they are likely to
have far fewer economic resources.  Furthermore,  as environmentalist
interests are  not always  economic  in  character  but are  instead  often
based  on  a  moral  vision  regarding  the  proper  relationship  between
humankind and the natural environment, environmentalists are espe-
cially unlikely to be able to enlist allies from  the business  community
to convert their vision  into the  campaign coffers  needed  for political
success.
Moreover,  the tremendous spatial and temporal dimensions asso-
ciated with ecological  injury create  tremendous impediments to effec-
tive  political organization  in favor of environmental protection.  The
pool of those  adversely affected  is  simply too  spread  out  over  space
and time  to effectively  organize  for collective  action.  Future  victims
do not yet know of the  damage;  for one thing, they might not yet be
born.  Present victims  are unlikely  to understand  the source  of their
suffering  given  the  extraordinary  complexity of the  natural  environ-
ment  and  the  associated  scientific  uncertainty.  Present victims  who
are aware of the source of their suffering  may also take  no action due
to the perverse incentives generated  by the prospects of "free riders,"
who exploit the ecosystem commons  to maximize their gains or mini-
mize their losses by relying on others  to make the necessary sacrifices.
Perhaps  for  these  reasons,  those  seeking  elected  office  tend  to
stress the importance  of economic growth and promise short-term  re-
sults: new businesses, new jobs, lower taxes, and a broader  tax base  to
support desired government services.  These short-term results tend to
be the catchwords  and slogans  of those seeking elected  office in rela-
tively short  electoral  cycles  (typically  two or four years),  especially at
the state and local levels.  A candidate  seeking elected office based on
an environmental agenda  that is not premised on traditional  notions
of economic growth but instead on the imposition of short-term limits
with the prospect of widely dispersed gain in the distant future  is sub-CORNELL LAW REVIEW
stantially disadvantaged  within the political system.98  Whatever short-
sightedness  individuals  have  because  of  their  basic  morality,  their
worldview  is  far  longer  than  that  of  the  typical  politician  seeking
reelection. 99
Finally, our political system  is  inherently dependent  on bargain-
ing and the forging of compromises.  The ability to compromise  com-
peting interests and thereby eliminate conflict is often the calling card
of a  successful  politician  or government official.  For  environmental
protection,  however,  compromise  is  not  always  a  viable  option.  In
some settings,  undertaking a series of compromises simply delays the
ultimate  destruction  of the  resource  of concern.  Effective  environ-
mental protection might require long-term adherence  to absolute lim-
its,  not  provisional  objectives  to  be  inexorably  bartered  away  over
time.  Yet  the  economic  pressures  on the  environment  are  constant
and unrelenting,  and  such  nonnegotiable  environmental  regulation
rarely  occurs.  That is  because  coalitions  are formed  on  the basis  of
short-term goals, and even a strong coalition  of environmentalists  can
quickly be broken down by appeals to their differing interests over the
longer term. 00
2.  The Making of Climate Change Law in Particular
Based  on the  preceding  analysis,  climate  change  law  is  no  less
than environmental lawmaking's worst nightmare, which is also why it
warrants the "super wicked" label.  By fragmenting lawmaking author-
ity and relying on short-term election  cycles, we make  it almost impos-
sible  to  form  the  political  coalitions  necessary  to  address long-term
issues.10 1  The  combination  of  the  science  of  climate  change  and
human  nature  perversely  triggers  obstacle after  obstacle.
98  See Alan  M. Jacobs,  Democracy, Public  Policy,  and Timing:  Toward  A  Theory  of
Intertemporal  Policy Choice  9  (June  3,  2004)  (unpublished  manuscript, on  file  with au-
thor),  available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Jacobs.pdf  (describing  how,  for
elected officials,  the "when" of the distribution of costs and benefits associated with  a pro-
posed  public  policy  is  crucial  and  they  naturally  favor  proposals  with  quick  positive
returns).
99  See Lagerspetz,  supra note  69,  at  159-60; William  Leblanc  et al.,  Majority-Rule Bar-
gaining  and the Under Provision of Public Investment Goods, 75 J. PUB.  ECON.  21,  21-47 (2000)
(explaining that because individuals  favor short-term  returns, politicians seeking  to maxi-
mize  votes do so even  more, which leads to underinvestment in the future and overutiliza-
tion  of natural  resources).
100  See Alan  M. Jacobs, Ties  that Bind:  Institutions,  Uncertainty,  and Politics of Long-
Term Constraint  10-11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with  author),  available  at http://
faculty.arts.ubc.ca/Jacobs/Jacobs%20Constraints%2OPaper%20-%20Workshop.pdf
(describing  the shifting nature  of political  coalitions  and how  they tend to be  organized
around  short-term  concerns  that  are  ineffective  at  maintaining  longer  term  political
agendas).
101  Id. at 10  ("[l]nstitutional  fragmentation  ...  renders  potential  long-term  commit-
ment mechanisms largely inoperative.");  see Pierrehumbert, supra note 17,  at 593 ("Solving
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First,  climate  change's  enormous  temporal  and  distributional
dimensions  undermine  the  building  of a  powerful  political  coalition
capable  of long-term  sustainability.  The  people  most  in  immediate
need of climate change  law are not even at the lawmaking table here
in the  United States.  They are  the very poor in far-removed  parts of
the globe and members of future generations, whether in the United
States  or  elsewhere,  so  temporally  distant  as  to  be  essentially
unimaginable  as  actual  human lives.  And even  those who are  physi-
cally available  and concerned  enough  about  climate  change  to  sup-
port legislative  action  are  typically  bound  together  largely  by short-
term  and narrowly  focused  interests  that serve  as a tenuous basis  for
long-term  advocacy.
Second, by contrast, the entities skeptical of and opposed or even
hostile to any such lawmaking will be extremely well represented  and
will  also  likely  be  supported  by  substantial  political  and  economic
power.  They  will  include  those  powerful  business  interests  that  be-
lieve  they have  the  most to  lose, at least  in  the short term,  from  any
significant restrictions on current economic activity for the purpose of
reducing greenhouse gas concentrations  in the atmosphere.  They are
economic  interests  that have  settled  investment-backed  expectations
in  maintenance  of the  status  quo  and for  which  a  long-term  invest-
ment might have a five-, ten-, or perhaps even a twenty-year  time hori-
zon, but nothing approaching  the temporal  reach of climate change.
They will  also include  many elected  officials.  Their  constituents  are
concerned  mostly  with  short-term,  not long-term,  factors,  reflecting
shades of Bill  Clinton's celebrated  campaign  slogan in  1992:  "It's the
economy, stupid."  But even  apart from  the constituents  who actually
cast ballots, elected  officials are responsive  to  the priorities of power-
ful economic  players who fund  their political campaigns. 1 0 2
The  potential for short-term  benefits  from climate  change in na-
tions like the  United States will  fuel other climate  change  lawmaking
skeptics.  Those  who  believe  they  have  something  to  gain,  whether
from  predictions  of enhanced  agricultural  productivity  or access  to
new  energy  resources,  will  be  naturally  reluctant  to join  a  coalition
favoring  climate change  legislation.
Third, it is not just the causes  of climate  change that are marked
by distributional disparities;  the same  is  true for the costs of reducing
greenhouse  gas emissions.  Some parts  of the United States,  some in-
the problem of global warming demands  a long-term  focus that is not a natural match  for
the way  political  institutions operate.").
102  See Cass R. Sunstein,  Irreversible and Catastrophic,  91  CORNELL L. REV. 841,  875 (2006)
(stating that politicians will  delay implementing environmental precautions  if costs "will be
incurred immediately,  and if the benefits  will not be enjoyed for many decades  ....  [be-
cause]  they  will  face  political  retribution  for  imposing  immediate  costs  and  might well
receive  little or no political gain for  delivering long-term benefits").CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
dustries,  and  some  activities  will  be  more  adversely  affected  than
others.  This  is  true  whether  the emissions  abatement  is achieved  by
emissions allowances,  carbon taxes, or technology-based  emissions  re-
duction requirements.  Although
the  net  cost  of  achieving  [significant]  levels  of  GHG  abatement
could be quite low on a societal basis, issues of timing and allocation
would likely lead various stakeholders  to perceive  the costs very dif-
ferently-particularly  during the transition  to a lower carbon econ-
omy.  Costs  will  tend  to  concentrate  more  in  some  sectors  than
others  ....  103
Those who perceive that they are on the losing end of these disparities
will invariably be able to create obstacles to implementation  by taking
advantage  of the  multiple opportunities  provided in  our fragmented
lawmaking  system.
104
Fourth, joining the skeptics will  be those concerned  about devel-
oping nations, especially China, outpacing the United States economi-
cally  if  we  were  to  diminish  our  economic  activity  to  reduce
greenhouse  gas emissions.  Even  worse, any possible positive  environ-
mental impact from our emissions  reductions  would be quickly  over-
whelmed  by emissions  increases  from sources  in those  other nations.
Accordingly,  these skeptics will be reluctant to agree to any significant
emissions  reduction  absent  enforceable  commitments  from  nations
like China to do  the  same.
Nor  is it so  easy  to  suppose  that a  grassroots  movement can  be
maintained over the long term as necessary  to overcome  the powerful
economic and political forces skeptical  of climate  change lawmaking.
Instead, as explained above, human nature, or more specifically,  limits
on human cognition,  suggest just the  opposite.  People  will generally
not perceive  the consequences  of their actions  today in distant lands
and unimaginably distant times.  The  consequences  of activities  that
promote  greenhouse  gas emissions today are too unavailable  and too
103  JON  CREYTS  ET  AL.,  REDUCING  U.S.  GREENHOUSE  GAS  EMISSIONS:  How  MUCH  AT
WHAT  CosTr?,  at ix  (McKinsey  & Co.,  Dec. 2007).
104  SeeJ.R. DeShazo  & Jody Freeman,  Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U.  PA.  L. REv.  1499,  1546-50  (2007)  (describing contrasting incentives
of various types of industries regarding the structure of climate change legislation).  Repre-
sentative John  Dingell's effort on behalf of the auto industry  to prevent passage  of more
demanding fuel efficiency standards is emblematic of the program of such  factionalization
and  its  potentially paralyzing  effect on  meaningful  climate change  legislation.  Although
Representative  Dingell  generally expresses  support  of climate  change  legislation,  he  has
frequently remained a stumbling block to efforts to include in such  legislation tougher fuel
efficiency  standards  that the  auto industry  in  his  congressional  district oppose,  notwith-
standing the  critical role  such  standards must play in reducing greenhouse  gas emissions.
See,  e.g., John  M.  Broder,  Hopes Dim for Measures to  Conserve Energy, N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept. 13,
2007, at A16  ("The mileage standard appears just in the Senate bill, having been squelched
in the House  by the opposition of Representative John  D. Dingell, the powerful Democrat
from  Michigan.").
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unrepresentative  of those activities  to allow for  the sustainable  politi-
cal movement  necessary for sustained  climate  change lawmaking.
II
CLIMATE  CHANGE'S  LAWMAKING  MOMENT  AND THE
PROPRIETY  OF PRECOMMITMENT  STRATEGIES
Of  course,  the  lawmaking  obstacles just described  explain  not
only why Congress has failed to pass climate change legislation during
the  past decade, but also why it will continue  to be  difficult for Con-
gress  to do so within the next few years.  As described  in more detail
below,  there  is  nonetheless  good  reason  to  suppose  that  domestic
politics  have  recently shifted enough  that such legislation  may in fact
soon  be  achieved.10 5  It  is therefore  important  now to  consider  how
best to  include  provisions within  any such statute  that are capable  of
increasing the law's ability to achieve  its objectives over the long term
by limiting the ability of future legislators and officials  to undermine
the  statute's  implementation.  Concerns  one  might  otherwise  have
about the antidemocratic  effects  of such lawmaking restraints should
be reduced  by the need for just those kinds  of restraints to  preserve
options for future generations.
Finally,  changes  in  the institutional  design of lawmaking  related
to  federal  climate  change  law  are  also  the  most promising  basis  for
overcoming  the features  of the  climate change  problem that make  it
so wickedly resistant to legal redress.  Three ingredients-the  science
of climate  change,  human  nature, and the  nature of our lawmaking
institutions-have  led to  the  current  logjam  precluding  effective  cli-
mate  change  legislation. 1 0 6  Those  same  three  ingredients  will  con-
tinue  to  impede  the  long-term  implementation  of  such  legislation
once it is finally enacted.  Of the three, moreover, only one is suscepti-
ble  to meaningful change in  the first instance, and that is  the institu-
tional  design  of  lawmaking  institutions. 1 0 7  The  science  of  climate
change  is a fixed factor.  It cannot be redefined  away.  To be sure, as
testified  to  by recent  events, some  politicians  may seek  to fictionalize
or  even  literally  to  rewrite  science  to  match  their  preferred  policy
views.  Such politicians pretend that the evidence of climate change  is
more equivocal  than scientific consensus  now accepts.108  Ignoring ac-
105  See infra Part  II.A.
106  See supra Parts IA-C.
107  STEPHEN  BREYER,  BREAKING  THE  VICIOUS  CIRCLE:  TOWARD  EFFEcrIvE  RISK  REGULA-
TION 55  (1993)  (describing how, because neither human nature nor congressional  politics
is susceptible  to  ready change,  it  is  best to focus instead on institutional  reform).
108  See Robert F. Rich &  Kelly R. Merrick,  Use and Misuse of Science: Global Climate Change
and the Bush Administration,  14 VA.J. Soc.  POL'Y & L. 223, 231  (2007)  (discussing the Bush
Administration's use and misuse of climate change science, in  particular its efforts to "limit
media access  to a leading scientist and.  ..  edit[ J ...  scientists'  work"); Andrew C. Revkin,CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153
tual science, however, is not a basis for addressing climate change but
just for further procrastination.
Nor can we  safely rely on human nature transforming on its own.
Here  too,  we  are who  we  are,  including  our  limited  time  horizons,
consumptive  biases,  and  susceptibility  to  certain  cognitive  errors  in
judgment.  As the Framers understood in crafting  the Constitution, it
is foolhardy to enact laws based on assumptions of who we ought to be
rather  than who we  in fact are.'0 9  Of course, utility curves  may shift
and different  societies  can  embrace  very  different  cultural  attitudes
toward resource consumption and shared communities.  And perhaps
over the longer term,  even  societies  like our own here in  the United
States  may change  and embrace  lifestyles  far less focused  on  the pre-
sent  and  more  sensitive  to  the  needs  of future generations.  Private
preferences are not static  and can change  significantly over time.  In-
formation  disclosure laws and other techniques aimed directly at indi-
vidual behavior responsible for unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions
no  doubt  can  effectively  "nudge" people  to  embrace  lifestyles  that
have much  smaller carbon footprints. 1 10
But these  kinds of changes in  private preferences are most likely
to be driven by law.'  Significant funds for public education  and in-
Climate Change  Testimony  Was  Edited by  White House,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  25,  2007,  at  A16
(describing the Office  of Management and Budget's editing of the written testimony of the
director of Centers  for Disease Control and Prevention,  which was  submitted to  the Envi-
ronment and Public Works Committee, as "'a misuse of science and abuse of the legislative
process' ")  (quoting Dr. Michael McCally);  Daniel  Smith,  Political  Science, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept.
4,  2005,  §  6 (Magazine),  at 36 (noting that American scientists are concerned that "'scien-
tific conclusions,  reached either within agencies  or by people  outside of government, are
being changed  for political  reasons  by people who  have  not done  the  scientific  work"')
(quoting Donald  Kennedy).
109  See infra notes  159-62  and accompanying  text;  see  alsoJoffe,  supra note  80,  at 97
("To  improve  the  world,  one  must  work with  human  nature  as  it  is  and  not assume  it
away.").
lo  See Richard  H.  Thaler  &  Cass  R. Sunstein,  NUDGE:  IMPROVING  DECISIONS  ABOUT
HEALTH,  WEALTH,  AND  HAPPINESS  193-96 (2008)  ("What if a way could be found to ensure
that people  see, each day,  how much energy  they  have used ....  [1f we  can find ways  to
make  energy  use  visible,  we'll  nudge  people  toward  reducing  their  energy  use  without
mandating any such  reductions."); Dernbach, supra  note 88, at 144-56 (describing possible
information disclosure and other programs directed to individual behavior); Vandenbergh
& Steinemann, supra note 86, at 1729-34 (describing individual carbon  release inventories,
information disclosure  on  related climate change impacts, and a carbon  neutral  registry).
111  Legislation  relating  to  seatbelts  is  illustrative.  Mandatory  seatbelt  legislation  is  a
classic  precommitment  strategy, and  a seatbelt  itself epitomizes an  anticipatory  restraint.
Individuals lacked  the judgment necessary  to  use seatbelts.  Mandatory seatbelt  use over-
came  that obstacle  and  eventually  caused such  a  major shift in  human  behavior  that for
most  people, any  notion  that this  legal mandate  is burdening  them or constraining  their
liberty has long  since dissipated.  Private preferences  have shifted in  response to  the legal
mandate.  See Stephen  Holmes,  Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM  AND  DEMOCRACY:  STUDIES  IN  RATIONALITY  AND  SOCIAL  CHANGE  195,  236  n.125
(Jon  Elster  & Rune  Slagstad  eds.,  1988).  Similarly, low-hanging  fruit exists  for  shifting
private preferences and lifestyles in ways that can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emis-
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formation  disclosure will certainly be an important component of cli-
mate  change  legislation  designed  to  promote  just  such  a  shift  in
public preferences  and lifestyle choices.  However,  the time frame for
action required  by the science  of climate change  does not provide  us
with the freedom to rely on public education to achieve the significant
changes necessary immediately.  The cost of further delay in reducing
greenhouse  gas emissions  is  too great.
A.  The Prospects  of Federal  Climate  Change  Legislation
Notwithstanding the  lawmaking hurdles that have  precluded en-
actment of federal  climate  change  legislation  to  date,  the  time  now
seems  ripe for its passage.  For the first time, both  the President and
congressional leaders in both chambers support passage of significant
climate  change  law.  Indeed,  never  before  has  the  occupant  of the
White  House made  passage  of such  legislation  a  primary part of his
campaign  for  the  Oval  Office.  President  Barack  Obama  repeatedly
stressed  his support of significant  climate  change  legislation  during
his  campaign,1 12  even  referring  to the  urgency  of addressing the  cli-
mate  change  issue the night of his election,
11 3 appointed  a "Climate
Czar" in  the  White  House  to  champion  the  issue,114 and, within  the
first week  of office,  issued  a memorandum  to  the  EPA directing  the
Agency  to  revisit policy  decisions  made  by  the  prior Administration
that had hindered implementation  of climate  change  law."
15
Events  outside  the  United  States  also  significantly  increase  the
likelihood  of congressional  action.  The  IPCC  2007  Report  has  re-
sions with little or no impact on human enjoyment.  SeeVandenbergh  & Steinemann,  supra
note  86, at  1699-1700.
112  See Obama for America,  Barack Obama  and Joe  Biden:  New  Energy for America,
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet-energy-speech_080308.pdf  (last visited Apr.
5, 2009)  (proposing  an  80 percent  reduction in  greenhouse  gas emissions  by 2050).
113  See Barack  Obama, Address After Winning  the Presidential  Election  (excerpt),  in
N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 5,  2008,  at P5  (presenting excerpts  from  a speech  by President-elect  Ba-
rack  Obama, who  referred to  "a planet  in peril").
114  John M.  Broder,  Title, but Unclear Power,  for a New Climate Czar, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  12,
2008, at A28  (reporting that President Obama named Carol Browner Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Energy  and Climate  Change).
1  15  John M. Broder & Peter Baker,  Obama's Order  Likely to Tighten  Auto Standards:  Signal-
ing Policy Shift; California  Leads Effort to Cut Emissions and Raise Efficiency, N.Y.  TIMES, Jan.  26,
2009, at Al  (announcing presidential  memorandum  to  the EPA, directing  the  EPA to re-
consider prior Administration's  denial of California's  application  to regulate  greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles).  On April 17, 2009,  pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson  signed formal  proposed findings that emissions of green-
house  gas  emissions  threaten  public health  and welfare  and  that combined  emissions of
such gases from new motor vehicles  and motor vehicle engines combine and contribute  to
climate change.  See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Green-
house  Gases Under  Section  202(a) of the Clean  Air Act,  (pre-publication  copy,  Apr.  17,
2009)  (to be codified at 40  C.F.R.),  available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endanger-
ment/downloads/GHGEndangermentProposal.pdf.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
moved any serious doubt from the political arena whether both signif-
icant  reduction  in greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  human  activities
and  concrete  plans  to  adapt  to  climate  change  are  now  necessary.
The long-awaited,  and  much-debated,  scientific  consensus  regarding
climate  change  cause  and effect  is now at hand.' 16
No less important, the pressure from other nations on the United
States to act as a leader in addressing climate change  is mounting to a
degree that can no longer be easily ignored.  Other nations, especially
nations in the European  Union, have  begun to address  the issue  to a
far greater extent than the United  States has.  However,  the  terms of
their engagement are frequently directly linked to whether the United
States will  also  take action.' 17
But the pressure  will not just arise from other developed  nations
that,  like  the  United  States,  have  historically  contributed  to  green-
house gas concentrations, albeit not to the same degree as the United
States.  The political  pressure will  also  be produced by  events in the
world's  poorer  nations,  as  they  begin  to  suffer  more  visibly  within
their  own  borders  and export  climate  change's  harmful  impacts  on
human health and welfare.'  1 8  Wholly apart from whatever moral obli-
gation U.S.  citizens  may  feel  to  address suffering  abroad  caused  by
wasteful energy consumption within our own borders,  the national se-
curity implications  to the United States from the resulting destabiliza-
tion of populations and governments are undeniably serious. 119  That
has long been true in theory.12 0  In the next few years,  however, some
of that theory will no  longer  be merely theoretical.
116  See supra note  7 and accompanying  text.
117  See, e.g.,  Proposal for a Decision of the European  Parliament and of the Council on
the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse  Gas Emissions to Meet the Com-
munity's Greenhouse  Gas  Emission Reduction Commitments  up to 2020, COM  (2008)  17
Final, at 4,  6  (2008)  (on file  with author)  (proposing that the European Union commit  to
30 percent greenhouse  gas emissions reduction  by 2020 as compared  to 1990, but take no
further steps toward  the goal of 50 percent reduction  by 2050 until other developed coun-
tries agree  to comparable  emissions reductions).
118  THE  CNA  CORP.,  NATIONAL  SECURITY  AND  THE  THREAT  OF  CLIMATE  CHANGE  6
(2008),  available at http://www.SecurityAndClimate.cna.org  ("Economic  and environmen-
tal  conditions in  already  fragile  areas  will further erode  as food production  declines, dis-
eases  increase,  clean  water  becomes  increasingly  scarce,  and  large  populations  move  in
search of resources.").
119  See KURT  M.  CAMPBELL  ET AL.,  THE AGE OF  CONSEQUENCES:  THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL  SECURITY  IMPLICATIONS  OF  GLOBAL  CLIMATE  CHANGE  20-21  (2007)  (describing
climate change  as "just  as dangerous-and  more  intractable-than  the arms race between
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War")  (quoting Thomas Homer-
Dixon,  Terror in the Weather  Forecast, N.Y.  TIMES, Apr.  24, 2007); THE CNA  CORP.,  supra  note
118,  at I  ("The nature  and pace of climate  changes  being observed  today and the conse-
quences  projected  by  the consensus  scientific  opinion  are  grave  and  pose  equally  grave
implications for our national  security.").
120  SeeJessica  Tuchman  Mathews,  Redefining Security, 68  FOREIGN An'.  162,  162  (1989)
(suggesting  in  1989 that "[g]lobal  developments  now suggest  the need for another analo-
gous,  broadening definition of national  security  to include  resource,  environmental  and
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There will  also likely be increased  domestic political  pressure for
federal  climate  change  legislation,  and  not just from  environmental-
ists.  As states increasingly  act to fill the gap left by Congress, business
interests will increasingly favor a national approach.  Large businesses
that operate  in many states  will far prefer one set of rules established
at the national level, even  if quite stringent, over an array of differing
standards established by fifty state sovereigns. 12 1  Those businesses will
no doubt make inclusion of some  federal  preemption  rules a  condi-
tion  of their support for  any  federal  legislation.  Nonetheless,  their
desire for federal legislation  of any kind will increase  the odds of con-
gressional enactment, whether or not the legislation passed ultimately
includes  the  kind  of  sweeping  preemption  businesses  may  have
wanted. 122
Moreover, businesses  seeking to avoid  state climate  change regu-
lation  will not be the  only ones to favor federal  legislation.  Many of
the  larger businesses  that operate  in other countries  and find them-
selves subject to climate  change regulation  elsewhere may favor legis-
lation  in  the  United  States.  For  instance,  they  may  wish  to  guard
against possible competitive  disadvantages  that might otherwise exist.
In addition, many businesses are likely to perceive  economic opportu-
nity in federal climate  change legislation. 123  Federal legislation offers
the  prospect of substantial  economic  sweeteners,  such  as  the buying
and selling of tradable  emission allowances  or subsidies  for the devel-
opment of more efficient appliances or alternative energy supplies,124
which  some  sectors  of  the  economy  hope  to  exploit  to  their
advantage.1
25
demographic  issues," given  that "[e]nvironmental  strains  ... are  .. .beginning to break
down the sacred  boundaries  of national  sovereignty").
121  DeShazo  & Freeman, supra note  104, at  1530-31,  1533-38;  see E. Donald  Elliott et
al.,  Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization  of  Environmental  Law, 1  J.L. EcON.
& ORG.  313, 326  (1985)  (describing how desire for federal  preemption  of state regulation
of motor vehicles  prompted the auto industry  to support federal  legislation).
122  See DeShazo  & Freeman,  supra note  104, at  1530-31,  1536  ("[1]ndustry demand  is
solely responsible for federal regulation, but [a multiplicity of]  state regulation  can prompt
industry  players  to  support a  federal  policy response  sooner  than  they  otherwise  might
have,  increasing  the likelihood of its passage.").
123  FRED KRUPP &  MiRiAM HoRN,  EARTH:  THE SEQUEL:  THE RACE  TO  REINVENT  ENERGY
AND  STOP  GLOBAL  WARMING 9-13, 250-52  (2008)  (describing how the institution of a cap-
and-trade system for carbon dioxide would provide  innovators  with  billions of dollars that
would  "mobilize virtually  every realm of economic  activity").
124  See  id. ("Only when legislators  make  it a regulatory  certainty that global  warming
pollution will be limited will U.S. companies  invest seriously in solar, biofuels, wave energy,
and clean  cars.").
125  SeeJuliet Eilperin,  150 Global Firms  Seek Mandatory Cuts in Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
WASH.  PoSr,  Nov. 30,  2007, at A3  (describing how some  of the  world's largest businesses,
including Coca-Cola,  General  Electric, Shell, DuPont, Nike,  and Johnson &Johnson, sup-
port a "legally binding agreement  [that]  'will provide business with the certainty it needs to
scale  up global  investment in  low-carbon  technologies"').CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Finally, it is increasingly clear that there is a significant amount of
"low-hanging fruit" that will allow people and businesses  in the United
States  to  significantly  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  without  the
kind  of severe  economic  disruption  some  have  prophesized. 126  One
of the advantages  of existing energy practices that are absurdly waste-
ful is that tremendous  efficiencies  can  be readily achieved by curbing
those  practices. 127  According  to  a  recent  widely  acclaimed  study
jointly commissioned  by leading industries and environmental  organi-
zations, the United States  already possesses  the technological  capacity
to  curtail significantly our greenhouse  gas  emissions without ruining
our  economy or making enormous  lifestyle  sacrifices.'2 8  This is true
for business,  but  is  also  true  for  individuals,  whose  energy-wasteful
lifestyles contribute  more  to  greenhouse  gas emissions  than  many  of
the nation's largest industries. 29  By adopting readily available  energy
conservation measures, individuals could reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions by as much as 60 percent.130  Although the cost of achieving
greenhouse gas reductions will rise substantially after the first series of
wasteful  behaviors  are  easily  eliminated,  those  initially  lower  costs
should make it politically  easier  to secure  a law's  passage.' 1 3   This  is
one  instance  in which  a  short-term  political  advantage  may  exist for
climate change  legislation  of human nature's myopic  tendencies.
For  all  these  reasons,  the  prospects  seem  not  only  better  than
they have ever been but even fairly good that the longstanding legisla-
tive  logjam will  finally  be  broken  and federal  climate  change  legisla-
126  See Michael  P.  Vandenbergh  et  al.,  Individual Carbon Emissions:  The Low-Hanging
Fruit,  55 UCLA L.  REV.  1701,  1705-09  (2008)  (describing a "low-hanging fruit" strategy, in
which  legislators  could try  to  achieve  large  reductions at lower costs).
127  See Vandenbergh  & Steinemann, supra note 86, at  1699-1703.
128  In a  report prepared  by McKinsey  and Company  in association  with  DTE Energy,
Environmental  Defense  Fund,  Honeywell,  National  Grid,  Natural  Resources  Defense
Council,  Pacific Gas &  Electric,  and Shell,  the authors noted  as their central  conclusion:
The United States could reduce greenhouse  gas emissions in 2030 by 3.0 to
4.5 gigatons  of  [carbon  dioxide  equivalent]  using  tested  approaches  and
high  potential  emerging  technologies.  These  reductions  would  involve
pursuing a wide array of abatement options  available  at marginal  costs  less
than  $50 per ton, with the  average net cost to the economy being far lower
if the nation  can  capture  sizable  gains from  energy efficiency.  Achieving
these  reductions  at  the lowest cost  to  the economy,  however,  will  require
strong, coordinated,  economy-wide  action that begins  in the near  future.
CREyrs  ET  AL.,  supra note  103,  at  ix  (citation  omitted);  see also  S.  Pacala  &  R.  Socolow,
Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies,
305  SCIENCE 968-72  (2004)  ("Humanity already possesses the fundamental, scientific, tech-
nical, and  industrial  know-how to solve  the carbon and climate  problem  for the next half-
century.").
129  Vandenbergh  & Steinemann,  supra note 86, at 1694.
130  Id. at 1700.
131  See Vandenbergh  et al.,  supra note  126, at  1701,  1705-09  (describing  how a  "low-
hanging fruit" strategy  could achieve large reductions  at lower costs  and which  could also
facilitate  a shift  of public support for more aggressive  regulation  in  the future).
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tion will be enacted within the next four years.  But passage  of climate
change  legislation  is one thing, while successful  implementation  over
the  decades  necessary  to achieve  its ambitious goals  is  quite another.
And  no sooner  than the  ink dries  on  the bill  signed into  law  by the
President  will  the  same  political  and  economic  forces  that long  re-
sisted the  legislation try to undermine  the new law's implementation,
especially  as costs  invariably  rise.
B.  The  Propriety of Lawmaking Restraints  in Federal  Climate
Change  Legislation
What  is  largely missing from  existing scholarship  is  direct atten-
tion  to the  question of how to  ensure the maintenance  of the neces-
sary  climate  change  legislation  over  time.  To  a  certain  extent,  this
inquiry is related to the question concerning the right mix of controls
to be adopted in the first instance.  Some types of controls are likely to
have  more staying power than others, either because they are less eco-
nomically  disruptive or otherwise more politically palatable.  It would
clearly  be  wise  to  favor  some  types  of controls  over others  for  that
reason.  Yet  consideration  of this relevant  factor  is no  substitute for
the exclusive focus of this Article's endeavor, which  is to anticipate the
challenges  that climate  change  law will  face  and structure  the  entire
program for its long-term success no matter which mix of controls the
legislation  includes.
13 2
As  I  see  it, one  of the  most significant  lawmaking  challenges  we
now face  is to exploit the upcoming  lawmaking moment  to create  cli-
mate change  laws that are not just momentary.  The requirements  of
federal  climate  change  legislation  have  to  be  steadfast  or "sticky" in
some respects and flexible in others, which  is no small feat.  The legis-
132  Accordingly,  it is not the purpose of this Article  to  enter directly  the debate  con-
cerning  the optimal  mix of controls  to achieve  the  necessary  reductions and  relief mea-
sures.  That is,  of course,  the  issue  that dominates  almost  all of  the current  policy and
lawmaking debates.  Which sectors  of the economy should  be covered  by  the  legislation:
electric utilities, mining, transportation, major industry, and agriculture?  Should the dom-
inant regulatory  tool be  a carbon  tax and,  if so, how much should it be?  Or should it be  a
scheme  for tradable emissions akin  to that utilized in  the 1990  Clean Air Act Amendments
for acid deposition?  And, if so, how should such allowances  be allocated?  Based on past
emissions?  Or  by  auction?  Or  should  the  primary  regulatory  mechanism  for  achieving
greenhouse gas  emissions reduction  be technology-based  standards, as in the Clean Water
Act?  If so,  to  what extent should  cost be considered  in  the determination  of such  stan-
dards, and under what deadlines must they  be promulgated and subject to enforcement?
These are just a very few of hundreds of first-order policy questions  with which  lawmakers
will  need  to  grapple  and answer  to  craft effective  climate change  legislation  in  the  near
future.  See,  e.g.,  Victor  B.  Flatt,  Taking  the Legislative Temperature:  Which  Federal Climate
Change Legislative Proposal  is  "Best"?, 102 Nw. U.  L. REv.  123,  139-40  (2007)  (noting that in
crafting climate  change legislation,  legislators must address several  policy  choices).  These
are  all clearly important questions, especially given that many address the short-term distri-
butional  consequences  upon  which  regulated industry most immediately  focuses.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lation must be sufficiently steadfast  to resist, over the longer term, the
constant  barrage  of pressures  launched  by  economically  and  politi-
cally powerful  interests seeking  to  delay and relax  the  law's proscrip-
tions  for their  own  short-term  gain.  But  it  would  be  no  less  of a
mistake for the law to be wholly inflexible and not subject to revision.
Precisely because  the effectiveness of any climate change  law depends
on its success  over the long term, the law must admit the possibility of
significant legislative or regulatory change in light of new information
and changing  circumstances.
The solution  to  this lawmaking conundrum  is the careful  use  of
asymmetric  lawmaking  processes  designed  to  make  some kind of fu-
ture lawmaking extremely hard to accomplish  and other kinds much
easier.  Asymmetry  will overcome  the  skewing that otherwise  exists in
our  lawmaking  fora  that  favors  those  with  short-term  interests  over
those with  long-term  interests and  those  outside  the formal jurisdic-
tional bounds  of the  relevant  lawmaking  entity,  yet  subject  to  their
laws.  Anticipatory  measures  that change  the  design  of normal  law-
making processes can  make it harder for those naturally more power-
ful  to secure  the change  in law  they seek and also make  it easier for
those naturally  less  powerful  to  safeguard  their  competing  interests,
including by securing the change in law that they believe  is necessary.
The  obvious  objection  to  any  such  deliberate  modifications  of
lawmaking  processes,  especially  those  that  make  future  lawmaking
more  difficult,  is  that they  are  antidemocratic.  These  modifications
allow  the views of existing majorities  to trump the views of future ma-
jorities who may well view sound public policy very differently.133  The
present  generation  always  tends  to  believe  that it may  well  be  wiser
than those generations who came before them or those who will come
after  them, and the risk  is too great that allowing such restraints  on
future lawmaking will allow the present, in its own self-interest, to con-
trol  the  future. 134  The  shorthand  reference  to  this  objection,  of
course, is that the dead hand of the past or present should not be able
to govern  the future.
There are, however, at least three compelling reasons for why the
dead hand concern  is not persuasive  as  applied to  the  need for sub-
stantial  lawmaking  restraints  in  federal  climate  change  legislation.
The first is that such  restraints, notwithstanding  their seemingly  anti-
democratic  implications,  have  a long and widely  accepted  history  in
domestic  law,  ranging  from  the  Constitution's  organization  of the
House and the Senate to a host of existing federal statutes that seek to
insulate  somewhat certain decisions  from politics. 135  Hence, such re-
133  See infra notes  145-49 and accompanying  text.
134  See id.
135  See infra Part  II.B.1.
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straints, rather than suggest a departure from the  nation's lawmaking
traditions, at the very least fall well within them.  Second, the lawmak-
ing restraints  in  federal  climate  change legislation  would be  deliber-
ately  asymmetric  in  order to  further  the  options available  to  future
generations, not restrict them.  Skewing currently exists  in lawmaking
in general and certain interest groups exercise undue influence  at the
expense  of  others.136  The  institutional  lawmaking  design  features
contemplated for federal climate  legislation would be designed  to re-
dress that existing skewing and therefore ultimately foster and not un-
dermine  the  fundamental  values  underlying  representative
government.
The final justification  relates  to the  sheer impracticalities  of fail-
ing  to  address over  the longer  term  the  threats  that climate  change
now poses.  Preserving the ability of future majorities to retain the full
range of options necessary for self-government most likely depends on
climate  change  legislation  capable  of  maintaining  greenhouse  gas
emissions  reductions  over  the  longer  term. 137  Otherwise,  current
lawmakers will undercut the autonomy of future majorities  by subject-
ing them  to a natural  environment that sharply curtails  their options.
In other words, cross-temporal  majority effects will occur with or with-
out climate  change  legislation.  The  question  is  not whether  to have
such cross-temporal  impacts, but which  ones  to have.  To the  extent,
therefore,  that lawmaking restraints are a necessary component  of cli-
mate  change  legislation  that  can  provide  future  majorities  with
greater opportunities, they further rather than undermine democratic
norms.
I discuss  each of these three justifications in greater detail below.
1.  A  Longstanding Tradition of Precommitment Strategies to Restrain
Future Lawmaking
Lawmaking  restraints  in  response  to  some  kinds  of  especially
challenging lawmaking  problems are a well-established  feature of law-
making.  Political  scientists,  philosophers,  scientists,  and  economists
refer  to  such  self-imposed  restraints  on future  behavior  as  "precom-
mitment" strategies. 138  Precommitment  strategies  are  techniques  we
all  use  in  our  day-to-day  lives  to  reinforce  certain  behavior  or  even
136  See id.
137  See Pierrehumbert,  supra note  17,  at 573  ("Humans have  become a major geologi-
cal force  with  the power  to  commit future millennia to practically  irreversible  changes  in
global  conditions.");  discussion  infra Part  II.B.1.
138  See Samuel  Freeman,  Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views,  19 PHIL.  & PUB.
Ari.  122,  143  (1990);  Thomas C.  Schelling, Enforcing Rules on  Oneself 1 J.L. ECON.  & ORG.
357, 363-64  (1985);  R.H. Strotz,  Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23
REv.  ECON.  STUD.  165,  165,  173  (1955);  Richard H. Thaler  & H.  M.  Shefrin,  An Economic
Theoy  of Self-Contro  89J. POL.  ECON.  392,  396-97  (1981).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
deliberately  to  limit  our  options:  placing  an  alarm  clock  the  night
before  on  the  other  side  of the  room;139  having  a friend  count our
calories  or  cigarettes;14 0  prepaying  an  annual  health  club  member-
ship;14'  holding a formal wedding ceremony to announce one's  com-
mitment in marriage  before one's family and community;  or even,  in
warfare, literally burning the bridge behind one's troops to be assured
that retreat is not an option.
1 42
One  of the  most  famous  precommitment  strategies  was  that  of
Ulysses  in  The  Odyssey.143  Ulysses'  challenge  was  to  avoid  the  ill  fate
that befell those who succumbed  to the seductive voices  of the Sirens.
The  goddess Circe  crafted,  in effect, a precommitment  strategy  that
would  allow  Ulysses  to  hear the  Sirens yet not become  their victim.
Circe instructed Ulysses  to have the men on his ship fill their ears with
wax,  tie Ulysses  tightly to  the mast, and then refuse  to  release him as
he  listened  to the Sirens'  song no matter how earnest his pleas to be
unbound.
44
Nor did the possible role of precommitment strategies escape  the
attention of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century  political philosophers
debating  how  best  to  craft  a  representative  democracy.  Many  con-
demned the notion as fundamentally antidemocratic  and foolish. Jean
Jacques Rousseau  proclaimed, "I1  est absurd6  que la volont6 se donne
des  chaines pour l'avenir  . . . ." (It is  absurd for  the will  to  lay itself
under  any restraint  regarding  the  future) .
14
5  Adam  Smith  similarly
declared  that "The earth and the fullness of it belongs to every genera-
tion,  and  the  preceding  one  can  have  no  right  to  bind  it up  from
posterity."'
1 46  Thomas Jefferson  warned that "[t]he earth belongs  to
the living, not to the  dead"1 47 and "by the law of nature,  one genera-
tion  is  to  another  as  one  independent  nation  to  another."
1 48  The
nineteenth-century  British  political philosopher Thomas  B.  Macaulay
similarly  challenged John  Stuart  Mills's  promotion  of democracy  as
the superior form of government.  Macaulay  asserted that
139  Holmes,  supra note  111,  at 236.
140  Id.
141  Schelling,  supra note  138,  at 369.
142  Jon Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge  Before  You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexi-
ties of Precommitment, 81  TEX.  L. REv.  1751,  1761-63  (2003).
143  HOMER,  THE  ODYSSEY  (Rodney  Merrill trans.,  Univ. of Mich.  Press 2002).
144  See id. at 238.
145  JEAN-JACQUES  ROUSSEAU,  A TREATISE  ON  THE SOCIAL  COMPACT  OR, THE  PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL  LAW  bk. II,  ch.  1 (London,  1795).
146  ADAM  SMITH,  LECTURES  ON JURISPRUDENCE  468  (R.L.  Meek,  D.D.  Raphael  &  P.G.
Stein  eds., Clarendon  Press  1978);  see also id. at 69-70.
147  THE JEFFERSONIAN  CYCLOPEDIA:  A  COMPREHENSIVE  COLLECTION  OF  THE  VIEWS  OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON  219  (John P.  Foley  ed.,  1900).
148  Id. at 376.
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[e]ven  if we were  to  grant that  [Mill]  had found  out the  form  of
government which  is best for the  majority of the people  now living
on the face of the earth .....  [i]t would  still be incumbent  on Mr.
Mill  to prove  that the interest  of every generation  is  identical  with
the  interest of all  succeeding  generations. 149
These  same  debates  were  reflected  in  the  early discussions  sur-
rounding the terms and proper role of our own federal  Constitution,
and  they continue  today.15
0  As Stephen  Holmes argues,  "[t]he  basic
function of a constitution is  to remove certain decisions from the dem-
ocratic process,  that is,  to  tie the  community's hands."151  The classic
justification  for such  a  restraint  is  that "constitutions  are  chains  im-
posed by Peter when sober on Peter when drunk."152  The enactment
of a  constitution  is,  at least  in theory,  a  moment  of reason  passing
limits  on  anticipated  moments  of passion.  Democracy  depends  on
such  constraints  to  survive;  otherwise,  moments  of majoritarian  pas-
sion  would  backlash  against  and  potentially  destroy  democracy  it-
self.'53  Constitutionalism  is  therefore  depicted  as an  effective  means
of balancing man's  passions and  the temptations  of power. 154
Humankind's cognitive limitations,  especially its tendency toward
myopia and susceptibility  to let passion overcome  reason, are  a domi-
nant theme underlying the arguments of those favoring such constitu-
tional  self-restraints.  According  to  Holmes,  a  "constitution  is  the
institutionalized cure for this chronic  myopia . . . ."15  The state must
overcome  the "short-sightedness of the individual  citizen" and "adopt
a long-term  perspective and take the responsibility for those decisions
that will produce benefits only in the long term."'156  Cass Sunstein has
analogously explained  how government may  try to  interfere with  pri-
vate preferences if they result from "motivational distortions that char-
acterize  addictions, habits,  and myopic  behavior."
157
149  Lagerspetz, supra note 69, at 160  (quoting T.B. Macaulay, Mill on Government (March
1829), in JAMES  MILL,  POLITICAL  WRITINGS,  271,  294-95  (Terence  Ball  ed.,  1992)).
150  See Holmes,  supra note  111,  at 201-03.
151  Id. at  196.
152  Elster, supra note 142,  at 1765  (citingJED  RUBENFELD,  FREEDOM  AND  TIME: A THEORY
OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  SELF-GOVERNMENT  130  (2001)).
153  SeeJon Elster, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND  DEMOCRAcY,  supra note  111,
at 6.
154  See Francis Sejersted, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Some Historical  Experiences of Con-
tradictions in the Striving  for Good  Government, in CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND  DEMOCRACY,  supra
note  111,  at  131,  133.
155  Holmes,  supra note  111,  at 196.
156  Lagerspetz,  supra note  69,  at 159.
157  Cass  R. Sunstein,  Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  1129,
1139  (1986).  Professor  Sunstein, however,  cautions against government  too readily seek-
ing to correct its perception  of such  "cognitive errors."  Id. at 1166.  He contends that such
governmental efforts can amount to huge intrusions  on individual  liberty, and governmen-
tal action can  itself be skewed  by irrelevancies  and rent-seeking perversions of the politicalCORNELL LAW REVIEW
The  lawmaking  structure  and laws  of the  United  States  are  rid-
dled  with  precommitment  strategies,  many  of which  are  clearly  in-
tended  to  anticipate  likely  errors  in  human judgment  that  might
otherwise  lead to  systematic  errors in lawmaking. 158  The Framers  of
the  U.S. Constitution sought for this very reason  to limit majority law-
making power in significant respects.159 James  Madison, for instance,
considered precommitment  essential because  the momentary circum-
stances  then  existing  for altruistic  lawmaking  "created  psychological
conditions  for trust and  cooperation" that were  "unlikely to endure"
and  Madison,  accordingly,  worried  about  instability  over  time.' 60
Madison  "expressly embraced the notion that what would separate his
constitution  from those that had gone before it would be a more real-
istic conception  of human nature."' 61  As the political scientist Martin
Diamond,  in his comments  on the political  science  embraced  by the
Framers  of  our  Constitution,  observed:  "[a]ncient  and  medieval
thought and practice were  said to  have failed disastrously  by clinging
to illusions  regarding how men  ought to be.  Instead, the new science
would take  man as  he actually  iS."162
Our constitutional  system deliberately  makes lawmaking  difficult
for that very reason:  to  guard against  potential overreaction  to  more
immediate  impulses  of the  moment. 163  Although  fragmentation  of
lawmaking  authority  poses  obstacles  to  climate  change  legislation,
such fragmentation  was designed,  ironically, to prevent  excessive law-
making by present generations that would effectively bind the future.
Thus, lawmaking authority is dispersed among the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive,  and Judicial  Branches  and  then  further  fragmented  within
each  of those branches.  The Legislative  Branch  is comprised  of two
chambers  to reduce  the  potential for impulsive  lawmaking;164  that is
also why representatives  within each chamber are elected for different
terms  and  from  differing  jurisdictional  boundaries. 165  The  upper
process.  Id.  He also  argues that present generations  discounting the needs of the future
need  not be considered  irrational at all.  See  id. at  1168-69.
158  See Rachlinski  & Farina,  supra note  67, at  554,  589.
159  See Elster, supra note  142,  at  1758  n.21.
160  Holmes, supra note  111,  at 216.
161  Jonathan  R.  Macey,  Competing Economic  Views of the Constitution, 56  GEO.  WASH.  L.
REV.  50, 55  (1987).
162  Jonathan  R.  Macey,  Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory,  87  COR-
NELL  L. REv.  280, 296  (2002)  (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan,  The  "New Science of  Politics"
and the Old Art of Government, 86 PuB. INT.  22, 23-24  (1987)).
163  See THE  FEDERALIST  No.  10  (James Madison),  Nos.  15,  51  (Alexander Hamilton);
Macey,  supra note  162,  at 296-99.  These protections can be seen  as counteracting heuris-
tics  and other cognitive  biases.  See Eskridge  & Ferejohn,  supra note  77,  at 639.
164  Macey,  supra note  162,  at 298;  see U.S.  CONsT.  art. I, §  1.
165  See U.S. Const. art. 1, §  2,  3.
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chamber's longer and staggered terms "ameliorate the predictable op-
eration  of the  availability and representativeness  heuristics."' 1 66
As  a further guard,  the  President  is  entitled  to  veto  legislation,
and any veto can be overcome only by a supermajority of legislators  in
both chambers.
167  Lawmaking is also generally separated  from law ex-
ecution, which guards against legislative  excesses.
168  The Constitution
provides  that  the  President  cannot  serve  more  than  two  terms,169
partly  in recognition  of the tendency  of voters to  reelect incumbents
rather than risk an unknown.
170  The Bill of Rights is  likewise riddled
with  limitations on  democratic  lawmaking  designed to  guard against
perceived  human  tendencies, for  instance:  "to  withdraw  certain  sub-
jects from  the  vicissitudes  of political  controversy,  to  place  them be-
yond  the  reach  of  majorities;" 171  to  rush  to judgment  against  the
criminally  accused;
1 72  to  silence  unpopular  speech; 173  to  disrespect
minority religions;174 to impose cruel and unusual punishment on the
despised;
175 and  to  diminish  private  property rights of the  few in  or-
der to promote  the interests of the many.
176
Finally, the  Constitution promotes an independent judiciary.  Al-
though  its  members  must  be nominated  by  the  President  and  con-
firmed  by  the  Senate,
177  the  Chief  and  Associate Justices  have  life
tenure  and  are  not subject  to removal  short  of an  impeachable  of-
fense. 178  Nor may the Legislature diminish their pay.'  79  The constitu-
tional message is  clear: the Framers sought to remove the interpreters
of the law and  the  Constitution  as much  as  possible  from  the hurly-
burly, short-term political pressures, and infighting often found in the
other two branches.  Thus, the Supreme Court does not weigh  public
opinion when deciding difficult  constitutional  cases, such  as whether
166  Eskridge  & Ferejohn,  supra note 77,  at 639.
167  U.S.  CONST.  art.  I,  § 7.
168  See Eskridge  & Ferejohn,  supra note  77, at  640.
169  U.S.  CONST. amend. XXII,  1.
170  See Bruce  G. Peabody &  Scott E. Gant,  The Twice and Future  President: Constitutional
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83  MINN.  L.  REV.  565,  601  (1999);  see also id. at
578  (quoting Thomas Jefferson  saying  "that his attachment  to the principle  of [presiden-
tial]  rotation ...  was born out of a fear that 'the  indulgence and attachments of the people
will keep  a man in  the chair after he becomes  a dotard, that re-election  through  life shall
become habitual, and election for life follow  that"' (quoting Letter from ThomasJefferson
to John Taylor,  in THE  POLITICAL  WRITINGS  OF  THOMAS JEFFERSON  142  (Edward Dumbauld
ed.,  1955))).
171  W. Va. State Bd.  of Educ. v. Barnette,  319 U.S. 624,  638  (1943).
172  See U.S.  CONST. amends. V,  VI.
173  See U.S.  CONST.  amend.  I.
174  See  id.
175  See U.S.  CONST.  amend. VIII.
176  See U.S.  CONST.  amend.  V.
177  U.S.  CONST.  art.  2,  §  2.
178  U.S.  CONST.  art.  3,  §  1.
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a  First Amendment  right exists  not to  be subject  to  criminal  punish-
ment for burning  an American  Flag.1 t 0
Early Supreme  Court precedent commented  on the Framers'  in-
tent in the Constitution to guard against the human tendency toward
myopia.  In  Fletcher v.  Peck,l8l  Chief Justice  Marshall,  writing for  the
Court  in  1810,  emphasized  "that  the  framers  of  the  constitution
viewed,  with  some  apprehension,  the violent  acts  which  might  grow
out of the feelings of the moment."182  The Constitution, accordingly,
sought to guard against or at least limit the harm that could be caused
by  such  moments  of passion:  "the  people  of the  United  States,  in
adopting that instrument, have  manifested  a determination  to shield
themselves  and their  property from  the effects  of those  sudden and
strong passions  to which  men are  exposed."183
2.  The Propriety of Using Precommitment Strategies to Overcome
Perceived Defects in Our Federal Lawmaking System
There  is  also  significant historical  precedent  for  modifying  our
nation's  normal  lawmaking  system  in  response  to  perceived  tenden-
cies  of our particular form of representative  democracy to achieve un-
sound  results in  addressing  certain  kinds  of problems.18 4  One  such
tendency, also implicated by climate change law, is the potential domi-
nation  of lawmaking processes  by  those seeking  to satisfy short-term,
more  narrowly  defined  interests  at  the  expense  of  longer-term
concerns.
For instance, Congress  sometimes delegates  lawmaking authority
to Executive  Branch  agencies  to  remove  members  of Congress  from
especially  difficult, politically  controversial decisions  that might upset
their constituents  because  of the decisions'  short-term  and  narrowly
focused consequences.' 85  Such delegation  allows Congress, in effect,
to  insulate  itself from  the influence  of powerful  interests  that would
180  See Texas  v. Johnson,  491  U.S.  397,  432-35  (1989)  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,  concurring)
(stating that no matter how  much  flag burning  offends,  such  an expression  is protected
under  the First Amendment  and cannot be  subject to criminal  prosecution).
181  10  U.S.  (6 Cranch)  87  (1810).
182  Id. at  137-38.
183  Id.  at  138.
184  Of course, what constitutes "unsound" results often  lies in  the eye of the beholder.
Political science  scholars  have long written about the  tendency  of legislative  majorities  to
seek  to  entrench  their policy preferences  in  legislation  or rulemaking  agencies  that will
survive over time,  including once they are no longer in the majority.  SeeTerry  M.  Moe, The
Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a  Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION  THEORY.
FROM  CHESTER  BARNARD  TO THE  PRESENT  AND  BEYOND,  116,  136,  138 (Oliver E. Williamson
ed.,  1990);  Matthew D. McCubbins  et al.,  Administrative Procedures  as Instruments of Political
Control, 3J.L. ECON.  & ORG.  243,  261,  264-71  (1987).
185  See Cass  R. Sunstein  & Edna Ullmann-Margalit,  Second-Order  Decisions, 110  ETHICS 5,
17  (1999).
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vigorously oppose those consequences. 186  For example, in the Health
Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act  of  1996  (HIPAA), 187
Congress sought  to produce  detailed laws governing the privacy of in-
dividual  health  records  in  electronic  form.  After  years  of legislative
stalemate,  Congress determined that it did not want to allow the legis-
lature's  longstanding  inability  to  answer  difficult  policy  questions  to
continue  to preclude  the  promulgation  of necessary  privacy rules. 188
In  deliberate  anticipation  of its  own  continued inability  to act,  Con-
gress  created  a  two-step  procedure  that would  ensure  the  establish-
ment of the needed rule.  Congress passed a law that provided for the
Department of Health  and Human Services  to submit proposed regu-
lations  to  Congress for its consideration,  but if Congress failed  to act
within a specified period of time, then the Act mandated that the De-
partment make those  regulations final.'8 9
The  same  policy  concerns  have  prompted  Congress  to  include
safeguards  in  the  organization  of  Executive  Branch  agencies,  to  re-
strain certain lawmaking options, favor  others, and generally insulate
the  agencies  from  short-sightedness  and other likely  cognitive  errors
in judgment.190  The Defense  Base  Closure  and  Realignment  Act  of
1990191  is  a contemporary  example.  The  Act's  stated purpose  is "to
provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realign-
ment of military installations  inside  the United States."1 92  The impe-
tus  for  this  special  legislation  was  congressional  realization  that  the
spatially and temporally limited interests  of individual  representatives
were precluding any kind of rational decision-making process. 193  The
adverse  economic consequences  of military base closures to the areas
186  Jacobs, supra note  100,  at 13  (citing McNollgast,  The Political  Origins of the Adminis-
trative  Procedure Act, 15J.L. EcoN.  & ORG.  180,  180-217  (1999)).
187  Pub. L.  No.  104-191,  110  Stat.  1936.
188  See Scope  of Criminal  Enforcement  Under  42  U.S.C.  §  1320d-6,  Op.  Off.  Legal
Counsel  (2005),  2005  WL  2488049,  at  *7  n.12,  available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
hipaafinal.htrn;  Peter A. Winn,  Confidentiality  in Cyberspace: The HPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERs  L.J.  617, 639-41  (2002)  (explaining  the history of the HIPAA).
189  See Pub. L.  No.  104-191,  § 264(c) (1),  110  Stat.  1936,  2033  (1996)  ("If legislation
governing standards with respect  to the privacy of individually identifiable health informa-
tion  transmitted  in connection  with  the transactions described  ...is not enacted by  [Au-
gust  21,  1999],  the  Secretary  of  Health  and  Human  Services  shall  promulgate  final
regulations  containing  such  standards  not later than  [February  21,  2000].").  The Fourth
Circuit rejected a nondelegation  doctrine challenge to this novel statutory scheme.  See S.C.
Med.  Ass'n v.  Thompson,  327  F.3d 346, 351  (4th Cir. 2003).
190  SeeJacobs,  supra note  100,  at  29-30.
191  Pub. L.  No. 101-510,  104 Stat.  1808.  I have  previously written about  this statute in
Richard J.  Lazarus,  Environmental Law  After Katrina: Reforming Environmental Law  by Re-
forming Environmental  Lawmaking, 81  TUL.  L. REv.  1019,  1049-50  (2007).  I derive  this dis-
cussion from  that earlier description.
192  Defense  Base  Closure  and  Realignment  Act  of  1990,  Pub.  L.  No.  101-510,
§ 2901(b),  104 Stat.  1808,  1808.
193  See  Kenneth  R.  Mayer,  Closing Military Bases  (Finally): Solving  Collective Dilemmas
Through Delegation, 20  LEGIS.  STUD.  Q. 393, 398  (1995).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
housing them were so serious, immediate, and focused that the politi-
cal process precluded  necessary closure decisions from being made. 194
The  resulting  patchwork  of military  bases  around  the  nation  both
wasted limited federal dollars and undermined  effective  and efficient
military  operations. 195  Only  by creating  an  artificially  rigid  and  en-
cumbered  decision-making  process  that allowed  for broader  spatial
and temporal considerations  (both budgetary- and defense-related)  to
dominate  could a more  rational decision  be  made. 196
To  that end, the Act establishes  a commission  charged with rec-
ommending  which  military  bases  should  be  closed  or  realigned.197
The  Act  also  creates  a  carefully  calibrated  procedure  to  provide
elected  officials  with  the  necessary  political  cover  and  essential
deniability.  The  procedure  includes  initial  recommendations  to  the
Commission  from  the  Secretary  of Defense, 198  Commission  recom-
mendations  for  presidential  review,' 99  the  President's  approval  in
whole or in part of the Commission recommendations,2 0 0  the possibil-
ity of a revised Commission recommendation upon presidential disap-
proval,201 and finally allowance for congressional  disapproval  by joint
resolution  of both  chambers.2 0 2  The  Act,  however,  specifically  im-
poses significant  limitations on the  timing of such congressional  con-
sideration,  limiting the ability of individual  members to  hold lengthy
hearings  and debates  and introduce  amendments. 2 0 3  The legislation
identifies which  congressional  committees  have initial jurisdiction,20 4
how much time they have to consider recommendations, 2 0 5 when con-
sideration  on each  chamber's  floor is  in order,2 0 6 how much  time is
allowed  for floor debate,20 7 and how any amendments  are barred.2 0 8
The joint resolution  is a straight up or down vote on the Commission
recommendations  as a whole.209  Although  the Act does not necessa-
rily bar Congress from changing those  self-imposed limitations,  it de-
liberately makes it harder for Congress to do so.  The Act is a restraint
that Congress  plainly welcomes  because  it is  deliberately  designed  to
194  See id. at 396.
195  See id.
196  See  id. at 396-98.
197  See Defense  Base  Closure  and Realignment  Act of 1990  § 2902(a).
198  See  id. § 2903(c).
199  See  id. § 2903(d).
200  See id. § 2903(e).
201  See  id. § 2903(e) (3).
202  See  id. § 2904(b).
203  See id. §§ 2903(b),  2908.
204  See  id. § 2908(b).
205  See  id. § 2908(c).
206  See  id. § 2908(d)(1).
207  Id. § 2908(d) (2)  (allowing  two  hours for floor debate).
208  Id.
209  See  id. § 2908(d).
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limit Congress'  perceived  accountability for decisions  that may be un-
popular in the  short term.
21 0
No doubt one of the most ambitious and strikingly innovative  ex-
ercises  of such  lawmaking  authority  was  the  creation  of the  Federal
Reserve  Board  by  the President and  Congress  in  the  early  twentieth
century.  With  rapid  technological  growth  and  economic  expansion,
the nation needed a reliable,  stable national banking system.  Several
banking crises,  including the Panic of 1907, made clear the urgency of
federal  governmental  intervention. 21 1  Yet  national  leaders  struggled
between reliance on private banks responsive exclusively to short-term
profit maximization  forces  and a national, public bank susceptible  of
being  captured  by political  leaders  promoting  their  own  competing
short-term  goals.
212
The  Federal  Reserve  System  was  born  out  of this  often  quite
heated  debate  with  congressional  enactment  of the  Federal  Reserve
Act  in  1913.213  It was  the  result of a  remarkable  collaborative  effort
spearheaded  by newly-elected  President Woodrow Wilson,  formerly a
political science  professor, Secretary  of State William Jennings  Bryan,
congressional  leaders,  and  academics. 214  Today,  such  independent
central  banks  are  routinely  considered  to  be  classic  instances  of
precommitment  strategies.
215
The  Federal Reserve  Board  of Governors,  Federal  Open  Market
Committee,  and  twelve  regional  banks  together  wield  tremendous
power over the nation's economy.  The Board controls the size of the
money  supply  by  buying  and  selling  federal  government  securities,
regulating  the  amount of money  that  member  banks  must keep  in
reserve, and adjusting the interest rates that are charged to banks that
seek  to  borrow money  from  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 216  The  re-
gional  banks  serve  as  fiscal agents for the U.S.  Treasury, but they are
210  See Mayer, supra note  193,  at 397, 405-06.
211  See ROGER  T. JOHNSON,  HISTORICAL  BEGINNINGS  ..  . THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  16-30
(1999),  available at http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/begin.pdf.
212  See id.
213  Federal  Reserve  Act,  12  U.S.C.  §§ 221-522  (2006).  See generally Federal  Reserve
Bank  of Kansas  City,  History  of the  Federal  Reserve,  FED101:  The Fed.  Reserve  Today,
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/fed]01/History/index.cfm  (last  visited  Apr.  5,
2009)  (offering an interactive  history of the Federal  Reserve  System  from  1775  to  2003).
214  SeeJOHNSON, supra note  211,  at 22-26;  Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas  City,  supra
note  213.
215  See, e.g.,JON ELSTER,  ULYSSES  AND THE  SIRENS:  STUDIES  IN  RATIONALITY  AND  IRRATION-
ALITY  90  (1979);  Sunstein  & Ullmann-Margalit,  supra note  185,  at  13.
216  See BD.  OF GOVERNORS  OF THE  FED.  RESERVE  Sys., THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  SYSrEM:  PUR-
POSES  AND FUNCTIONS  3  (9th ed. 2005),  available  at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/
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not  themselves  agencies  of the  federal  government.  They  are  each
run  by a nine-member board of directors. 217
To  insulate  Board  members  from  shorter-term  political  influ-
ences, the President appoints them to fourteen-year terms, which nec-
essarily cut across administrations;  the Chair and Vice  Chair have four-
year  terms,  subject  to  possible  reappointment.  The  Board  also  has
one  distinctive  advantage  over  ordinary Executive  Branch  and  inde-
pendent agencies: it is not subject to the congressional appropriations
process.  The Board  is self-financed  by its  own financial  transactions.
So although the Board remains subject to congressional oversight and
Congress  may,  of course,  amend the Federal  Reserve  Act at any  time
(subject  to  either  the  President's  signature  or  veto  override),  the
Board  enjoys  virtually unparalleled  insulation  from budgetary limita-
tions,  appropriations  riders,  and  other  techniques  that members  of
Congress  routinely utilize  to  micromanage  the work  of federal  agen-
cies on behalf of narrow congressional  constituencies. 21 8
3.  The Practical  Consequences of Global Climate Change and Their
Impact on Future Generations
Ironically,  however,  perhaps  the  most compelling  argument  in
favor of precommitment  strategies  in  federal  climate  change  legisla-
tion  can  be  found  in  the  arguments  historically  made  against  their
legitimacy.  The  principal  argument  against  precommitment  strate-
gies  is that the present should not be able  to bind  the future.219  No
doubt that argument has force in some contexts.  But no less certainly
it  possesses  comparatively  little  force  if  the  very  purpose  of using
precommitment  strategies  is,  as  in federal  climate change  law, to pre-
clude the present from binding the future.
After  all,  the purpose  of climate  legislation  is not  to protect the
present at the  expense  of the  future; precisely  the opposite.  Climate
change legislation seeks primarily  to protect the future at the expense
of the  present. The  most  serious  threat that the present  poses  to  the
future  is not climate  change  legislation  that  is later  hard  to unravel.
The far greater  threat  to  the future  is  the  potential  devastation  and
global destablization  that  can  occur  in the  absence of legislation  with
such precommitment  strategies.
217  See 12 U.S.C.  § 248  (2006);  BD. OF  GOVERNORS  OF THE  FED.  RESERVE  SYS.,  supra note
216,  at 10; The Federal  Reserve Board,  The  Structure of the Federal  Reserve  System:  The
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (July  8,  2003),  http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm;  see also David  Masci,  The Federal Reserve:  The Issues,
10  THE  CQ RESEARCHER  675, 676  (2000).
218  See 12  U.S.C. § 244;  BD.  OF GOVERNORS  OF  THE FED.  RESERVE  SYs.,  supra note 216, at
2-3.
219  See supra notes 132-83 and  accompanying  text.
1204 [Vol.  94:11532009]  SUPER WICKED PROBLEMS AMD  CLIMATE  CHANGE  1205
Cross-temporal  majorities  are  to  a  certain  extent  unavoidable.
Any law passed now invariably  limits the prerogatives of future majori-
ties.220  At the  very  least,  the  future inherits  the  laws  of the  present
and therefore  has  the affirmative burden of the cumbersome  process
of amending existing law.  So too, the future inherits the legal obliga-
tions and responsibilities  incurred by earlier lawmakers, which cannot
be  easily shed.  The future likewise  inherits  the natural environment,
the  bounty  of  which  can  be  irreparably  damaged  by  prior
generations.
221
Nor  is  passage  of laws  the  only way  that  the  present  may,  as  a
practical  matter, bind  the future.  Inaction  as well as action may  have
irreversible  consequences  that dramatically limit the options available
to  future  generations.  The  failure  to  enact  and  maintain  climate
change  laws  is  just  such  an  inaction.  The  catastrophic  global
destabilization  threatened  by climate  change would not only as a prac-
tical  matter bind  future  generations  but also  potentially undermine
their ability to  govern themselves  using  the full  range  of options  re-
quired  for greater  autonomy.  It would therefore  be  tragically  wrong
to posit that protection of the political prerogatives of the future pre-
cludes  current generations  from adopting laws  that seek to  preserve
the  options  of future  generations.  Sometimes  lawmaking  limits  do
weaken  the future.  But sometimes, such  limits strengthen  the  future
instead.
222
III
PRECOMMITMENT  STRATEGIES  FOR  FEDERAL
CLIMATE  CHANGE  LEGISLATION
Institutional  design  for lawmaking  matters.  As  described  above,
by structuring the "mechanisms of democracy" within our lawmaking
processes,  we  can and  routinely do  influence  not only  how decisions
are made,  but the issues  and judgments  that are  reached.223  We can
promote  the  soundness  as  well  as  the  fairness  of decisions,  which
sometimes requires that we  embrace new institutional designs for par-
220  See Michael  J.  Klarman,  Majoritarian  Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO.  L.J.  491,  504-05  (1997)  (acknowledging  that  "virtually any action  taken  by  today's
majority  may  (deleteriously)  affect the future").
221  See Eric  A. Posner  & Adrian  Vermeule,  Legislative Entrenchment: A  Reappraisal,  111
YALE  L.J.  1665,  1672,  1686-88  (2002).
222  Holmes,  supra note  111,  at 227  ("Limits  do not necessarily  weaken;  they  can  also
strengthen.").
223  ADRIAN  VERMEULE,  MECHANISMS  OF DEMOCRACY:  INSTITUTIONAL  DESIGN  WRIT SMALL
4  (2007)  ("[M]echanisms of democracy  are small-scale  rules that structure  the process by
which  laws are made .. ");  see also Adrian Vermeule,  Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountabil-
ity upon Majorities, 13 J.  POL.  PHIL.  74,  75-76  (2005)  (describing  a  variety of lawmaking
institutions,  including  Congress  and  the  Supreme  Court, that  use submajority  voting  in
certain  contexts  to ensure that minority interests  have  voices in  agenda-setting).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ticular  lawmaking  challenges  in  anticipation  of our  own  human  na-
ture and the perceived tendencies of existing lawmaking processes. 224
We  can also  design lawmaking processes  to make it harder to unravel
legislative  bargains  once  struck and,  in  effect, to  "stack the  deck" in
favor of certain interests and to the detriment of others as the statute
is implemented  over time.225
For  federal  climate  change  legislation,  asymmetric  precommit-
ment strategies will  be necessary because  of the tremendous  lawmak-
ing  challenges  presented  by  the  science  of  climate  change  in
combination with  human nature.  Some strategies should  be focused
on making it harder for otherwise disproportionately  powerful short-
term  economic  interests  to  undermine  the  legislation's  implementa-
tion.  Other  strategies  should,  conversely,  be  designed  to  make  the
law's  terms  susceptible  to  influence  by disproportionately  politically
weaker groups, in particular those seeking to protect the diffuse inter-
ests of future  generations.  In  this manner,  these  contrasting  design
features operate not unlike chutes and ladders.226  A chute  is deliber-
ately designed  to  place a  player at a disadvantage  and a ladder is  in-
tended to  make  it easier  to achieve one's  objective.
Described  below are  some preliminary  ideas,  many of which  are
traceable  to strategies  that Congress has previously embraced in other
contexts.  Some  are directed  to congressional  lawmaking and  others
to  Executive  Branch implementation  because  the risks  are present in
both branches.  The  ideas  include  tools  such  as  interagency, scientific
advisory,  and stakeholder consultation requirements to  promote  certain
voices;  statutory and regulatory hammers to  keep  statutory  implementa-
tion on track; federal preemption and non-preemption triggers  to provide for
regulatory  innovation  and  to  recognize  state sovereign  prerogatives;
and  limited and enhanced  judicial review provisions to promote the effec-
tiveness of oversight by potentially underrepresented  interests and to
diminish  the power of those who  are potentially  unduly influential.
Absent these kinds of asymmetric  precommitment  strategies,  cli-
mate  change  legislation  will most  likely  be eroded  by  the  daily  eco-
nomic and political  pressures that cannot long countenance  imposing
immediate costs in return for benefits so removed temporally and spa-
tially from  the present.  The erosion will  be  quiet yet far-reaching  in
effect.  It will  happen  in  the  chambers  of Congress,  in  the  form  of
compliance  extensions,  budgetary  shortfalls,  appropriations  riders,
224  See, e.g.,  Penn, supra note 69, at 292-95  (noting, in the context of ecological  conser-
vation,  the  importance  of observing limits on  human  altruism in  making social  policy).
225  Moe,  supra note  184,  at  136-38;  McCubbins  et  al.,  supra note  184,  at  261-63,
264-71  (describing ways  to "stack the deck"  to favor  policy entrenchment  and prefer cer-
tain  interests  over others  in statutory  implementation).
226  See supra note  6 and accompanying  text.
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and  earmarks,  and  it will  happen  in  the vast  hallways  of the federal
bureaucracy, in the form of delays in the promulgation  of regulations,
agency interpretations of statutory mandates as nonmandatory, gener-
ous agency settlements,  and simple  nonenforcement  of the law.
A.  Congress
The most significant restraint on Congress'  ability to enact sweep-
ing revisions  to federal  climate  change legislation  is already  in place.
The same fragmented system of lawmaking in Congress that the Fram-
ers  supplied,  further  fragmented  by  the  dizzying  array  of congres-
sional committees with  overlapping jurisdiction  over climate change,
that made legislation  difficult to pass in the first instance makes  it dif-
ficult to pass comprehensive  amendments  to that law once passed.  It
is much  harder  to  achieve  congressional  passage  of a  significant  law
than  to  prevent its  passage;  there  are many  opportunities  within  ex-
isting  legislative  procedures  for  less  powerful  political  interests  to
block a statute's enactment, even  a statute  supported by powerful po-
litical constituencies. 227  That is  why, for instance,  even  a highly con-
troversial  law  such  as  the  federal Superfund  law,
228  which  has  been
widely criticized  by business and political leaders for its harsh liability
scheme,  has largely  escaped significant  amendment  since  its passage
in  1980.229  Similarly,  efforts  to  lift  restrictions on  oil exploration  in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge foundered in Congress even when
the  political  party  controlling  both  chambers  of Congress  and  the
White  House  had  made  ending  that  ban  a  priority.2 30  There  is  a
strong  tendency  in  our  existing  legislative  lawmaking  framework
against  destabilization  of existing  laws,  including  laws  that may have
been  highly controversial  when originally enacted. 231
Some  have  speculated  that  Congress  could  do  even  more  and
could formally prevent amendment of an existing law by a future Con-
gress. 232  Based  on that view of the  entrenchment power of a legisla-
ture,  Congress  could  constitutionally  provide  that  an  existing  law
227  Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr.,  Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insu-
lation, 96 Am.  POL.  Sci.  REv. 321,  322  (2002)  ("Because of the multiplicity of veto points in
the legislative  process under a separation of powers  system, new laws are extremely difficult
to pass, for a minority  can  block new legislation.").
228  "Superfund" is  the popular  name  for  the federal  Comprehensive  Environmental
Response,  Compensation,  and Liability Act,  42  U.S.C.  §§ 9601-9675  (2006).
229  See LAzARus,  supra note  2,  at  150.
230  See Felicity Barringer  & Carl  Hulse, Arctic Drilling Opponents Cheer Nip-and-Tuck Vote,
N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  22,  2005,  at A30.
231  Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn,  Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE  L.J. 1215,  1216
(2001)  (describing  how super-statutes  "'stick'  in the public culture").
232  See, e.g.,  Posner & Vermeule,  supra note  221, at 1666,  1673-85  (suggesting that it is
not only constitutional  but also  normatively  attractive  to  allow  legislatures  to  bind  their
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could  not be  amended  and,  accordingly,  render  that law  absolutely
binding  on future  Congresses,  which  would  be  powerless  to  change
the law.  Whatever the merit of that theory of legislative entrenchment
authority,  which  is  at  least  subject  to  serious  constitutional  chal-
lenge,233 any such proposal for formal entrenchment would plainly be
a poor  idea for federal  climate  change  legislation for two  reasons.
The  first reason  is  entirely practical.  Any effort  to  include  such
an extraordinarily far-reaching  assertion of congressional authority in
federal  climate  legislation  would  by  itself  be  so  controversial  as  to
likely doom the  initial  legislative  effort.  Any restraints  on future  law-
making  proposed  for inclusion  in  federal  climate  legislation  will  no
doubt themselves  be subject  to  considerable  debate,  and their legiti-
macy should not become  the lightening rod of controversy that itself
perversely  prevents  the  legislation's  initial  passage  or  significantly
weakens  its  ability  to achieve  its  substantive  goals.234  Indeed, one  of
the  primary  political  advantages  of  modifications  of  lawmaking
processes  is supposed to be  their susceptibility  to flying under  the ra-
dar of close  scrutiny.235
The  second reason  is that absolute entrenchment  of federal  cli-
mate change law would  be poor public policy even  if within constitu-
tional  bounds.  The  temporal  reach  of  federal  climate  change
legislation  is  too great and there  is far too  much surrounding uncer-
tainty regarding the best way to approach  the problem to warrant such
a drastic  legislative  step.  Those  supporting  certain dramatic  steps  to
address climate change  may  prove  to be  the Sirens that Ulysses must
resist.2 3 6  It  is  sometimes  harder  than  one  realizes  to  know for  sure
233  See, e.g., John  0.  McGinnis  & Michael  B. Rappaport,  Symmetric Entrenchment: A  Con-
stitutional and Normative  Theory, 89  VA.  L.  REv.  385,  390-415  (2003); John  C.  Roberts  &
Erwin  Chemerinsky,  Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A  Reply  to Professors Posner and
Vermeule, 91  CAL.  L.  REv.  1773,  1782-95  (2003)  (addressing  the  constitutional  issues  that
legislative  entrenchment  raises).
234  See B.  Dan Wood  & John  Bohte, Political  Transaction Costs and the Politics of Adminis-
trative Design, 66J. POL.  176,  179  (2004)  ("Building a winning coalition  often depends  on
making compromises  that place  onerous  restrictions on  bureaucracies  or result  in weak
administrative designs.").
235  It  is sometimes easier politically to make  laws that change lawmaking structures and
processes rather  than  directly change substantive  law,  even  though  the former results  in
the latter.  Substantive  policy proposals are more transparent and, as a result, can be more
quickly buried  in debates  among competing  special  interests;  matters  of institutional  de-
sign  can  sometimes mask  policy differences  and  cut across otherwise  divergent interests.
See Neal  Kumar Katyal,  Internal  Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous  Branch
from Within, 115 YALE  L.J.  2314,  2323  (2006)  (arguing that broad design choices are some-
times easier  to  attain by  fiat or  legislative  inertia  than  by  specific  policies  because  policy
proposals  may get mired  in special interest competitions).
236  SeeJeremy Waldron,  Banking Constitutional  Rights: Who Controls Withdrawals?,  52 ARK.
L. REv. 533,  547  (1999)  ("What one man  calls 'greed,'  another  will call  'entitlement.'  . . .
And  what  one  faction  calls  'rage'  or  'panic,'  another  will  call  'righteous  anger'  or
'prudence.'").
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who  the Sirens are, 2 3 7  or if Peter is sober rather than drunk.238  Cer-
tainly environmental  law  has not been immune from moments when
moral outrage rather than cool analysis  has dominated  lawmaking  ef-
forts.239  Congress  therefore  plainly  needs  to  retain  authority  to
amend  any  legislation,  like  federal  climate  change  legislation,  that
purports  to achieve  its objectives  over hundreds  of years.240
There are, however, ways  that one could deliberately make  more
difficult  the  subsequent  passage  of legislative  amendments  designed
to  undermine  the law's  ability  to  achieve  its objectives,  while  still al-
lowing for the  possibility that a whole  new policy  approach  might be
necessary.  This flexibility could be accomplished by making the politi-
cal cost of such  amendments high enough  to  ensure that they could
be  enacted  only with  widespread  and  fairly  overwhelming  political
support and  therefore  beyond  the  easy  reach  of  powerful  political
forces  driven  by only short-term  interests.
One potentially powerful  technique would be to couple domestic
climate change  legislation with the United States'  agreement to inter-
national  treaty  obligations  by  making  clear  that  the  former  was  in-
tended  to  comply with  obligations  under the  latter.  These  could  be
obligations  related to the kind of multilateral agreements that will be
negotiated  in  Copenhagen  in  2009.241  Or, more  easily,  such obliga-
tions could even be tied to multilateral agreements with a smaller sub-
set of nations.  In either event,  such international  treaty  obligations,
although  subject  to  abrogation, would significantly  raise the  political
cost of any retreat from domestic  legislation  designed to fulfill  those
international  obligations.  As  a  result, both  Congress  and  the Execu-
tive  Branch  would  be  especially  cautious about  any appearance  of a
retreat and  oversight of domestic  implementation  of climate  change
legislation  would,  as  a  practical  matter,  extend  to  governments
overseas.
237  See Louis  Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1571,
1591  n.64  (1988)  (suggesting  that  an  individual's  will  or  desire  is  often  context-
dependent).
238  JED  RUBENFELD,  FREEDOM  AND  TIME:  A  THEORY  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  SELF-GOVERN-
MENT  130  (2001)  (describing how "Peter sober" legislating  for "Peter drunk" may turn  out
to be "Peter drunk" legislating for "Peter sober");  see also supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
239  Christopher  H.  Schroeder,  Cool Analysis  Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of
Federal  Environmental  Criminal  Law, 35 WM.  & MARY L. REV.  251,  253-57  (1993)  (presenting
"cool  analysis"  and  "moral  outrage"  as  two  competing  approaches  to  environmental
policy).
240  Cf  Sunstein,  supra note  102,  at  858-59,  866  (contrasting  precommitment  value
with  option  value of keeping  future options  open to  change  directions  in light of better
information).
241  See Michael  von  Billow,  The  Countdown  to  Copenhagen, UNITED  NATIONS  CLIMATE
CHANGE  CONFERENCE,  Jan. 23,  2009,  http://en.cop15.dk/news/view-ews?newsid=578.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Another possibility would be  to design federal  climate  legislation
in a manner that would create a powerful political constituency with a
strong economic incentive favoring the legislation's preservation.  For
instance,  one  reason  for  the  failure  of  regulatory  reform  efforts
launched  during  the  104th  Congress  to  cut  back  on air, water, and
hazardous waste control laws was that, by that time, much of the econ-
omy  had  already  been  effectively  "greened"  in  response  to  those
laws.242  New businesses had emerged  and economic values,  including
property values, had formed in reliance on the environmental protec-
tions promised by those laws.243  As a result, there were powerful  busi-
ness interests  and other constituencies  that found value  in the  tough
pollution control requirements and strongly resisted their undoing.244
Federal climate change legislation could include provisions delib-
erately  designed  to  create  such  constituencies.  Such  provisions
should not be difficult to create.  The tradable  emissions  program  is
expected  to  generate  billions of dollars  in  revenue  from  the  sale  of
emissions  rights.
24 5  Those  revenues  will  in  turn  be  allocated  to  ad-
dress climate  change concerns, ranging from  efforts to develop more
efficient  technologies  capable  of reducing  greenhouse  gas emissions
to assistance  to persons  and places  likely  to  suffer from  both  the cli-
mate change no longer avoidable and dislocations caused by a shift to
an  economy  that  produces  lower  emissions.246  Recipients  of those
funds will have a strong incentive to resist legislative amendments that
threaten  the  continued availability  of such financial  support.
A more finely  tuned design  feature to  resist future amendments
proposed  by narrow  interest  groups  to  relax  the  law's  requirements
would be to include language in the original bill that directly impeded
the passage  of such amendments or at least limited their effectiveness
once  passed.  Requiring  that  amendments  to  relax  emissions  reduc-
tion  requirements  be  passed  by  supermajorities  would  no  doubt be
242  See LAZARUS,  supra note  2, at  161.
243  See id. (noting  "by the  mid  1990s,  [environmental  protection  laws  had]  been  in
place for virtually a generation" and that "[p]owerful  economic interests had, during  that
time, invested millions  if not billions  of dollars in  compliance with  those  laws").
244  Id. at 161-62  (arguing that many large  companies  who had "internalized environ-
mental  law"  by the  late  1990s  "no longer  so  naturally  welcomed  the destabilization  and
legal  uncertainty  that would  likely  result from  widespread  reinvention  and  reformation
efforts"  and  noting  that by  2000,  the  market  for  the  pollution  control  industry  in  the
United  States was more  than  $200  billion and accounted for more  than  1.4  million jobs).
245  See Peter Crampton  & Suzi  Kerr, TradeabLe Carbon Permit Auctions. How and Why  to
Auction Not Grandfather,  30 ENERGY  POL'v 333, 334  (2002)  (discussing the revenue-generat-
ing possibilities of a tradable emissions  permit auction and contending  that such  a system
could  raise  $125  billion per year).
246  See, e.g.,  Lieberman-Warner  Climate  Security Act of 2008,  S.  3036,  110th Cong. tits.
V,  VI,  IX; H.R._,  110th Cong.,  tits. I  (§§ 724-29),  VI  (Discussion  Draft, as reported  by H.
Comm.  on  Energy  & Commerce,  Oct. 7,  2008)  [hereinafter  Dingell-Boucher  Discussion
Draft].
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too controversial,  even  if the provision  avoided the most serious  con-
stitutional  issue by also making clear that a future Congress could lift
that requirement  based on a  majority vote.  But there are  other pos-
sibilities,  analytically  similar  though  likely  less  controversial.  For  in-
stance,  the  original  legislation  could  provide  that  future  efforts  to
relax emissions  reduction requirements  would be legal only if accom-
panied at the time of congressional consideration  by a congressionally
delegated entity's formal analysis of the impact of the proposed relax-
ation on the law's ability to achieve  its goals.  Such a procedural hur-
dle,  in  the  form  of  a  consideration  and  information  disclosure
requirement, would undoubtedly make  it harder to  enact an amend-
ment.  And  the  most  serious  constitutional  objections  to  such  a  re-
quirement  could  be  addressed  by  making  clear  in  the  initial
legislation  that  a future  Congress  would  retain  authority  by majority
vote  to lift that procedural requirement completely  or as applied  to a
particular amendment.
247
A lesser, but also potentially effective,  limitation would be for the
original legislation  to declare a canon of construction for the statute's
interpretation.  For  instance,  the  law  could  provide  that  any future
amendments  designed to  relax  the  law's  requirements  for particular
activities would  be presumed  to last no more than  a statutorily speci-
fied number of years,  unless the  amendment expressly provided  oth-
erwise.  Such a canon could,  as a practical matter, limit the impact  of
future  efforts  to undermine  the  law's  ability to achieve  its objectives.
Here too, the  provision could  avoid the most serious  potential consti-
tutional  objections  by  making  clear  that  a future Congress  could,  of
course,  eliminate  the  canon  by  a  simple  majority vote  in  the  same
manner  as any other law.  As  described  above, however, what is theo-
retically possible to accomplish  legislatively  is much harder, as a prac-
tical  matter, to do.
A different  tack would  be  to  limit more  directly the  lawmaking
avenue  most susceptible to being used by powerful, narrowly focused
interests  seeking  to  gain short term  economic  advantage:  the  appro-
priations  process.  To the  great detriment of environmental  law, it is
the  appropriations  process that has  most lent itself to such efforts  by
riddling  environmental  law  with  appropriations  riders  and  ear-
marks.248  One possible  anticipatory response would be to include the
above procedural hurdles or canons  of statutory construction but tar-
get  them  directly  to  laws enacted  exclusively  through  the appropria-
tions  process.  The justification  would  be  the  shared  understanding
that the appropriations  process does not lend itself to the careful  de-
247  For a  discussion  of potential  constitutional  objections  relating  to "entrenchment"
of legislation,  see  supra notes 232-43 and accompanying  text.
248  See supra note 96 and accompanying  text.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
liberations  generally  warranted  for  major  changes  in  substantive
law.
2 4 9
A far bolder  move,  however,  would  be  to  insulate  parts  of the
greenhouse  gas  emissions  reduction  and  climate  change  adaptation
programs from the appropriations  process altogether.  What Congress
did with the Federal Reserve Board provides the legislative  precedent.
Congress allowed  the Federal Reserve  Board to retain revenue it gen-
erated in its operations  in order to shield  the Board from the politics
of the  congressional  appropriations  process. 25 0  The  same  could  be
done  in  the  context  of climate  change.  Implementation  of federal
climate  change  legislation  will,  assuming  a  tradable  emissions  pro-
gram, generate  billions of dollars in revenue. 251  Some of that revenue
could  be  used  to  insulate  the  especially  vulnerable  aspects  of  the
greenhouse  gas regulation program  from  the appropriations  process
and  therefore  the  short-term  economic  interests that  tend  to  domi-
nate that particular lawmaking  avenue.
B.  Executive  Branch  Lawmaking
There are  many ways  to  design  climate  change  legislation  in an-
ticipation of problems that may arise in the Executive Branch's admin-
istration  of the  law.  Some  measures  could  be  designed  to  insulate
agency  officials  to  some  extent  from  political  pressures,  especially
those  pressures  likely  to  derive  from short-term  economic  concerns,
which undermine the law's effectiveness.252  Other measures  could be
crafted  to  enhance  the  influence  of  interest  groups  that  are  con-
cerned about protecting future generations  but which  otherwise  lack
the necessary  economic  or political  clout.  Some  of the  possibilities
worthy of consideration are  catalogued  and described  below.
1.  Insulating (Somewhat) Agency  Officials from Politics
A variety of measures could be used to try to insulate agency offi-
cials  from  the  short-term  political  pressures  that could undermine  a
climate  change  statute's  effective,  fair, and  impartial  administration.
None purports to achieve complete insulation, nor should they.  Polit-
249  See Lazarus,  supra note  4,  at 632-33  (arguing that because  of a  rise of appropria-
tions legislation in the environmental context, "Congress has displayed no ability to engage
in the deliberate policymaking  essential to thoughtful resolution of the difficult economic,
social,  and moral issues  raised  by  environmental  lawmaking").
250  See supra note  218  and accompanying  text.
251  See Crampton  &  Kerr, supra note 245,  at 334  ("[A]n  efficient  auction  could  raise
$125  billion annually."); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade  System  to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARv.  ENVWL  L. REv.  293,  317 n.94 (2008)  (citing U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration  data for the proposition  that an  economy-wide  emissions permit auc-
tion could generate  annual  revenue  in excess  of $100  billion).
252  See BREVER,  supra note  107,  at 62-63  (discussing  the  advantages  of insulation  of
agencies  in terms of "rules,  practices,  and procedures").
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ical  influence  is  neither  all  bad nor  all  inappropriate.  Quite  often,
some political  accountability  is  necessary for  a law's  legitimacy,  espe-
cially if, as would no doubt be true for climate  change law,  all discre-
tionary  decisions  are  not susceptible  to  being answered  by  objective
factual  inquiry divorced  from  broader  policy  considerations. 253  The
purpose of such insulating measures  is  to  temper, not eliminate,  the
influence  of politics  on statutory  implementation.
254
For instance,  federal  climate  change  legislation  could  define  in
some  detail  the  qualifications  and  tenures of specific  agency officials
charged with particularly important and sensitive statutory responsibil-
ities.  There is no reason for Congress to delegate complete discretion
on such potentially important matters  to the President, cabinet secre-
tary,  agency  head, or other agency  officials.  Several  possibilities  are
described  below.
a.  Staggered terms of agency official appointment that cut across presi-
dential  administrations  and  thereby  promote  political  autonomy  re-
present a classic legislative  technique for reducing political influence.
The staggered  term  alone  sends  a strong  message  both  to  the Presi-
dent and  the  Senate,  which  is  responsible  for  the confirmation  pro-
cess, that the person to be chosen is not a standard political appointee
for whose appointment the President is owed heightened political def-
erence. 255  The  individual's  qualifications  are  instead  intended  to
transcend  political  loyalty  to  the  current presidential  administration
and  reflect  an expertise  grounded  more  directly  in  the  statutory  re-
sponsibilities  and  fiduciary  responsibilities  of  the  agency  position
under consideration.
25 6
253  See id. at 77  ("[Slince  many risk-related  choices are,  and  must remain,  inherently
political,  to  insulate  totally  the  group's  major  policy  decisions  from  those  of politically
responsible  officials  is neither  desirable nor possible.").
254  See id. at 77-78.
255  See Wood & Bohte, supra note  234, at 185-86  (noting the effect of staggered terms,
as well as  other devices,  on agency autonomy versus  "political responsiveness").
256  There  is  already  plenty  of precedent  for  such  an  approach  to  appointment  of
agency officials.  The Federal  Reserve  Board is an obvious example.  See supra note 218 and
accompanying  text.  Under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  the  President,  with  the  advice  and
consent of the Senate, appoints  members of the Board  generally  to fourteen-year  terms,
which  extend  far beyond the term of any President,  even assuming reelection  to a second
term.  12  U.S.C.  § 241  (2006).  From  those on the  Board,  the President can  pick a Chair-
man and Vice Chairman  who, again  upon Senate confirmation,  serve for four-year  terms,
which  may well cross  presidential administrations.  Id. § 242.  The Director of the Federal
Bureau  of Investigation  is another example.  By  statute,  the President appoints the Direc-
tor to a  ten-year  term, subject  to Senate confirmation.  See 28  U.S.C.  § 532  (2006)  (com-
menting  in  a  historical  note  that  the  Director's  term  shall  be  ten  years).  Many  other
examples exist.  The commissioners  of the Securities  and Exchange  Commission,  Federal
Communications Commission, and Federal Election  Commission each have terms fixed by
statutes.  FEC commissioners serve for single six-year  terms that are deliberately staggered
by three two-year intervals.  See 2  U.S.C.  § 437c(a) (2) (A)  (2006).  SEC commissioners serveCORNELL LAW REVIEW
b.  Length of the agency official appointment is an important  related
design feature  for promoting  agency  autonomy.  The  longer  the ap-
pointment,  the more  a government  official will  potentially feel  insu-
lated from political  pressures surrounding the implementation  of the
law for which  she is  responsible. 257  It takes  no great imagination  to
appreciate that someone with a two-year term will feel more accounta-
ble to political pressures  than someone with  a fourteen-year  appoint-
ment, as  in  the  case  of the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  That is precisely
why  members  of Congress  are  elected  every  two  years-so  that  they
will feel constant accountability-and members of the Federal Reserve
Board generally  have fourteen-year  terms-so that they will  not.  For
the  purposes  of  implementing  climate  change  law,  in  particular,
longer  agency-official  terms  are  quite  important  because  they  are
more in keeping with the longer-term agenda of climate  change.258  A
longer term of appointment also sends  a strong  message  to Congress
that this  is not a standard political  appointment, but rather one that
warrants  a more  searching  inquiry into a nominee's  background  and
expertise  for such a position.259
c.  Grounds  for agency official removal are another potentially effec-
tive design feature.  For instance,  the President can remove members
of the Federal  Reserve  Board from  their position only "for cause."260
This  sharply  limits  the  President's  authority  and  leverage  over  the
agency  decisionmaker.  Even  absent  a  formal  statutory  declaration
that removal is available  only for cause, just providing a lengthy term
of appointment  persuades  some  courts to  infer a "for cause" require-
ment,261 and  may,  as  a  practical  matter, render  the  political  cost  of
for five-year  terms.  15  U.S.C.  § 78d  (2006).  FCC Commissioners  also have five-year terms.
47  U.S.C.  § 154(c)  (2006).
257  See Wood  &  Bohte,  supra note  234,  at  186  (noting  the  potential  effect  of term
length on  the  level of agency autonomy).
258  See Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, Short-Term Leaders Should Make Long-Term Ap-
pointments, 14  INT'L  TAX  PUB.  FIN.  55,  56-57  (2007)  (discussing  the importance  of long-
term  appointments  in general).
259  Id. at 55-57.
260  12  U.S.C.  § 242.
261  For the  FEC,  FCC,  and  SEC,  however, none  of  three  federal  governing  statutes
expressly provide  the grounds, if any, for presidential  removal of a commissioner.  See,  e.g.,
2 U.S.C.  § 437c; 15  U.S.C.  § 78d; 47 U.S.C.  §  154(c).  The courts,  however,  have generally
accepted  the  notion  that even  if a federal  statute  is silent on  the grounds for presidential
removal of an agency official,  the statute may be read,  in light of the purpose and structure
of the commission,  to allow  for removal  only for  cause.  See Wiener  v. United States,  357
U.S.  349,  354-55  (1958)  (holding that tenure  protection  may be inferred  from statutory
silence  in  the context of the War Claims Commission); FEC v.  NRA Political Victory Fund,
6 F.3d  821,  826  (D.C. Cir.  1993)  (concluding  that the  FEC was  "likely correct"  that "the
President can  remove  the commissioners  only for good  cause, which  limitation  is  implied
by  the Commission's  structure and  mission  as well  as the commissioners'  terms");  SEC v.
Blinder, Robinson  & Co.,  855 F.2d 677,  681  (10th  Cir. 1988)  ("[F]or the purposes of this
case, we accept...  that it is commonly  understood that the President may remove a com-
missioner  [of the  SEC]  only  for 'inefficiency,  neglect of duty or malfeasance  in office.'");
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removing an official too high.
262  Because political pressure on agency
officials  implementing  climate  change  law  is  especially  great,  there
might  even  be  reason  to  limit  their  removal  by  procedural  mecha-
nisms beyond the substantive requirement of "for cause."  There  is no
judicially established  constitutional  requirement  that an  agency  offi-
cial be subject to the President's plenary power to remove. 263  Accord-
ingly, there are myriad  ways that this design feature  could be crafted
to narrow the grounds for removal while maintaining  the safety valve
that allows for removal in case of an extreme circumstance  of derelic-
tion of duty orjudgment.
264
d.  Agency  official qualifications and disqualfications could  also  be
statutorily  prescribed.  Such  express  qualifications  and  disqualifica-
tions  help to  ensure that the best-qualified  individual receives  an ap-
pointment.  The  qualifications  (and  disqualifications)  serve  to  limit
significantly those who  can be brought to the President's  attention as
possible nominees, empower the Senate to take more seriously its role
in confirmation,  and provide  Senators with  a  touchstone  for evaluat-
ing  credentials.  There  is  plenty  of analogous  congressional  prece-
dent,  ranging  from  requirements  that  the  Solicitor  General  of the
United  States  be "learned in  the law"265  to  requirements  that the Di-
see also Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,  513 U.S. 374, 398  (1995)  (suggesting by direct
negative  comparison that "commissioners of independent regulatory agencies" are  "remov-
able  by  the President  for  cause,"  although  incorrectly  suggesting  that such  removal  for
cause  is set forth "by the explicit terms  of the statute" for the  SEC  and FCC).
262  For example,  federal  law nowhere  provides  that the President must find  cause  to
remove the FBI Director, and the President is legally free to remove the FBI Director at any
time.  The mere fact, however, that the federal statute  creates a presumptive  ten-year term
serves  as a significant political  constraint on the President's doing  so.  As one member  of
Congress  explained  at the time  the ten-year tenure rule was adopted,  "the setting of a  10-
year term of office by Congress would, as a practical matter, preclude-or at least inhibit-
a President from arbitrarily dismissing an FBI Director for political reasons, since  a succes-
sor would have  to be confirmed  by the Senate."  122 CONG.  REc.  23,809 (1976)  (statement
of Sen. Byrd).  President Bill Clinton's ongoing dispute with FBI Director Louis Freeh, who
openly  criticized  the President and pointedly did  not resign from  office  until after  Presi-
dent  Bush  assumed  office,  illustrates  the  political  limits  on  the  president's  authority  to
control  the Director's position.  See, e.g.,  The Federal Bureau of Independence,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18,  1997, at A26; Mr. Freeh Retires, N.Y.  TIMEs,  May 4,  2001,  at A24.
263  See  Humphrey's  Executor  v.  United  States,  295  U.S.  602,  626-27  (1935)  ("[T]o
hold  that ...  the members  of the commission  continue  in office  at  the mere  will  of the
President,  might be to  thwart,  in large  measure,  the very ends  which  Congress sought to
realize  by definitely fixing  the  term of office.").
264  A statute might, for instance, describe  the removal grounds in some detail to make
it clear  that  the  grounds  are  not entirely  open-ended.  One  could  also  go  further and
create  a  procedure  for  considering  a  claim  that grounds  for  removal  were  present  and
provide for  a board  to  review  the merits  of that  claim.  The board  members  themselves
could represent  a cross-section  of relevant perspectives,  including  those  more likely to  be
sensitive  to longer term concerns.  A simple majority might not even be enough  to sustain
the  claim that removal is  warranted.
265  Act of June  22,  1870, ch.  150,  §  2,  16  Stat. 162  ("[T]here  shall be  in said  Depart-
ment an officer learned in the law, to assist the Attorney-General  in the performance of hisCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  94:1153
rector of the  Park  Service  have  "substantial  experience  and  demon-
strated  competence  in  land  management  and  natural  or  cultural
resource  conservation." 266  Congress  could well  be within  its  bounds
in  prescribing  relevant  professional  background  and  expertise  for
agency  officials  with  significant  responsibility  for  implementing  cli-
mate change law.  Congress could also, as it has often done elsewhere,
proscribe  qualifications and disqualifications intended to promote bi-
partisanship 67  or to  avoid  financial  conflicts  of interest  that  could
skew  agency  decision  making.
268
2.  Structuring  the Implementation Process to Diminish the Influence
of Short-Term Interests Likely  to Be  Unduly Influential and
to Promote Consideration of Longer-Term Interests
Otherwise Unlikely  to Receive  Their Due Weight
A  second  category  of  institutional  design  features  pertains  to
techniques  for ensuring  that  certain  kinds  of factors  are  given  due
consideration and that others are not given  undue weight during the
Executive  Branch's  implementation  of  climate  change  legislation.
These techniques can be used to promote accountability, deliberative-
ness,  impartiality,  and  transparency  in general.2 69  Alternatively,  they
can be shaped to ensure that specific  factors that are anticipated to be
duties,  to be  called  the solicitor  general  .... ").  Of historical  interest,  before Congress
added  the position of Solicitor General,  the Attorney General  was required to be "learned
in  the law."  Judiciary Act of 1789,  ch.  20,  §  35,  1 Stat. 73,  92-93  ("And  there shall  ...  be
appointed  a  meet  person, learned  in  the  law,  to  act as  attorney-general  for  the  United
States  .... ").
266  16  U.S.C.  §  1  (2006).  Members  of the  FEC are  to  be selected  based upon  "their
experience,  integrity,  impartiality,  and good judgment."  2  U.S.C.  §  437c(a) (3)  (2006).
The  entire institutional  design of the  Foreign Service  within  the  State Department  is in-
tended to promote the establishment of a bureaucracy of elite federal  employees proud  of
their substantive  expertise,  autonomy, and  independent judgment  in service  of the long-
term  interests of the nation  in foreign  affairs.  See Katyal,  supra note 235,  at 2328-31.
267  For instance, members of the FCC, FEC, and SEC must represent different political
parties.  No  more  than  three  of the  five  members of  the  SEC  "shall  be members  of the
same  political  party  and  in  making appointments  members  of different  political  parties
shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable."  15 U.S.C. §  78d(a)  (2006).
The FEC similarly  includes  a  three-out-of-six  member  ceiling  for the  same  political  party
and also expressly  provides for staggered terms for pairs of appointees from  two different
political parties.  2  U.S.C.  §§ 437c(a)(1)-(2).  The  applicable provision  for the  FCC  pro-
vides only that "[t]he maximum  number of commissioners  who  may be  members of the
same political  party shall be a number equal  to the least number of commissioners  which
constitutes  a majority of the  full membership  of the  Commission."  47 U.S.C.  §  154(b) (5)
(2006).
268  Federal  law  lists  a series  of such  disqualifications  based  on financial  interests  for
FCC Commissioners, 47 U.S.C. §  154(b) (2),  a general  prohibition for SEC Commissioners,
15  U.S.C.  §  78d(a),  and  an  extensive  prohibition  on  any employment  by  the  executive,
legislative,  or  judicial  branches  of  the  federal  government  for  the  FEC,  2  U.S.C.
§  437c(a) (3).
269  See VERMEULE,  supra note  223,  at 4-5  (proposing  mechanisms  that advance  these
core values  of democratic  constitutionalism).
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undervalued  instead  receive  their  due.  Several  possibilities  are  de-
scribed  below.
a.  Interagency consultation requirements are  one  standard  mecha-
nism for Congress  to promote  a  fuller consideration  of relevant  fac-
tors  and  therefore  reduce  the  prospects  of  a  narrow,  short-term
interest hijacking  a law's  implementation. 270  If, for instance,  there  is
reason  for  concern  that  the  agency  may  fail  to  provide  adequate
weight to the requirements of a particular federal statute to which it is
subject, it has become fairly routine to  require that agency  to consult
formally with another agency that shares  the same primary mission of
the federal  statute. 27I  That formal consultation not only provides  the
action  agency with  relevant information  that may prompt the agency
to reach a different decision, but it also places the consultant agency's
views  in  the  administrative  record. 272  As a  result, should the agency
taking action  ignore  the consultant agency's  counsel  or refuse  to  en-
gage  in the consultation altogether, it may very quickly find itself vul-
nerable  to  a successful  lawsuit brought by those  disappointed  by the
agency's  decision.
273
270  Interagency consultation  requirements are a regular feature of environmental stat-
utes.  For instance,  the Endangered  Species Act  (ESA)  requires  that federal  agencies sub-
ject to section  7 of the Act consult with  the Secretary  of the Interior  (for terrestrial wildlife
or  plants)  or the  Secretary  of Commerce  (for marine  life)  if they  believe  that an  endan-
gered  or threatened  species  may be adversely  affected  by  a contemplated  agency action.
See 16 U.S.C. §  1536(a) (1)  (2006).  The consultation  results in a formal biological opinion
by  the  Fish  and Wildlife  Service  (for  the  Secretary  of  the Interior)  or  National  Marine
Fisheries  Service (for the  Secretary of Commerce).  See id. §  1536(b)(3)-(4).  The biologi-
cal opinion considers the potential  for such an adverse effect to occur and whether reason-
able  alternatives  exist for its avoidance.  See id. Another  example  of an  existing,  effective
interagency  consultation  requirement  is section  309  of the Clean Air Act,  which  requires
federal  agencies preparing environmental  impact statements pursuant to the National  En-
vironmental  Policy Act to provide the  EPA with an opportunity  to review their draft impact
statements.  42  U.S.C.  §  7609  (2006)  ("The  Administrator  shall  review  and  comment  in
writing on  the environmental  impact of any matter relating to duties  and responsibilities
granted  pursuant to  this  chapter or other  provisions  of the  authority  of the Administra-
tor ....  .").  The Council on  Environmental  Quality regulations similarly require consulta-
tion with  offices  in  other agencies  of the federal  government with  relevant expertise.  40
C.F.R.  §  1502.19(a)  (2008)  (requiring agencies  to circulate  the entire draft to "[a]ny Fed-
eral  agency which  has jurisdiction  by law or special  expertise with  respect  to any environ-
mental impact involved").
271  SeeJ. R.  DeShazo & Jody Freeman,  Public Agencies as Lobbyists,  105  COLUM.  L. REv.
2217,  2261-63, 2288-92, 2295-2300  (2005)  (describing the impact on agency decisions of
congressionally  mandated interagency consultation,  including  potential enhanced consid-
eration  of environmental  concerns).
272  See id.
273  See,  e.g.,  Am.  Bird Conservancy,  Inc. v.  FCC, 516 F.3d  1027,  1031  (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(striking down the  FCC categorical  exclusion of communication towers from National  En-
vironmental  Policy Act  analysis  for failing  to  provide  for  required consultation  with  the
Fish  and  Wildlife  Service);  Sierra  Club  v.  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Eng'rs,  701  F.2d  1011,
1019-24  (2d  Cir. 1983)  (relying on  negative comments  in  the administrative  record sup-
plied  by the EPA, National  Marine Fisheries Service,  and Fish and Wildlife Service regard-CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
Such an interagency consultation requirement  might well  be  ap-
propriate for climate change legislation  given the wide-ranging  impli-
cations  of climate  change  rules  and therefore  the  number  of other
agency offices with  potentially relevant expertise.  It could also be  de-
liberately  enlisted  to  make  it  difficult for  any  one  agency  to  create
exceptions  or  otherwise  modify  climate  law's requirements.  For  in-
stance, the statute could provide  a strict process for any relaxation  of
legal  requirements.  In  short, the  purpose  of this statutorily created
body would, in  some respects, be  the opposite  of the purpose of the
body created by Congress in the Endangered Species Act-referred  to
as the "God Squad"-which was  to allow the lifting of restrictions nec-
essary  to prevent a  species  from  extinction.2 74  The  interagency  con-
clusion  process  in  climate  change  legislation  could,  by  contrast,  be
aimed  at  making  it  harder  to  create  an  exemption,  rather  than
easier.
275
b.  Creation of a  new  expert governmental entity would  be  an  even
more direct way for Congress to ensure that certain interests are given
due  weight during agency implementation  of climate  change  legisla-
tion.  This  office  would  provide  an authoritative  voice  guided  by ca-
reer  government  experts  who  were  more  insulated  from  political
pressures.276  Such  an  office  would  have  either  the  right to  consult
and comment on proposals or affirmative authority to oversee the stat-
ute's  implementation.  For climate  change,  Congress  could  take  the
bold step  of creating an office  with  the formal  responsibility  of safe-
ing  the U.S.  Army  Corps of Engineers'  proposal  to grant a wetlands development  permit
associated  with construction  of a major highway).
274  See 16 U.S.C. §  1536(e),  (g),  (h)  (describing the broad powers given  to the Endan-
gered  Species  Committee  to  exempt certain  federal  agency  activities  from  Endangered
Species Act restrictions on federal  agency activities that jeopardize  the continued existence
of endangered or  threatened  species); John  Copeland  Nagle,  Playing Noah, 82  MINN.  L.
REV.  1171,  1172  (1998)  (describing the operation  of the Endangered  Species Committee
and  its frequent  characterization  as  the "God Squad").
275  The  Clean Water  Act  actually contains  a  limited absolute bar  on  relaxing  certain
requirements  of discharge  permits.  See 33  U.S.C.  §  1342(o)  (2006)  (supplying an  anti-
backsliding  provision).
276  See BREYER,  supra note  107,  at 70-71  (describing the insulation  of the French Con-
seil  d'Etat).  To  some  extent,  this  proposal  resembles  what  EPA Administrator  William
Reilly  did at  the close  of his  tenure.  He created  the  EPA Administrative  Appeals  Court,
which hears  and decides appeals of challenges  to rulings by EPA administrative  law judges.
Such  rulings  had previously  been subject to  appeal  to  the  EPA Administrator,  where  the
risk was much greater that politics  would influence  the  outcome in fact or in appearance.
Decisions of the Appeals Court are not subject to Administrator  review unless the Appeals
Court seeks such  review.  Instead they  are subject  to  review only by the  federal judiciary.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1.25(e)  (2008).  Administrator  Reilly adopted this reform for the purpose of
"inspiring confidence  in the fairness  of Agency adjudications."  Changes  to Regulations to
Reflect  the  Role  of the  New Environmental  Appeals  Board  in Agency  Adjudications,  57
Fed.  Reg.  5320  (Feb.  13,  1992).
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guarding  the interests of future generations. 277  That office  could be
provided  with  a range  of authorities and  responsibilities,  from mere
reporting  authority  and formal consultation  rights  to actual  veto au-
thority over certain kinds of decisions.  No obvious domestic analogue
currently  exists, 278  although  the  Council  on  Environmental  Quality
within  the  Executive  Office  of the President  is  certainly expected  to
provide a voice within that Office for environmental concerns  in gen-
eral.  There  have,  however, been  past proposals  to  establish such  an
office  in  the  United  States,279  and  at  least a  few  other  nations  have
done so.
2 8 0
277  This idea  finds an interesting parallel  in previous  suggestions of other commenta-
tors that human  cognitive limits,  in particular  the  "availability heuristic,"  might warrant  a
lawmaking  design  feature  to guard  against  the human  tendency  to  exaggerate and  over-
react  to  certain  perceived  threats.  See  Rachlinski  & Farina,  supra note  67,  at  556.  The
recommendation  was  to counter  this tendency  by requiring  federal  agencies  to  use peer
scientific  review  or  to  consult a  website  providing  neutral  information  concerning  risk.
Another  recommendation  was  to increase  the power  of the  Office  of Management  and
Budget's Office  of Information and Regulatory Affairs to review a federal  agency's decision
based on the former's own  risk assessment.  See Kuran & Sunstein,  supra note 77, at 754-58;
see also BREVER,  supra note  107, at 60  (proposing "creation  of a small, centralized  adminis-
trative group, charged with a rationalizing mission").  My proposal is similar in that it looks
to institutional design but is very differently derived and directed.  My concern in  the con-
text of climate change finds its origins  in the potential for an "unavailability heuristic" and
the corresponding  need to guard against underregulation  rather than  overregulation.
278  An  extremely rough analogue  in existing domestic  law might be the  Office  of In-
spector General, which  currently  exists  within most Executive  Branch  agencies.  Congress
created the Inspectors General to serve as watchdogs to guard against anticipated  abuse  or
neglect of statutory agency duties and authorities.  See Inspector  General Act of 1978, Pub.
L.  No. 95-452,  92  Stat.  1101  (establishing  the  Office  of Inspector General  and  listing  its
purpose and  duties).  See generally PAUL  C.  LIGHT,  MONITORING  GOVERNMENT:  INSPECTORS
GENERAL  AND  THE  SEARCH  FOR  ACCOUNTABILITY  (1993)  (discussing the influence of Inspec-
tors General  on  government).  Each Inspector  General  is deliberately  insulated from  the
politics of the Administration  and has control  over  his or  her own  professional  staff.  See
Katyal,  supra note  235,  at  2347.  An  Inspector  General  report  can  be  highly  influential
because it can  expose wrongdoing within an agency  that the agency cannot easily ignore.
See,  e.g.,  David Johnston  & Eric Lipton,  Gonzalez Met with Advisors on Dismissals:  Record Seems
at Odds with Past Comments, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar.  24, 2007,  at Al  (discussing investigation  into
Attorney General  Alberto Gonzalez  carried out by Inspector General);  Philip Shenon, In-
spection Notes Errors  in Terror  List, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept.  7,  2007, at A24  (discussing errors found
by an Inspector General in  a Justice Department terrorist watch list and the resulting out-
cry);  David Stout,  F.B.I. Head Admits Mistakes in  Use of Security Act: Data Wrongly  Obtained;
Report Details  Improper  Demands  for Records-Bipartisan  Anger, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar. 10,  2007, at Al
(reporting the FBI Director's acknowledgment of improper use of the Patriot Act following
an Inspector  General's  report).
279  See EDITH  BROWN  WEISS,  IN FAIRNESS  TO  FUTURE  GENERATIONS:  INTERNATIONAL  LAW,
COMMON  PATRIMONY,  AND  INTERGENERATIONAL  EQUITY  124-26  (1989).
280  See id.  In Germany, there is an advocate  within  the government  whose  focus is on
long-term policies and protection of the interests of future generations.  See Gfinter Krings,
Member of the Bundestag, Address  at European Sustainability Berlin:  Linking Policies and
Implementation:  Making  SD  Strategies  a  Case  for  Parliamentary  Activities  (June 3-5,
2007),  available at http://www.eeac-net.org/workgroups/pdf/ESBO7/ESBO7_Dinner_
speechKrings-07-06-03.pdf.  In  Sweden, there  is an "Institute of Future Studies," which  is
responsible for producing  reports that focus on  the future to ensure  its general  considera-CORNELL LAW REVIEW
c.  Provisions  for consideration of more neutral, objective scientific exper-
tise during  statutory  implementation  can  also  provide  a  means  for
Congress to guide a statute's future implementation  within the Execu-
tive  Branch.  Expert scientific  consultation  can  both diminish the in-
fluence  of  politically  powerful  short-term  economic  interests  and
promote  consideration  of longer-term  consequences  if supported  by
scientific  evidence.  There  are  a wide variety  of techniques that Con-
gress could use, and has used in prior laws,281 to provide for consider-
ation  of such  expert  scientific  advice  in  federal  climate  legislation.
Congress could  provide  merely  for the production  of a report unat-
tached to any particular agency  rulemaking, or a narrowly focused re-
view  by  an  expert  group  of scientists  of a  specific  agency  decision.
The scope of such a  report or review could  range from  an entire  set
of rules  to  a  specific  environmental  protection  requirement.  The
agency itself (or a separate  office within the agency)  could employ the
scientists  or the scientists  could  be formally  outside the agency's  em-
ployment  in order to  promote independent scientific judgment.
The Fish and Wildlife  Service and  the National Marine  Fisheries
Service  are examples  of agency-employed  scientific  expertise.  Exam-
ples  of  non-agency-employed  expert  scientists  whom  Congress  has
charged  to  provide  an  agency with  formal advice  include  the  Clean
Air Science Advisory Committee,  created  by Congress  to provide  the
EPA with  advice  in the implementation  of the  Clean  Air Act,282  and
tion in  governmental lawmaking.  See Sandrine  Paillard,  Futures Studies and Public Decision
Making in Sweden,  8 FORESIGHT  56, 57-58  (2006).  The  Israeli Knesset includes  a Commis-
sion  on Future  Generations.  See KNESSET,  COMMISSION  FOR  FUTURE  GENERATIONS,  http://
www.knesset.gov.il/sponsorship/future/eng/futureindex.htm  (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
And in  Hungary,  there is  a Parliamentary  Commissioner for Future  Generations.  See PAR-
LIAMENTARY  COMMISSIONER  FOR  FUTURE  GENERATIONS:  ABOUT  THE  OFFICE,  http://www.jno.
hu/en/coll=&menu=about  (last visited  Mar.  18,  2009).  Some writers  have  also  recently
suggested  the possibility  of electing to the legislature formal  representatives of future  gen-
erations,  with varying  suggestions concerning  the qualifications of candidates for election
and  whether  they  should  be  allowed  two  votes  rather  than the  normal  single  vote.  See
Andrew  Dobson, Representative Democracy and the Environment, in DEMOCRACY AND  THE  ENvi-
RONMENT  124,  124-39  (William  M.  Lafferty  & James  Meadowcroft  eds.,  1996)  (advocating
two  votes for  future  generation  representatives);  Kristian  Skagen  Ekeli,  Giving a Voice  to
Posterity: Deliberative  Democracy and Representation of Future  People, 18 J.  AGRIC.  & ENVrL.  ETH-
ICS  429-50  (2005)  (advocating  that voters  elect both  regular  representatives  and  future
generation  representatives);  Tine Stein,  Does the Constitutional  and Democratic System  Work?
The Ecological Crisis as a Challenge to the Political  Order of Constitutional  Democracy, 4 CONSTEL-
tATIONS  420-49  (1998)  (describing  an "ecological  council"  elected by the legislature, with
longer terms than  regular legislators and with  power  to delay legislation).
281  See generally SHEILAJASANOFF,  THE FIFTH BRANCH:  SCIENCE  ADVISERS As POLICYMAKERS
(1990)  (describing widespread  use of science  advisors in federal  agency  lawmaking).
282  Under  the Clean Air Act, the  EPA Administrator  is instructed to appoint "an inde-
pendent  scientific  review  committee"  to review  the science  and make  recommendations
concerning  the  establishment  of  national  ambient  quality  standards.  42  U.S.C.
§ 7409(d) (2)  (A)  (2006).  The  statute  describes  some  of the  membership  qualifications,
including at least one physician and a member from the National Academy of Sciences.  Id.
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the  "committee of scientists"  created by Congress in the National For-
est Management  Act to provide  the Forest Service with advice  for de-
veloping  environmental  principles  for  the  management  of  the
nation's forests. 283  The Food and Drug Administration  (FDA)  utilizes
a dizzying array of expert federal advisory committees of scientists and
medical  experts in administering  its regulatory authority.284
Agencies that ignore the advice of congressionally  designated sci-
entific  experts  do  so at  their  legal  and  political  peril. 2 8 5  But,  given
those stakes, safeguards  are often needed  to protect against the natu-
ral tendency of special interests to seek to capture the scientific review
process itself.  In recent years,  there has been rising concern  that oc-
casions  for expert scientific  review  have  become just another forum
for adversarial  debates  between  experts  funded by opposing  sides of
policy disputes rather  than true opportunities  for informed  scientific
discussion,  deliberation,  and  consensus.286  There  are  nonetheless
ways to craft the selection of scientists  that reduce that risk and create
incentives  to  diminish  the  influence  of biased,  advocacy  science. 2 87
The commendable  success  of the IPCC over decades  in providing the
world with careful,  deliberative assessments  of the state of climate  sci-
ence  is  a  wonderful  example. 288  There  also  exist within  the  United
The statute  requires  the committee  to  make formal  recommendations  to  the Administra-
tion  on  several  matters,  including "new  national  ambient air  quality  standards  and  revi-
sions of existing criteria and standards  as  may be appropriate."  Id. § 7409(d) (2) (B).
283  16 U.S.C.  §  1604(h)(1)  (2006).
284  See generally INST.  OF  MED.,  FOOD  AND  DRUG  ADMIN.  ADViSORY  CoMMs.  (Richard  A.
Rettig et al.  eds.,  1992)  (listing and  evaluating  the  external  advisory  committees  used  in
administrative  decision  making);JASANOFF,  supra note  281,  at 152-79  (detailing the FDA's
advisory  network).
285  See  Felicity  Barringer,  Report Says  Interior Official Overrode  Work  of Scientists, N.Y.
TIMES,  Mar. 29,  2007, at A19  ("A  top-ranking  official overseeing the  Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice at the Interior Department rode roughshod over agency scientists, and decisions made
on her watch  may not survive court challenges  ....  ); Juliet Eilperin, EPA  Tightens Pollution
Standards:  But Agency Ignored Advisers'  Guidance,  WASH.  POST,  Mar.  13,  2008,  at Al  ("[The
administrator's]  decision  to  set a  lower but still less-restrictive  limit  than  what the  EPA's
advisory  committees  had recommended  sparked  a backlash  from  Democratic  lawmakers,
public health advocates and his own independent advisers.");  see also Holly Doremus, Scien-
tific  and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86  TEX.  L.  Rv.  1601,  1603-17  (2008)
(describing a series  of controversies involving  alleged political  manipulation  of science  in
the  administration of environmental  laws).
286  See THOMAS  0.  MCGARITy  &  WENDY  E.  WAGNER,  BENDING  SCIENCE:  How  SPECIAL
INTERESTS  CORRUPT  PUBLIC  HEALTH  RESEARCH  7-12  (2008)  (describing the negative impact
of advocacy  groups  on the  use of scientific  data in  regulatory  law).
287  See id. at 259-60, 262-69,  283-90  (making a series of institutional reform proposals
designed to  promote independent  scientific  advice to agency  decision  making).
288  See supra notes 7 and 138 and accompanying text.  The IPCC itself is a terrific  exam-
ple  of how,  by institutional  design, lawmakers  can  be  provided  with expertise  critical  to
their formulation of laws.  The IPCC was  awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 along with
former Vice  President  Al  Gore.  See Walter  Gibbs &  Sarah  Lyall,  Gore Shares Peace Prize for
Climate Change Work: Nobel Also Honors Panel of Scientists  from the U.N.,  N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  13,
2007, at Al.CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153
States itself reputable  institutions, such  as the National Academies  of
Sciences and more narrowly focused organizations  such as the Health
Effects  Institute, 2 8 9  which  focuses  on  automobile  emissions,  that
demonstrate  that it can  be  done.
With the necessary safeguards,  federal  climate change  legislation
should  be  able to  offer  multiple opportunities for Congress  to  build
into  the  implementation  process  expert  scientific  consultation  re-
quirements that keep the statute on its long-term  track and prevent its
short-term  derailment.290  Such  expert  scientific  advice  can  serve,
moreover, as an especially important check to ensure that any future
efforts  to  significantly redirect  the  statutory  focus  based  on  a  newly
discovered  understanding  of climate  science  or available  technology
find support in actual  scientific advances rather than  political science
fiction.
291
d.  Participatory  rights for selected stakeholders can  also  be  expressly
provided for in the lawmaking process in order to ensure that impor-
tant but less politically powerful voices  are heard during statutory  im-
plementation.  There  is much statutory precedent for such  a feature.
Some precedents  are in the form of federal advisory  committees  and
provide  for an advisory function with  varying degrees  of actual  influ-
ence.292  Other  bodies'  formal  authority  exists  within  the  statutorily
prescribed  lawmaking  process, such  as  the  scientific  committees just
described.293  The  Clean  Air  Act,
29 4  Taylor  Grazing  Act,
295  and  the
289  The Health Effects Institute, in Boston,  Massachusetts, is jointly funded  by the EPA
and  the automobile  industry  and  is  widely  credited  with providing important,  objective,
and impartial scientific expertise to regulators.  See McGARiTv  & WAGNER, supra note 286, at
262-65  (contrasting the  Health  Effects Institute  with  other  scientific  bodies  in  advisory
positions);JASANOFF,  supra note  281, at 208-26 (discussing the success of the Health Effects
Institute as  a  model for science  policy reform).
290  Although  not  focused on  the  particular  challenges  of climate  science,  Professor
Holly Doremus has recently  published an excellent article that proposes ways  to structure
agency  decision  making  to  promote  greater  scientific  integrity  in  environmental  poli-
cymaking.  See Doremus,  supra note  285, at 1640-52.
291  See  id. at  1643-44  (advocating  for neutral  expert  advice  to  enhance  integrity  in
environmental  policymaking).
292  See Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act, 5  U.S.C.  App.  1 (2006).
293  See supra notes 281-91 and  accompanying  text.
294  Under the Clean Air Act, there are "interstate  transport commissions"  made up of
representatives  of state  governments  and the  EPA with  authority  to  make  recommenda-
tions for strategies  to address interstate  air pollution.  42  U.S.C.  § 7506a-c  (2006).
295  Under  the Taylor Grazing  Act,  as supplemented  by  the Federal  Land  Policy and
Management  Act, resource advisory councils  consisting of members "representative  of the
various major citizens'  interests concerning the problems  relating to land use planning or
the management of the public lands" are provided  certain formal advisory  responsibilities.
43  U.S.C.  § 1739(a)  (2006).  These  responsibilities are  also  provided  to "grazing advisory
boards" that concern  the development of allotment management  plans  and the distribu-
tion of rangeland-betterment  funds.  Id. § 1753.
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Magnuson-Stevens  Fishery  Conservation  and Management  Act 296  all
provide  instances  when  Congress  sought  to  provide  stakeholders
outside the federal government with significant authority in the imple-
mentation  of  a  federal  statute.  The  results,  especially  with  the
Magnuson-Stevens  Act,  have  been  mixed,  resulting  in  encumbered
lawmaking  that  has  been  inefficient  and  slow  in  making
recommendations.
2 9 7
As  applied  to  climate  change  legislation,  however,  this  kind  of
design feature would need to be structured completely differently and
could  be far more  effective  in promoting its objective.  In  these prior
statutory  schemes,  Congress  provided  additional  political  leverage  to
already-powerful  interests, such  as the large commercial  fishing inter-
ests, which  no doubt helped secure  the legislation's initial passage. 298
The  concern  for climate  change  legislation,  however,  should be just
the  opposite  (as  perhaps  it should  have  been for the  Magnuson-Ste-
vens Act):  not that long-term  interests will  trump short-term, but that
296  Pursuant  to the  Magnuson-Stevens  Act, eight regional  fishery  management  coun-
cils  play a  critical  role  in  the  Act's  administration.  See  16  U.S.C.  §  1852  (2006).  These
councils  have  the primary  responsibility  for both  proposing  and  then initially  allocating
individual  tradable  rights  in  most fisheries,  known  as  individual  tradable  quotas.  See id.
§  1854(c) (3).  Their recommendations  become  law upon  review and approval  by  the Sec-
retary  of Commerce.  Id.  §  1854(a).  There  are  a  specified  number of voting  and  non-
voting  members  for  each  council  and  the statute  sets  forth  in  some  detail  the  general
qualifications.  See id.  §§ 1854(a),  (b).  In addition  to the Regional Director of the National
Marine Fisheries  Service for the  relevant geographic  area, id.  §  1852(b)(1)(B),  the Secre-
tary  appoints  to  the council  "individuals  who,  by reason  of  their occupational  or other
experience, scientific  expertise, or training, are knowledgeable  regarding the conservation
and management, or  the commercial  or recreational  harvest, of the  fishery  resources  of
the geographical  area  concerned."  Id. §  1852(b)(2) (A).  The  Secretary  of Commerce  is
further required  to ensure, "to the extent practicable,  . . .a fair and balanced apportion-
ment ...  of the active participants  (or their representatives)  in the commercial and recrea-
tional fisheries  under the jurisdiction  of the  Council."  Id. §  1852(b) (2)  (B).
297  The regional councils of the Magnuson-Stevens  Act were designed  to promote the
fishing industry's acceptance  of what was expected to be a controversial regulatory scheme,
especially transferable  fishing rights, by promising commercial  interests  a powerful seat at
the lawmaking  table.  Industry would  not be  limited to commenting on proposed rules but
rather was provided a formal  role in the crafting of the substance of those  rules in the first
place.  In practice,  however, it proved very hard  for the different commercial  interests  to
forge  agreements  in  what  was  often  a  zero-sum  game  of allocating  fishing  rights.  One
reason that the councils  have not been even slower than they are in reaching agreement  is
that  they are dominated by  the larger,  more economically  powerful  sectors of the fishing
industry.  Katrina Miriam Wyman,  From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering  the Evolution of Private  Prop-
erty,  80  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  117,  177-81  (2005).  The  particular  structure  created  by  the
Magnuson-Stevens Act  also invites a series of potential vetoes that in practice  make further
lawmaking  obstacles.  The  Secretary  of Commerce  retains formal  power of approval,  dis-
gruntled interests can seek judicial  review of approved  measures, and, most significantly to
date, special interest groups can  prompt individual senators  to block regional council rec-
ommendations by appropriations riders and other narrowly focused legislative enactments.
Id. at 181-85.  In the 1990s, a handful  of senators successfully imposed a four-year morato-
rium on  transferable  quota  programs  approved  by both  the  Secretary's  National  Marine
Fisheries Service  and regional  councils.  Id. at 184-88.
298  Wyman,  supra note  297, at  184-88;  see, e.g.,  16  U.S.C. §  1852.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
long-term  interests  will get bargained  away over  time by a steady bar-
rage  of short-term  pressures.
For this same reason, the kind of stakeholders  that would warrant
a heightened  role in the lawmaking process for climate change would
be those who give voice to long-term interests  of future generations 299
and not  representatives  of industry who  do  not otherwise  lack influ-
ence in lawmaking fora.300  These voices could, as described  above, be
given a formal office within the government. 301  Or they could instead
be  included  as  nongovernmental  employees  on  councils  more  like
those  contemplated  by  the  Magnuson-Stevens  Act,30 2  albeit  with  a
quite different policy  focus. 30 3
Finally, the role of such stakeholder councils in the  implementa-
tion of climate change law could also be substantially modified.  In the
Magnuson-Stevens  Act, their role  is  to initiate  the lawmaking process
by making recommendations  on certain policies.3 0 4  That is, of course,
not the only possible  role of a stakeholder  council.  A council might
be alternatively designed to ensure that statutory implementation  stays
on track, that is,  to  provide the oversight  necessary  to make sure it is
not derailed.  A  council  could also  be designed to ensure that if new
scientific  information  surfaces indicating that even tougher measures
are  required,  the  statute's  implementation  would  be  modified
accordingly.
Of course,  this is similar  to the kind of role  that an internal  (to
the government) or external committee of scientists might serve.  The
only  difference  is  the  precise  makeup  of the  council  or committee.
Given the nature  of some of the decisions to be made, however, there
is reason to believe that a science-driven group may lack the necessary
breadth of perspective  that other stakeholder leaders might supply,305
299  Jacobs,  supra note 94,  at 218-19  (commenting  on  how organized  interest groups
can "represent one of the few mechanisms forcing governments to take long-run outcomes
seriously").
300  See Noah  D. Hall,  Toward a New Horizontal  Federalism: Interstate Water Management in
the Great Lakes Region, 77  U. CoLo.  L.  REv. 405,  455 (2006)  (noting that representatives  of
industry have a  sphere of influence  in Congress).
301  See supra notes 276-80  and  accompanying  text.
302  16  U.S.C. §§  1801-84.
303  Heads of philanthropic foundations, nonprofit organizations,  university presidents,
or former governmental leaders could, by dint of their professional outlook and past expe-
rience, be  anticipated  to  have  the essential  broader,  longer-term  focus  and  perspective.
These,  of course,  are the  kind of seasoned veterans,  no longer preoccupied  by personal
ambition,  on  whose judgment  the  nation  frequently  relies  in  times  of crisis.  The  9/11
Commission and  the  Iraq  Study Group  are  two obvious  recent examples, although  their
ultimate work  product  was  limited  to  reports  that included  recommendations.  See 9/11
COMMISSION  REPORT,  at xv-xviii  (2004);  IRAo STUDY  GROUP  REPORT  6-8  (2006).
304  See 16  U.S.C.  § 1852(h).
305  See Sheila Jasanoff,  Transparency in Public  Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 68  LAw  &
CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  21,  43  (2006)  (noting that "both lay and professional viewpoints" might
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which  is  why a stakeholder council  is a further design  feature worthy
of consideration.
3.  Maintaining  and, if Necessary, Accelerating the Executive
Branch's Implementation of Climate Change Legislation
A  third  category  of design  features  anticipates  the  many  road-
blocks that will  occur during the process  of statutory implementation
within the Executive Branch, especially over the long term.  These fea-
tures deliberately build into the original statutory scheme mechanisms
that directly limit  the  effectiveness  of the  roadblock.  These  features
accomplish  that end sometimes  by creating lawmaking  shortcuts  that
circumvent  the  roadblock  and other times  simply  by eliminating  the
roadblock altogether.  The statutory objective is to prevent the Execu-
tive  Branch,  either intentionally  or negligently, from frustrating  con-
gressional  objectives  by delaying the  law's  implementation.
a.  For instance,  Congress  can  create  a  lawmaking  shortcut that
allows  lawmaking  to be made in the absence of Executive Branch action within
a specified time period. This can  occur if Congress would actually prefer
Executive  Branch  lawmaking but anticipates  that roadblocks may pre-
vent  the  agency  from  acting  in  a  sufficiently  expeditious  manner.
Both  to encourage  the agency to act, and  to ensure that law is  made
without undue delay, Congress can create  a lawmaking scheme that is
triggered  by  default  in  the  event  that the  agency  fails  to  act by  the
statutorily  specified  deadline.  Moreover,  an  especially  demanding
congressional  scheme  that  is  triggered  by  default  provides  powerful
economic  interests  that might normally  have  been  seeking  to  delay
agency  lawmaking  efforts  with  every  incentive  to  ensure  that  the
agency meets its  deadline.
Congress embraced such  a design feature  in  the Hazardous and
Solid  Waste  Act  Amendments  of  1984,306  which  amended  the  Re-
source  Conservation  and  Recovery  Act  (RCRA). 3°7  Under  section
3004  of RCRA,  Congress  required  the  EPA to  promulgate  pretreat-
ment standards  for a series of categories  of hazardous  wastes prior to
their disposal  on land.30 8  But Congress was  also  aware  that the EPA
had violated similar deadlines  in  environmental  statutes  in  the  past,
sometimes because  of agency intransigence  but just as  likely because
of regulated  industry lawsuits. 3 0 9  The  result was  years  of regulatory
be needed  to ensure  the breadth  of perspective  that would represent the interests of citi-
zens in  government decisions).
306  Pub. L. No.  98-616,  98  Stat.  3221.
307  42  U.S.C.  §§ 6901-6992  (2006).
308  Resource Conservation  and Recovery  Act  § 3004  (codified in scattered  sections of
42 U.S.C.).
309  See Richard J. Lazarus,  The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal  Environ-
mental Law, 54  LAw  & CoNTEMP.  PROBs.  311,  323-25  (1991).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
delay  and  an  undesirable  vacuum  of  environmental  protection
standards.
3 1 0
To  avoid  that  happening  again,  in  1984,  Congress  added  what
have been euphemistically  referred  to as "soft" and "hard" "hammers"
that  call  for  automatic  imposition  of extraordinarily  harsh  pretreat-
ment standards  in the  event that  the EPA misses  the  statutorily pre-
scribed  deadlines  for  promulgation  of  pretreatment  standards.31 1
The soft hammer, triggered by a miss of an initial deadline,  is  a very
tough standard set forth by the statute.  The hard hammer, triggered
by missing a final deadline,  is an absolute  prohibition of the disposal
of the waste  in question  on land.312
Congress'  establishment  of  a  default  standard  completely
changed the lawmaking  dynamic.  Not only did the EPA have an over-
riding incentive to meet the deadlines, but regulated industry also had
an  incentive  to  ensure the  agency's  compliance.  Industry could  not,
accordingly,  risk legal  challenges  or other  action  that might prompt
the agency to miss the deadlines.  Not surprisingly, the EPA met essen-
tially all of the applicable  deadlines. 3 1 3
Drafters of climate change legislation might well want to consider
including  comparable lawmaking  shortcuts that precommit to certain
climate  change  emissions  reduction  requirements  in the  absence  of
the  necessary  subsequent  action  taken  by  the  Executive  Branch
agency charged with  the law's implementation.  The potential  is con-
siderable  that  those  resisting imposition  of climate  change  emissions
reduction  requirements will  seek  to delay their implementation.  But
by anticipating  that potential and precommiting to certain  legal  stan-
dards  in  the event of delays  greater than  a specified  time period, cli-
mate  change legislation  can  effectively both reduce  the incentive for
such  obstructionist  efforts  and  ensure  that  a  lengthy  legal  vacuum
does  not result.
b.  Congress could also create a lawmaking shortcut by separating
the policy question  of what standard should  apply in a particular  fac-
tual circumstance  from the distinct factual inquiry of whether that cir-
310  See id. at 355-56.
311  42  U.S.C.  § 6904;  see Julie  M.  Kane,  The  Resource  Conservation and  Recovery  Act
(RCRA),  in BAsics  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAw  295,  316-17  (PLI  Real Estate  Law  &  Practice
Course  Handbook  Series  No.  373,  1991); James J.  Florio,  Congress as Reluctant Regulator:
Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALEJ. ON REc.  351,  351  (1986)  (noting that Congress
"established self-enforcing  standards to be implemented in  the absence of agency action");
Michael  P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A  New Framework to Link Environ-
mental Targets in Environmental Law, 85  Ky.  LJ. 803,  839  (1997).
312  42  U.S.C.  §  6924(d)-(e),  (g);  see Kane,  supra note  311,  at 316-17;  Arlene  Elgart
Mirsky  et al.,  The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46  Bus. LAW.  623,
678-79  (1991)  (discussing the restrictions on land disposal under the Resource  Conserva-
tion and  Recovery Act).
3135  LAZARUS,  supra note  2, at  194.
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cumstance  is actually present.  A statutorily  prescribed  standard  triggered  by
a subsequent agency finding allows  Congress  to  dictate what the regula-
tory requirements  or other  regulatory  measures  must  be  to  address
different degrees  of environmental  hazards but then leave  to another
entity the  responsibility  (and potential  political  heat)  of making  the
finding that triggers the standard.  Congress, in effect, precommits  to
a series of lawmaking standards  that someone else then triggers.
The nonattainment  provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of  1990  illustrate  this  possibility.314  Here  again,  Congress  sought  to
take  away  the  EPA's  discretion  to  decide  what  regulatory  measures
were  necessary  to  address  varying  degrees  of nonattainment  of na-
tional ambient air quality standards.  Accordingly,  Congress  set forth
in  exhaustive  detail  programs  that became  increasingly  prescriptive
for sources  of air pollution  as an  area of the  country went from just
barely out of compliance to extremely out of compliance. 315  The spe-
cific  statutory  designations  were  "Marginal,"  "Moderate,"  "Serious,"
"Severe,"  and  "Extreme"  nonattainment. 3 1 6  Congress  therefore  was
not itself  responsible  for  deciding  which  parts  of the  country  war-
ranted which designation, which allowed it to avoid political pressures
that otherwise might have made it more difficult to prescribe stringent
requirements.  Under  the Act,  the EPA was  responsible  for designat-
ing whether  an area  in nonattainment  was  marginal,  moderate,  seri-
ous, severe, or extreme.
317
Climate  change legislation  could also utilize this kind of precom-
mitment device.  Congress  could precommit  to increasingly  stringent
standards  depending, for instance,  on the degree  of greenhouse  gas
emissions reductions deemed  necessary.  This precommitment  would
allow  Congress  to  make  the  critical  policy  determination  regarding
which  kinds  and combinations  of regulatory measures  and economic
incentives would be best to achieve different levels of emissions reduc-
tion.  But at the same time, Congress could leave  to a more detached,
politically  insulated  body  the decision  regarding  how serious  the cli-
mate  change  problem  truly was,  how  much  temperature  could  rise,
and therefore how much reduction of emissions was in fact necessary.
Such  a scheme  has the added benefit  of simultaneously  allowing for
steadfastness  in the  overall policy  objective, for an established  legisla-
tive  decision  regarding  the distribution  of compliance  costs,  and for
flexibility for change in applicable  legal  requirements  in response  to
the latest scientific  information about climate  change.
314  See 42  U.S.C.  §§  7501-15.
315  See  id. §§  7511-7512.
316  Id.
317  Id.  §  7407(d).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In  addition,  although  Congress  delegated  the  determination  of
the relative seriousness of the problem to the EPA in the Clean Air Act
Amendments  of 1990, Congress might decide to delegate the relevant
fact-finding trigger  in climate  change  legislation to a more  politically
autonomous  body.  As  described  above, such  a decision-making  body
could take any of a variety of forms, including a committee of govern-
mental  or nongovernmental  scientists  or  a  specially crafted  commis-
sion or committee dominated by individuals appointed based on their
ability to maintain the necessary longer-term perspective. 318  Congress
could make such  a more  politically autonomous body responsible for
any of a host of findings-(1)  current greenhouse  gas emissions;  (2)
current atmospheric  concentrations  of greenhouse  gas  emissions;  (3)
current  forecasts  of  temperature  increases;  (4)  current  percentage
emissions  reductions  necessary  to  achieve  prescribed  goal  of atmos-
pheric concentrations  or temperature  change; or  (5)  the presence  or
absence  of comparable  greenhouse  gas reduction efforts  by other de-
veloped  or developing nations-that  could  in  turn trigger  a wave  of
statutory  requirements,  or even  relax them.
c.  A statutory  provision  for non-, limited-, or conditional  federal  pre-
emption of state  climate  change  law  could  be  another effective  tech-
nique  for  ensuring  that  federal  climate  change  legislation  stays  on
track  over the  long term.  The extent  to which federal  law preempts
state climate change law is  likely to be one of the most significant pol-
icy disputes in the  drafting of the  federal  legislation  during  the next
four years.319  Industry's desire for federal preemption of state climate
law  is one of the  reasons why  many in the industry affirmatively want
federal  legislation:  to  eliminate  the  potential  burden  of having  to
comply with multiple and varying state law requirements. 32 0  Both the
states  and  many environmentalists,  however,  believe  no  less  strongly
that state police power authority to address climate change should not
be preempted, especially  in light of what they perceive  as decades  of
foot-dragging  on the issue  by the national  government.3 2 1
318  See supra Part III.B.2.
319  See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism,  and the Constitution, 50 ARIz.  L. REv.
879, 900-10,  921-23  (2008)  (discussing preemption in the context of climate change law).
320  See William W. Buzbee,  Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction,  82  N.Y.U.  L. REv.  1547,  1569-70  (2007)  (discussing  "industry support for fed-
eral legislation  broadly preempting  state and local  regulation  of greenhouse  gases");  Eric
Lipton  & Gardiner  Harris,  In Turnaround, Industries Seek  US. Regulations: A  Broad Tactical
Shift; Trying to Fend Off Suits, Foreign Competitors and State Efforts, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept. 16, 2007,
at Al  ("While  businesses often oppose  requirements  by saying they are unnecessary as it is
already in their interest to produce safe products,  at other times they have  asked for them
to avoid  a patchwork  of state regulations, to ensure  that competitors must meet the same
standard  or to  provide legal  protection.").
321  See Lisa  Heinzerling,  Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ.  L. REv.
925, 925-29  (2008)  (suggesting that "state regulation of greenhouse gases...  would bene-
fit from equal  attention  to the role  of state  executive agencies  in asserting power  to regu-
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Congress  could  draft a  federal  preemption  provision  that  both
strikes  a  balance  between  these  competing  concerns  and  serves  as  a
very significant check on the federal government's  implementation of
climate change legislation.  For instance, not only could  any such pro-
vision narrowly define the scope of federal preemption to leave signifi-
cant room for state law that supplements and in  no manner conflicts
with federal requirements, but the federal statute could make the ulti-
mate scope of federal preemption expressly dependent on the success
of federal  efforts.  Congress could  use any number of benchmarks  to
measure success or lack of success.  The statutory  trigger required for
preemption,  limited  preemption,  or nonpreemption  could be  a for-
mal finding or action by a designated federal government official, 322 a
designated committee of individuals within or outside the government
with relevant  expertise, or even  the states themselves.  An  example of
this last option could be a federal preemption provision that would be
lifted  in  the  event  of  a  state  establishing  the  existence  of specified
circumstances.  Alternatively,  the  trigger could be  a statutorily  speci-
fied number of states  taking certain  action,  including  the  passage  of
their own requirements  addressing a particular  issue.  Congress could
consider just the fact  of action  by a large number of states to be  suffi-
cient  evidence  that  there  was  something  remiss  in  the  federal  ef-
fort.323  The  lifting  of federal  preemption,  or the  mere  threat  of a
lifting of federal preemption, might well be enough to provide federal
officials  and  industry  with  the  incentives  necessary  to  jumpstart  a
stalled  federal program.
d.  Finally, lawmaking  design  features could  even seek  to remove
altogether  anticipated  litigation  roadblocks  to  statutory  implementa-
tion  by  limiting  judicial review of some  kinds  of agency  decisions  and
promoting  judicial review of other kinds  of agency decisions.  Congress
could define  these limits  by focusing  on types  of decisions or types  of
plaintiffs  in  determining  which  kinds  of lawsuits  threaten  timely im-
late even in  the face of federal  resistance");  Felicity Barringer & William Yardley, Bush Splits
on Greenhouse Gases with Congress and State Officials, N.Y. TIMES,  Apr. 4,  2007, at Al.
322  For instance,  the  current Clean Air Act expressly  preempts state regulation  of mo-
tor vehicle emissions  but makes  an  exception for  California based upon  a finding by  the
state that the state standards will be "at least as protective of public health and welfare" as
applicable federal standards.  42 U.S.C.  §  7543(b).  Thus, EPA must grant California a pre-
emption waiver unless the EPA Administrator affirmatively finds that the State's determina-
tion  is  "arbitrary  and  capricious,"  not  justified  by  "compelling  and  extraordinary
circumstances,"  or " not consistent" with  the federal  standards.  Id. §  7543(b).  The Clean
Air Act also allows  other states to adopt the California standards if they are  in noncompli-
ance  with  relevant national air quality standards.  Id. §  7507.
323  See Howard A. Learner, Restraining  Federal  Preemption When There Is an "Emerging  Con-
sensus" of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 Nw. U. L. REv.  649,  651  (2008)  (arguing
that "an  emerging  state  consensus"  should  "influence  a  reviewing  court's  application  of
federal  preemption  principles").CORNELL LAW REVIEW
plementation and which kinds of lawsuits are, by contrast, necessary to
spur timely implementation.
Statutory  analogues  exist  in  other  contexts.  For  instance,  the
Anti-Injunction Act forbids  a federal  court from issuing an injunction
to stay state court proceedings in the absence  of express congressional
authority.324  The  Tax  Anti-Injunction  Act  limits  the  authority  of
courts  to enjoin the  imposition of federal  taxes.3 25  In  the Norris-La-
Guardia Act of 1932,326 Congress sought  to limit the authority of fed-
eral  courts  to  enjoin  labor  strikes.  More  recently,  in  the
Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,  Compensation,  and Liabil-
ity  Act,  Congress limited judicial  review of administrative  agency  or-
ders  and  remedies  to  clean  up  hazardous  waste  sites  in  order  to
prevent lawsuits from  slowing the cleanup process. 327  There may well
be  aspects  of the  implementation  of climate  change  legislation  that
are at least as urgent and for which  Congress may want to ensure  im-
plementation  is not delayed as  a result of lawsuits brought by certain
kinds  of aggrieved  plaintiffs.  Any  such limitation  on judicial  review,
however, should be considered a fairly drastic lawmaking restraint and
embraced  at all only in narrowly tailored and bounded circumstances.
As a practical  matter,  moreover, any broad  effort  to limit judicial  re-
view  is  likely  to  be  politically  unpalatable,  as  witnessed  during  the
Bush Administration's recent effort to include  such a provision in fed-
eral  bailout legislation.
328
Conversely,  Congress  may decide  that judicial  review  is precisely
what is necessary  to  eliminate statutory  roadblocks,  including agency
enforcement, that Congress anticipates  will arise within the Executive
Branch.  To  that end,  Congress  can authorize certain  kinds  of plain-
tiffs  with  certain  kinds  of claims  to bring  citizen suits seeking a  court
order that the agency comply with statutory mandates or judicial relief
against  a source  of greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  violation  of federal
requirements.  Of course, such citizen-suit provisions are already one
of modern  environmental  law's hallmark achievements.  Congress has
included  citizen suit provisions in almost every modern pollution con-
trol  statute  in  anticipation  of federal  agency recalcitrance  to  imple-
ment  or fully  enforce  pollution  control requirements  in  the  face  of
powerful  political and economic resistance.  The resulting citizen law-
324  28  U.S.C.  § 2283  (2006).
325  See 26 U.S.C.  § 7421 (a)  (2006).
326  Ch.  90,  § 1, 47 Star. 70  (codified at 29  U.S.C. §§  101-115  (2006)).
327  See 42  U.S.C.  § 9613(h).
328  See Andrew Ross  Sorkin, A  Bailout Above  the Law, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept.  23, 2008, at Cl
(quoting the proposed bill as saying, "Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority
of  this Act are  non-reviewable  and  committed  to  agency  discretion,  and  may not be  re-
viewed  by any court of law or any  administrative  agency.").
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suits  have filled what would  otherwise  have  been  a significant  gap  in
compliance.
329
Citizen-suit  provisions  will  likely  need  to  play  a  similarly  impor-
tant  function  in  climate  change  legislation  to  guard  against  antici-
pated  Executive  Branch  hesitance. 330  Because,  however,  of  the
tremendous  ecological  complexity  and  scientific  uncertainty  sur-
rounding the  sheer mechanics  of climate  change  harm,  plaintiffs  al-
leging  climate  change  harm  will  sometimes  be  hard  pressed  to
establish the kind of "imminent, concrete injury,"  "causal nexus," and
"redressability"  required  for Article  III  standing.  But  the  Supreme
Court has suggested that Congress can help plaintiffs  overcome those
standing hurdles by providing citizen-suit provisions specifically aimed
at authorizing  such  lawsuits.  In  particular,  the  Court has  ruled that
Congress can create injuries, define  causal chains, and provide for le-
gal redress  in a manner that allows for a lawsuit that would otherwise
fall short of Article III.
33 1 Congress could therefore include  in federal
climate  legislation  language  designed  to  allow  citizen  suits  by those
seeking to vindicate the interests of future generations in avoiding cat-
astrophic climate change.
CONCLUSION
Lawmaking moments do not happen very often, at least for envi-
ronmental law.  The last major environmental  lawmaking moment was
almost  twenty  years  ago,  when  Congress  passed  the  Clean  Air  Act
Amendments of 1990332  after a thirteen-year  legislative logjam arising
out of the  distributional  battles  surrounding  acid  rain.  Soon,  how-
ever,  the nation  is  likely to have  an exceedingly  important lawmaking
moment  with  the  passage  of long-overdue  domestic  climate  change
329  See LAZARUS,  supra note  2,  at 190-91.
330  The climate change  context no doubt creates  heightened concerns  about  citizen-
suit  plaintiff  Article  III  standing  in  light  of  the  often  enormous  spatial  and  temporal
dimensions  of climate  change  cause  and  effect.  The  Supreme  Court  has already  estab-
lished, however, that Article  III standing requirements do not preclude a citizen suit based
on  climate change.  See Massachusetts  v. EPA, 549  U.S.  497, 526  (2007).  Moreover,  there
are other innovative  ways for Congress to create,  in effect, a category of plaintiffs with  the
requisite interest for Article  III standing.  See Cass R. Sunstein,  What's Standing  After Lujan ?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,  " and Article III, 91  MICH.  L.  REV.  163,  229-35  (1992)  (suggesting
ways that Congress may "alter  [the]  outcomes" in "cases in which the Court has previously
rejected  standing").
331  549 U.S.  at 516  ("'Congress  has the  power to define  injuries and articulate chains
of causation  that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.'")  (quot-
ing Lujan v.  Defenders  of Wildlife,  504 U.S.  555, 580  (1992)  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring  in
part  and  concurring  in judgment));  Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,  128  S.Ct. 1142,
1153  (2009)  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring)  ("This case would present different considerations
if Congress  had  sught to provide  redress for a  concrete injury  'giv[ing]  rise  to  a case  or
controversy  where  none existed before.'")  (quoting same).
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legislation.  All  the  political  ingredients  seem  well  in  place  for  that
moment sometime  during  the next four years.
The ultimate success of that legislation, however,  depends on ad-
vance  recognition  by  Congress  that  lawmaking  moments  are  only
that-"moments."  Congress should,  accordingly,  include  within  cli-
mate change  legislation institutional design features, such  as precom-
mitment strategies,  that deliberately  make it hard for powerful, short-
term political  and economic pressures to undo that legislation.  Insti-
tutional  design  of lawmaking processes  always  matters,  but it matters
most if, as  is true for climate change  law, long-term implementation  is
essential  to  the law's  success.
In application to climate change legislation,  moreover, any per se
objection to precommitment strategies based on concerns about their
antidemocratic  effects  should  go  unheeded.  Such  precommitment
strategies  are  a  well-established  design  feature  of  our  lawmaking
processes, embraced  both  by the Framers of our Constitution  and by
prior Congresses.  They are embedded in the traditions of our form of
government  and  in no  manner represent  an anathema.  If, as  here,
the  impact  on  future  generations  of present generations'  failing  to
address climate change is so potentially devastating, the greater threat
to  future  generations  by far would be  the failure  of present genera-
tions to restrict  lawmaking  to safeguard  the future.
The challenge  to develop the right mix of precommitment strate-
gies is considerable  and the risk of any particular law being perversely
hijacked  can never be eliminated.  But through the kind of asymmet-
ric hurdles and shortcuts that I have described,  Congress could dimin-
ish the risk of short-term pressures undermining  whatever  legislation
it passes and increase the  chance  that the concerns  of future genera-
tions would be not be  forgotten during the  decades required for the
new  law's  ambitious  objective  to  be  achieved.  That  would  be  truly
momentous.
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333  As of the time  of this Article's going to press  (early  2009),  none  of the  major cli-
mate change bills pending before Congress included any significant or systematic efforts  to
enlist precommitment strategies  in the form of either hurdles or shortcuts  in anticipation
of problems  likely to plague the law's subsequent implementation.  During the  110th Con-
gress,  Senate  Bill  2191  contemplated  the  creation  of several  new  governmental  entities
(Carbon  Market  Efficiency  Board,  Climate  Change  Credit  Corporation,  and  Climate
Change Technology Board)  and sets for  terms of office  (up to fourteen  years),  qualifica-
tions  (including  representation  of both business  and consumer  interests),  and bipartisan-
ship, and  provides  for a  science  advisor  for  the  Carbon  Market  Efficiency  Board.  See S.
2191,  110th  Cong.  tits. II,  IV  (2007).  A draft discussion  bill promoted  by  Representative
John  Dingell  during  the  110th  Congress  similarly contemplated  creation  of new  govern-
mental  entities  (International  Climate  Change  Commission,  Office  of Carbon  Market
Oversight,  National  Climate  Change Adaptation  Council),  lengthy  terms  for some  posi-
tions  (up  to  twelve years),  and  bipartisanship  requirements.  See Dingell-Boucher  Discus-
sion  Draft,  supra note  246,  §§ 403,  602,  784.  The  most  sweeping,  recent  legislative
initiative,  is the  discussion  draft bill informally  circulated  by  Representatives  Henry Wax-
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man  and  Edward  Markey on  March  31,  2009,  entitled  the  "American  Clean  Energy  and
Security  Act  of  2009."  See  H.R.  __, llth  Cong.  (2009)  (discussion  draft),  http://
energycommerce.house.gov/PressI  1  1/20090331/acesa  discussiondraft.  pdf.  This  latest
discussion  draft does include some  promising  examples  of precommitment  strategies, in-
cluding  (1)  the creation of an advisory council  the members of which  have longer terms,
required scientific  expertise,  and assigned  lawmaking  authorities,  id. §§  731-33  (describ-
ing the "Offsets  Integrity Board");  (2)  inclusion on a corporation  board established  by the
Act of a representative  from nonprofit environmental organizations,  id. §  114(b)  (describ-
ing  membership on  a "Carbon Storage  Research  Corporation);  (3)  legislative  declaration
of  specific  numerical  standards  to  be  established  for  percentage  electricity  savings,  id.
§  611(d) (1) (B),  greenhouse-gas  reduction  in  emissions,  id. at 327-28,  and  total  annual
emission allowances,  id. §  721 (e);  (4)  provisions for persons  to petition the  EPA Adminis-
trator to undertake  certain regulatory action  coupled with  requirements  that the Adminis-
trator  must  act  within  specified  deadlines,  e.g.,  id.  § 711(c)(6);  and  (5)  potentially
expansive  citizen suit provisions plainly designed  to overcome Article III standing hurdles
suggested  by  recent Supreme  Court precedent,  by defining  "harm"  to  include  "risk" of
injury, "incremental  exacerbation"  of  risk of injury,  "widely shared"  risk,  harm  causd  by
agency  action  that "slows  the  pace  of implementation  of this Act,"  and the  possibility  of
compensation  for the  citizen  plaintiff in  the form of "beneficial  mitigation  projects."  Id.
§§ 336,  862.  These  are  all  promising  isolated  initiatives,  but  all  of these  bills currently
under discussion  still  fall far short of anticipating and addressing  the need for the kind of
systematic  precommitment  strategies,  discussed  in  this Article,  to  avoid  the  law's  derail-
ment and  to increase  the  odds of its achieving its  long-term goals.CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1153 1234